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PREFACE
In his Cry, the Beloved Country Alan Paton commented that 
"the world has never let South Africa alone." The present study is 
one more of a great many works which have been written in recent years 
on topics related to South Africa; these works give continuing proof 
to the truth of Paton's statement. In the course of preparing this 
dissertation I had the very good fortune to receive an appointment 
to lecture in American history at the University of Natal in Durban, 
South Africa, for six months. For this I am deeply indebted to 
K. H. C. McIntyre, the Chairman of the Department of History and 
Political Science at the University of Natal. Jeffrey Horton, Bill 
Guest, Andrew Duminy, Michael Spencer, and Tony Lumbey of the same 
Department assisted me in gaining a better understanding of South 
African history and were most hospitable to an American family very 
far from home, I am likewise indebted to many other South Africans 
for what they revealed to me about their society. South Africa is 
still a relatively small country, and it was possible for me to meet 
Prime Minister B. J. Vorster and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and to see 
and hear other prominent political figures. Many South Africans were
more than willing to tell me as much as they could about their country.'1
Newsmen discussed their activities and gave me access to the clippings 
files of their newspaper. A Xhosa tribesman who lived in Idutywa 
described landholding and tribal authority to me in the Transkei. A
ii
student took me to visit the Cato Manor magistrate's court so that I 
could learn more ahout the administration of justice in South Africa.
A retired Afrikaner psychologist gave me a personal tour of the 
Voortrekker Monument. These and many other acts of kindness contri­
buted directly and indirectly to this study and made me understand why 
Paton called it the beloved country.
I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of John 
Preston Moore with whom I began this study, David H. Culbert who 
assumed the responsibility for advising me after the retirement of 
Professor Moore, and John Loos, Chairman of the History Department 
of Louisiana State University. Appreciation must be expressed, too, 
for the cooperation given me by officials at various pro- and anti- 
South Africa organizations including the South Africa Foundation, the 
South African Information Service, the American-African Affairs 
Association, the American Committee on Africa, the Southern Africa 
Committee, and the Council for Christian Social Action of the United 
Church of Christ, Some of these officials were understandably re­
luctant to reveal their activities to an inquisitive researcher of 
unknown political views, but they did provide valuable information 
which I have acknowledged in greater detail in my footnotes. I have 
also acknowledged in the footnotes the assistance of a number of 
newspapers which sent me, in response to my request, copies of the 
editorials they printed at the time of the Sharpeville crisis in South 
Africa in i960.
The pursuit of my topic took me to several libraries where 
librarians were helpful in finding materials relating to South Africa.
iii
These included the libraries at Louisiana State University, Luke 
University, the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), North 
Carolina Central University, and the University of Natal, the 
Philadelphia Free Library, and the New York City Public Library. 
Finally, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my wife, Kay, for 
her patience, assistance, and typing, and to my son, Patrick, who 
showed consideration and understanding to a busy father.
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ABSTRACT
Since the Nationalist Party gained political control in South 
Africa in 19^8, the South African government has been criticized for 
its policy of apartheid (or separate development) by nearly every 
country in the world. Many countries have endorsed the use of 
economic sanctions or other measures against South Africa. Except for 
implementing an arms embargo, the United States has opposed the use 
of collective measures to bring about change in South Africa. It is 
the purpose of this study to develop the reasons why some Americans 
in the 1960s came to believe that the United States should take strong 
action against South Africa, to discuss the views of other Americans 
who opposed such actions, and to examine various factors affecting 
American views on South Africa. Source material for this study in­
cluded news magazines, journals of opinion and reportage, newspapers, 
books, Congressional hearings, brochures and pamphlets of organizations 
both hostile and favorable to South Africa, publications of the South 
African government, and personal interviews.
After an introduction which suggests an analytical approach 
to the study of views on, or images of, other countries, this disser­
tation is divided into two parts. Part I begins by describing Ameri­
can criticism of apartheid and the Nationalist government primarily in 
the period from 19^8 to i960. Although the American press was very 
unfavorable to South Africa in this period, few American citizens or
vil
publications advocated changes in American policy on South Africa 
prior to i960. The remainder of Part I discusses the developments 
that led to a movement in the United States for measures against 
South Africa. Problems in American race relations in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s led some Americans to believe that the United States 
had to prove its opposition to racism and segregation by denouncing 
apartheid or by taking stronger action against South' Africa. The 
coming to Independence of numerous African countries around i960 
increased this belief. The killing of a number of Africans at 
Sharpeville, South Africa, in i960 intensified American fear of a 
racial war in southern Africa and precipitated a movement for strong 
measures against South Africa. This movement went through several 
phases that began with calls for governmental policy changes and 
turned finally to putting pressure on American corporations to 
"disengage" from South Africa.
Part II of this dissertation describes the efforts of a num­
ber of groups to improve South Africa’s image in the United States 
and focuses upon the activities of the South African government, the 
South Africa Foundation, and the United States-South Africa Leader 
Exchange Program. It then discusses the views of Americans more 
favorable to, or less critical of, South Africa than those discussed 
in Part I, These Americans were to be found particularly among three 
groups: anti-Communist conservatives, white Southerners, and business­
men. The conclusion suggests that the "climate of opinion" in the 
United States became more favorable to South Africa in the late 1960s 
because of the Viet Nam War, a conservative reaction to American race
viii
problems, disillusionment over the record of the first decade of 
African independence, and the work of the opinion influencing groups.
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate an interrelationship 
between American perceptions of South Africa and views on policy 
towards South Africa. Evidence is not yet available to show that the 
factors which played a role in shaping the views of members of the 
public on South Africa were the same factors that influenced the views 
of policy makers. The study does, however, provide a perspective on 
the South African policy of the United States through analysis of 
many different American views on South Africa, and it describes the 
efforts of various groups to influence those views.
INTRODUCTION
South Africa is a land of controversy. Virtually every gov­
ernment on earth has strongly condemned its government and racial 
policies. A majority of the countries of the United Nations have en­
dorsed the use of strong collective measures against South Africa to 
"bring an end to those policies. The opposition of the United States 
and several countries of Western Europe for more than a decade has 
prevented the implementation of measures which could lead to massive 
social change in South Africa. Because of its own racial difficulties, 
the question of policy on South Africa has had a special significance 
for the United States. The question of South Africa has created an 
additional international dimension to a domestic problem. Although 
relatively few Americans have concerned themselves actively with South 
Africa, the views that have been expressed by Americans on South Africa
are of interest for what they reveal about certain aspects of American
1society and about an element of the policy-making process. It is the 
purpose of this study to develop the reasons why some Americans in the
^American views on South Africa have not appeared very impor­
tant to many Americans but they have been quite important to South 
Africans. As an Afrikaans paper, Die Burger, once commented: "In
[South Africa's] information battle the American front is the chief 
line in the West." Quoted in Eschel Rhoodie, The Paper Curtain 
(Johannesburg, 1969), 1^* This spirited attack on American (and 
other) criticism of South Africa is of considerable interest because 
Rhoodie has since become Secretary of Information for South Africa 
and thus has the responsibility for improving foreign opinion of 
South Africa,
1
1960s came to believe the United States should take strong actions 
against South Africa, to discuss the views of other Americans who 
opposed such actions, and to examine various factors affecting Ameri­
can perceptions of South Africa.
For the reader whose familiarity with South Africa is limited,
it will perhaps he helpful to begin with a brief description of the
features of South Africa which are pertinent to the present study and 
to clarify some of the terminology which will be employed. A wealth 
of material is available in English on South Africa to the reader who
Owishes to explore its recent or more distant history in greater detail. 
Much of it is, however, strongly polemical in character.
As its name suggests, South Africa is located at the southern
tip of the African continent, a fact which has given it strategic 
significance from the days when the Dutch used it as a way station to 
the East Indies to the present. Without taking into consideration 
South West Africa (renamed Namibia by the United Nations), South Africa 
is about the same size as the combined area of Texas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. The country has long had a repu­
tation for wealth which has been based primarily on its extensive 
mineral resources, notably diamonds, gold, platinum and other precious 
metals. The South African economy also has a very modern manufacturing
oFor an excellent introduction to the historiography of South 
Africa, see Leonard M. Thompson, "South Africa," in Robin Winks, ed, ,
The Historiography of the British Empire and Commonwealth (Durham, North 
Carolina, 19o6i, 212-36, See also Monica Wilson and Leonard M.
Thompson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa (2 vols.j New York 
and Oxford, 1969-71)', I, ^7-72, II," 529-5^; and "Comprehensive Bibli­
ography on South Africa Since i960," In Heribert Adam, ed., South 
Africa; Sociological Perspectives (New York, 1971), 301-332.
3
3sector. The range of manufacturing activity has increased considera­
bly since the mid-1930s; diversification has been stimulated by economic 
conditions and by government encouragement to the point that the coun­
try is virtually capable of self-sufficiency.
South Africa's population of over tventy-one million people is 
one of the most racially and culturally diverse of any country,** The 
different groups have been classified in a variety of ways and thus 
many terms are used in this study in reference to different elements 
of the population. These terms should be explained in order to avoid 
confusion.
Slightly less than one-fifth of the total population is of 
European extraction. Generally referred to as Europeans in South 
Africa, they are often spoken of simply as the whites in American pub­
lications. They are subdivided by language, history, and self-identi­
fication into two groups, Afrikaners and English-speaking South 
Africans.
The Afrikaners predominate numerically over the English-
speaking and politically over all other racial groups. Approximately
65 per cent of the whites are Afrikaners which means they speak
3]D. Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy (2nd ed. ; Cape
Town, 1967), 118-37. On the interaction of politics and economic 
development in South Africa, see Ralph Horwitz, The Political Economy 
of South Africa (.London, 19^7), 12, 380, A fact often overlooked by 
foreign observers is that conditions for agriculture and livestock are 
generally quite poor throughout South Africa. David L. Niddrie, South 
Africa; Mation or Nations? (Princeton, 1968), 20.
On the population groups of South Africa, see Leo Marquard,
The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (Uth ed.; London, 1969)*
28-81. Wrquaxd’V  bodk is probably the best single volume available 
on South Africa.
primarily the Afrikaans language and have a consciousness of being 
Afrikaners.^ The Afrikaans language is derived from the Dutch of the 
early white settlers of South Africa, once known as the Boers tfarmers). 
A group consciousness has arisen from generations of struggle with the 
South African frontier, African tribes, British imperialism, and, more 
recently, hostile world opinion, Afrikaners overwhelmingly form the 
constituency of the Nationalist Party, the party which has had control 
of the South African Parliament since 19^8.
The English-speaking South Africans came to South Africa some*- 
what later than the Afrikaners, but they have played a greater role in 
the development of the South African economy. They have tended to be 
more "liberal" on questions of race policies than the Afrikaners and 
have primarily belonged to the United Party or the smaller Progressive 
Party, However, their sense of group identification has not been so 
strong as Afrikaner nationalism. Both groups of whites enjoy a stan­
dard of living equal to that of most Americans. Conflict between them 
has persisted from the bloody Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 to the 
present.
The largest racial group in South Africa consists of more than
g
fifteen million Africans. Officially called the Bantu, they will
^Several recent works of particular note on the Afrikaners are 
Sheila Patterson, The Last Trek; A Study of the Boer People and the 
Afrikaner Nation (London, 1957); William Henry Vatcher, White Laager;
The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism (New York, 1965); and T. Dunbar 
Moodie, "Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion" (unpub­
lished Ph,D, dissertation, Harvard University, 197l).
^African political development is treated in Edward Feit,
South Afrlcat The Dynamics of the African National Congress (London, 
1962), and Peter Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South 
Africa (London, 1970).
usually “be referred to here as Africans or as "blacks, the latter 
especially when it would be clumsy to refer to the African South 
Africans. Use of the term Africans should not obscure the fact that 
the group is actually made up of a number of diverse subgroups. There 
are four distinct African language groups and within these principal 
language stocks there are various language clusters and tribal 
groupings. Some of the African nations have fought each other just 
as bitterly as Afrikaners have contended with the English-speaking, 
and today they are united only in their domination by the whites. The 
Africans' claim to being the indigenous inhabitants of South Africa 
is not much better than the Afrikaners'; both groups were preceded by
•7the Khoikhoi (Hottentots) and the San (Bushmen). Many Africans 
still engage in the subsistence agriculture of their ancestors while 
others are partially or fully integrated into the industrial economy 
of South Africa.
The Coloureds are another distinct racial group in South 
Africa. A catch-all classification that includes all who are known 
to be of "mixed" race, it is an old saw that the Coloureds came into 
existence nine months after the landing of the first whites in South
QAfrica. More than two million South Africans are so classified, and
7"The date of the African migration across the Limpopo River 
into present South Africa remains obscure and controversial. Recent 
scholarship suggests that it was about 1300 A.D. John Cope, South 
Africa (2nd ed.; New York, 1967), 67; Wilson and Thompson, Oxford 
History, 38-39. Successive waves of African migration drove earlier 
Africans from their areas of settlement,
Q
On the history of the Coloureds, see J. 3. Marais, The Cape 
Coloured People.1652-1937 (London, 1939).
most are culturally similar to the whites, though having lower status 
and standard of living.
Finally, there are ahcrut 700,000 South Africans termed Asiatics 
or Indians. Most are of Indian origin, brought to South Africa by the 
British to perform labor tasks for which African labor was not avail­
able. Despite their relatively limited numbers, Asiatics have played 
a prominent role in non-white (or non-European) opposition to white 
domination. Not only have they been more advanced educationally and 
economically than the Africans, they have had the support of Indian 
spokesmen at the United Nations since 19^5.
Although this dissertation will discuss many American opinions 
on South Africa's peoples and policies, it does not purport to be a 
study of American "public opinion" of South Africa within the meaning 
that this term has acquired. While historians have studied American 
opinions on other societies for generations, the works of many of 
these historians have been severely criticized for mistaking editorial 
opinion for public opinion and for attributing to such opinions a
9policy influencing or determining role which could not be demonstrated. 
The development of scientific techniques of public opinion polling has
^Melvin Small, "Historians Look at Public Opinion," in Melvin 
Small, ed., Public Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Studies
(Detroit, 1970), 13; Paul F. Lazarfeld, The Historian and the Pollster," 
and Joseph R. Strayer, "The Historian's Concept of Public Opinion," in 
Mirra Komarovsky, ed,, Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, 
Illinois, 1957), 2U2-62, 263-68; Ernest R. May/ "An American Tradition 
in Foreign Policy: The Role of Public Opinion," in William H. Nelson,
ed., Theory and Practice in American Politics (Chicago, 196k), 101-122; 
Floyd H. Allport, "Toward a Science of Public Opinion," Public Opinion 
Quarterly, I (January, 1937), 7-23.
been thus far of relatively limited usefulness to historians. First, 
accurate polling data concerning public opinion on foreign policy 
issues is available only for a limited number of topics. After in­
vestigation and various inquiries to public opinion research centers, 
the author was unable to locate any American opinion polls that may 
have been conducted directly pertaining to South Africa. Secondly, 
most social scientists agree that only a small percentage of Americans 
keep informed on foreign affairs, and the foreign policy public is 
unlikely to be representative of the general populace.^ The ex­
pressions discussed in this study, although diverse, are not necessarily 
representative of the sentiments of all Americans on matters pertaining 
to race and foreign policy. Finally, foreign policy decisions remain 
primarily in the control of small groups of individuals in the execu­
tive branch of the government. Even with access to their papers, and 
assuming that the papers would accurately reflect the decision-making 
process, it seems most doubtful that anyone can make a direct correla­
tion between public opinion on a country and policy decisions on the 
country.'*'̂  The author cannot claim to make any such correlation aside 
from subjective judgment.
James N. Eosenau, The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy 
(Princeton, 1963), 2-3; Alfred 0. Hero, Americans in World Affairs 
(Boston, 1959), 6; Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy 
(Princeton, 1963), 254; V. 0. Key. Public Opinion and American Democracy 
(New York, 1961), 353; Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and 
Foreign Policy (New York, i960), 80-84.
11Bernard Cohen, after studying the rimountainous" literature 
on public opinion and foreign policy, has commented: "We are left . . .
with the unsatisfactory conclusion that public opinion is important 
in the policy making process, though we cannot say with confidence how, 
why, or when." Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy 
(Boston, 1973}, 7.
Despite these problems it is believed that study of views of 
members of the American public on foreign countries and foreign policy 
can be of use to the historian, and can contribute to a better under­
standing of American society and the development of foreign policy. 
Other historians who have reached the same conclusion have been groping 
for a rationale and method for studying this aspect of American his­
tory. Their efforts have pointed to a "diplomatic" history which 
makes use of the techniques of intellectual history. Peter G. Filene, 
in his Americans and the Soviet Experiment. 1917-1933. employed many
traditional sources of American opinions in developing the early
12history of American attitudes towards the Soviet Union. He stated
that the study of these attitudes would "indirectly describe Americans’
conceptions of democracy, of capitalism, and of themselves as a society
and nation.Utilizing sources of a similar nature, Ernest H. May
studied American views on colonialism to gain insight into American
foreign policy decisions in the late l890s.'*'̂  Akira Iriye likewise
focused on what he termed "mutual perceptions" between Americans and
East Asians to show "how policy makers and thinking people in America,
China, and Japan have viewed each other, the world and their common
problems.— how, in short, they have tried to define their respective 
15realities." These are only a few of a number of recent studies which
1 OPeter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917- 
J.933 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 19^7), 1-3.
13Ibid., 3.
litErnest B, May, American Mperlalismt A Speculative Essay 
CUew York, 1968), especially 23-39.
1'’Akira Iriye, Across the Wide Pacific t An Inner History of 
' American-East Asian Belations (Hew York, 1967), xvi.
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have made use of public expressions on foreign countries for the per­
spective they can give on a society and its foreign policies."*"̂
The present study borrows from the works of Filene, May, and 
other historians, but the author has also found helpful the approaches
to the study of "images" offered by several social scientists, in
17particular William A. Scott, H. C. Kelman, and Kenneth Boulding.
They have provided a framework for analysis of American expressions 
on South Africa. As used here, the term "image" includes within its 
meaning the whole range of concepts about and feelings towards another 
country which might be designated attitudes, opinions, beliefs, senti­
ments, or views. The term "views" is more often used in this study 
because it suggests expressions by individuals which are less complete 
than a fully structured image, or, to put it another way, a view 
suggests an articulation of a part of an image of a country held by 
a person. As explained by Scott, an image can be described as
For examples, see Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa: 
British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850 (Madison, Wisconsin, 196k);
Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Tmages of China
and India (Hew York, 1958); William Welch, American Images of Soviet 
Foreign Policy; An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic 
Community (New Haven, Connecticut and London, 1970); Felix H. Okoye,
The American Image of Africa; Myth and Reality (Buffalo, New York,
1971), A. T. Steele, The American People and China (New York, 1966).
17Kenneth Boulding, The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society
(Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1956), and, by the same author, "National Images 
and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, III (1959), 
120-31; Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the 
Study of International Relations," and William A. Scott, "Psychological 
and Social Correlates of International Images," both in Herbert C, 
Kelman, ed., International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Approach
(New York, 19^51, 3-39, 71-103. See also, Daniel Katz, "The 
Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," Public Opinion 
Quarterly. XXIV (Summer, i960), 1&3-76.
consisting of three analytically distinct aspects:
First and primary is the set of cognitive attributes by which 
the person understands the object in an intellectual way.
This is his view of its "inherent" characteristics, which he 
regards as independent of his own response to them. Second, 
the image may contain an affective component, representing a 
liking or disliking for the focal object. This is usually 
associated with perceived attributes that the person either 
approves or disapproves. Finally, the image may carry an 
action component, consisting of a set of responses to the 
object that the person deems appropriate in the light of its 
perceived attributes.1®
In analyzing the views or images of South Africa held by 
Americans, the author has attempted to focus on the elements dis­
cussed by Scott. With regard to the cognitive, the effort has been 
to determine the sources of information that contributed to American 
knowledge of South Africa, the content of those sources, and American 
perceptions of the characteristics of South Africa’s political and 
racial order based on those sources. As to the affective element, the 
author has attempted to show how Americans have felt about South 
Africa and what factors have influenced their feelings. Finally, 
with reference to the action component, the author has described the 
various policies that Americans have advocated on the basis of their 
perceptions of South Africa and their views on related issues of 
domestic and foreign problems.
Reflecting the above approach, the first part of this study 
describes critical American information on, and views of, South 
African politics and race policies in the period freon the Nationalist 
victory in 19^8 to the early 1960s; it then traces the growth of a 
movement for sanctions against South Africa and the developments in
-| QScott, "Psychological, and Social Correlates of International 
Images," 72 (emphasis in original).
the United States and abroad that contributed to the growth of such 
a movement. The second portion of the study discusses the conserva­
tive response to the criticisms of South Africa and the policy mea­
sures advocated by the critics. The conclusion notes the changed 
climate of opinion on South Africa that appeared at the end of the 
1960s and suggests reasons for the change.
This study has sought to draw upon as broad and diverse a 
range of sources as possible. With the tremendous amount of informa­
tion published today on world affairs, it has not been possible to 
examine everything available that might be relevant to the subject. 
This is particularly true of newspapers which remain the basic source 
of news for most Americans. In the late 19^0s and early 1950s when 
the Implementation of South Africa's racial policies was beginning to
make news, there were over seventeen hundred morning and evening
19newspapers in the United States. It would be an impossible task 
to examine even a small number of these papers for material on South 
Africa over the quarter century covered by this study. However, it 
was possible to gain some insight into what went into American news­
papers by examining the report of a South African government commis­
sion which investigated press activities in South Africa.
Soon after the Nationalists were elected in South Africa in 
19I+8, the new government undertook a lengthy study of press operations. 
A Commission of Inquiry into the Press was appointed with Jacobus W. 
van Zijl as its chairman. The Commission's Keport, published in 
1961*, provides a great amount of data on the news flowing to the
"^International Press Institute, The Flow of the News (Zurich, 
Switzerlandi 1953), 15•
American press from South Africa in the periods from May 1950 to July 
1955 s and from February to April i960. It also reprints many of 
the cables sent by newsmen.
Throughout the period covered by this dissertation, most 
American newspapers, and some American periodicals, received nearly 
all of their foreign news from two American news agencies, the 
Associated Press and the United Press (United Press International 
after its merger with International News Service in 1958). As the 
van Zijl Report reveals, most of the news on South Africa transmitted 
by these services was supplied by stringers and sub-stringers serving 
on the English-language press in South Africa, that is, by journalists
employed full-time by the English-language newspapers and serving the
22American agencies only on a secondary basis. Reflecting the long­
standing divisions between Afrikaners and English-speaking South 
Africans, the English-language papers have moderately to sharply 
opposed the Nationalist government and its policies. Thus most of 
the news stories sent to the United States on political and racial 
matters in South Africa were written by, or based on the reporting of, 
newsmen whose language group and newspapers were in opposition to the
20Jacobus W. van Zijl, Commission chairman, Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Press (Pretoria, I96U), hereafter van 
Zijl Report. The author made use of a copy of this Report in the 
University of Natal Library, Durban, South Africa.
21International Press Institute, The Flow of the News, 16.
nnThe Associated Press and the United Press received 87 per 
cent and 8l per cent respectively of their news cabled in the 1951 to 
1955 period from stringers and sub-stringers serving on the English- 
language press. Van Zijl Report, 1029, 105U. Most of the remaining 
amount was cabled by correspondents sent to South Africa to cover 
particular stories.
government. Although several American newspapers and the Luce publi­
cations (Time, Life) sent their own correspondents to South Africa in 
the periods covered by the van Zijl Report, these correspondents
apparently worked closely with the English language press while in
23South Africa and had few contacts with the Afrikaans press.
The result of this situation was that the great bulk of daily 
news flowing from South Africa to the United States was critical of 
the government and its policies. A correspondent of the Chicago 
Tribune, Arthur Veysey, commented on this in a cable to his paper in 
1952:
The flare-up [racial friction] is being magnified abroad 
largely through the activity of Britons [English-speaking 
South Africans] who want to get the republic-speaking 
Nationalists out of power. News reports going out from South 
Africa are compiled by Britons or by opposition party adher­
ents. The Nationalist politicians hinder their own cause by 
foolish barriers which they erect between themselves and 
foreign visitors and thus tend to throw visitors into the 
sole hands of their political opponent s.^
As will be seen later, some newspapers in the United States receiving 
and printing critical articles on South Africa could still take an 
editorial position favorable to South Africa; and readers, too, could 
react favorably to South Africa despite critical news stories. Never­
theless, it does help-to understand American criticism of South 
Africa to know that much of the news had something of a slant to it 
from the beginning. For American views expressed in newspapers,
^Ibid., 1338. The newspapers which sent correspondents to 
South Africa for brief periods between 1951 and 1955 were the Chicago 
Tribune, the Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times, and the 
New York Herald Tribune.
“̂ Cable of Arthur Veysey from Cape Town, May 16, 1952, in 
van Zijl Report, Annexure XX, 15^3-HU.
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the author has also consulted the New York Times over most of the 
period covered by this study and other newspapers for more limited
periods, in particular for editorial opinion at the time of the
25Sharpeville crisis in South Africa in 19^0.
Other sources consulted by the author have included periodi­
cals , a variety of books, publications of the United States and South 
African governments, the clippings files of a South African news­
paper, the materials distributed by a number of groups attempting to 
influence American opinion, special business reports, personal inter­
views, and several unpublished papers. Particular attention has been 
paid to periodicals because, unlike newspapers, they generally have 
had a national audience, and they are quite useful for noting changes 
in viewpoint over a period of time. The author doubts that there 
is any truly scientific approach to the study of ideas through the 
use of such materials; the reader has to rely on the informed judg­
ment and the honesty of the historian.
Race has been an agonizing domestic problem; it is difficult 
to assess the role it has played in international affairs. It is 
hoped that this study will shed same light on a complex and sensitive 
issue in American foreign policy and can contribute to a better
25On the use of newspapers, see William H. Taft, Newspapers 
as TooIb for Historians (Columbia, Missouri, 1970); see also on the 
New York Times, Gay Talese, The Kingdom and the Power (New York,
1970).
^The author has made use of periodical indexes and citations 
in other materials to locate articles touching upon South Africa or 
related topics. Of use in judging some of the periodicals utilized 
have been John H. Schacht, The Journals of Opinion and Reportage (New 
York, 1966) and W. A. Swanberg. Luce and His Empire (New York, 1972).
understanding of how peoples of different countries interact. 
Americans' views of South Africa have been closely related to their 
views of their own society, and for many Americans the problem of 
South Africa has simply been an extension of a domestic problem.
If same Americans have not understood the problem of South Africa, 
it has been because they have not understood fully their own society.
CHAPTER I
SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS AND POLICIES:
SYMBOL OF OPPRESSION
When the voters went to the polls throughout South Africa on 
May 26, 19^8, it had been expected that Prime Minister Jan Christiaan 
Smuts and his party would have no problem in retaining control of 
Parliament. Much to the dismay of Smuts’s United Party, however, the 
Nationalist Party succeeded in taking twenty-five seats from them.
This gave the Nationalists five more votes than could be mustered by 
the United Party. The Nationalists thus were able to gain effective 
control of the House of Assembly and to make their leader, Daniel F. 
Malan, Prime Minister. A watershed in recent South African history was 
marked by this election.^- The Nationalist Party, composed predominant­
ly of Afrikaners, has had control of the government from that date to 
the present. Any consideration of American policy in South Africa 
since 19^8 has had to depend upon some assessment of the South African 
political system. The arguments advanced in the 1960s by Americans for 
a strong policy against South Africa were based in part on views estab­
lished in the 19U0s and 1950s on the Nationalist Party (as personified 
by its leaders), on the possibility of change through the white polit­
ical structure, and on the racial policies implemented in South Africa
■^Gwendolen M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality: South Africa
Since 19U8 (New York, 1958), 37.
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in those years. By the 1960s, South Africa’s political system was, as 
Time magazine declared, the world's "Symbol of Oppression." By the 
1960s the Afrikaans word apartheid had become in all languages, as an 
American official told the United Nations, "a stigma, symbolic of the 
whole range of the discriminatory racial legislation and practices of 
the Union of South Africa."
The reaction of the American press to the Nationalist victory 
of 19^8 was immediate hostility.^ The reason for this was not so much 
that the Nationalists were about to implement a purportedly new racial 
policy with the ugly-sounding name of apartheid (pronounced apart- 
hate), although this was a factor. Rather, the reasons go back to 
Afrikaner opposition to South African participation in World War II.
The Nationalists in their victory were burdened by a "pro-Nazi" reputa­
tion they had acquired during the war against Germany, a burden they 
have carried to the present. To understand this, and why it has been 
something of a distortion, it is necessary to go back briefly to World 
War II.
When Britain decided in September 1939 to go to war with Ger­
many after the German invasion of Poland, the question arose whether
^"South Africa: The Great White Laager," Time, August 26,
1966, p. 18.
^Francis T. Plimpton, in Department of State Bulletin, April 
2U, 1961, p. 600.
A South African newspaper surveyed the reactions of the Ameri­
can press to the election. It quoted at length from various news­
papers and periodicals and stated: "The result of the Union’s general
election, and particularly the defeat of General Smuts, has evoked un­
usually widespread press comment in the United States. This comment 
varies from excited alarm at the alleged possibility of civil war to 
the view that the result was symptomatic of the world-wide clash of 
color." Cape Town Cape Times, June 7, 19^8, p. 1.
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Britain's action committed other members of the Empire and Common­
wealth to war as well. The resolution of the question produced a 
crisis in South Africa where an important segment of the population 
deeply resented the Commonwealth connection. Prime Minister J. B. M. 
Hertzog strongly favored neutrality and announced this as the govern­
ment's policy. Deputy Prime Minister Jan Smuts refused to accept 
Hertzog's decision and carried six other Cabinet ministers with him. 
When Hertzog and Smuts put their rival policies before Parliament, 
that body sided with Smuts by a vote of eighty to sixty-seven. Smuts 
became Prime Minister and declared war against Germany.*’
There were Afrikaners who favored South African participation 
in the war, but others felt the war was Britain's war and was of little 
concern to South Africa. These others believed that participation in 
the war signified continuing subservience to a foreign power whose 
interests did not coincide with the interests of most Afrikaners. They 
remembered that Germany had shown them sympathy when British imperial­
ism had begun its attacks on the Afrikaners in 1895- Like the Germans, 
the Afrikaners had known defeat at the hands of the British. Some 
Afrikaners thought that a German victory would allow South Africa to 
become a republic entirely independent of Great Britain.^ It is not 
surprising then that Prime Minister Smuts found himself faced with 
strong opposition to the war.
After the war began, it was Daniel F. Malan who led the
^Eric A. Walker, History of Southern Africa (3rd ed.; London, 
1957), 693,
^See D. W. Kruger, The Age of the Generals; A Short Political 
History of the Dnion of South'Africa, 1910-19^8 CJohannesburg, 1961), 
197, 203-20h.
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parliamentary opponents of the war, Outside Parliament an organiza­
tion called the Ossewahrandwag (the OB) took the lead in representing 
Afrikaner hostility to the war. The OB had begun as a cultural group
in 1938, but soon it became clear that its leaders had been influenced
Tby the ideas of German National-Socialism. For a brief period the 
OB and Malan's party cooperated in opposing the war. However, the 
agreement fell apart in August 19^1 because the Nationalists remained 
committed to a form of parliamentary democracy while the OB reflected 
a totalitarian spirit. Malan broke the back of the OB by banning
Oparticipation in OB activities for all Nationalist Party members.
Despite Malan's rejection of the ideology and tactics of the
firebrands of the OB, the legend grew up in World War II that the
Nationalists, and the Afrikaners generally, were working for a Nazi
victory. During the war American publications took a very favorable
view of Prime Minister Smuts, depicting him as struggling desperately
against a Nazi movement which was strong among the Afrikaners. The
New Republic praised Smuts in 19^1, and noted the odds against which
he was struggling. It asserted its belief that the leaders of the
Nationalist Party had formed
a full-fledged Nazi movement aimed at the creation of a 
dictatorship by the Afrikaners in the Union. . . .  If Britain 
should be defeated, it seems certain that the Union of South 
Africa would be a Nazi state, anti-American in spirit and
jT. Dunbar Moodie, "Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil 
Religion" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1971), 
218.
Q
Michael Roberts and A. E. G, Trollip, The South African 
Opposition. 1939-19^5 (.London, 191*7)» 119-21*; Kruger. Age of the 
Generals, 205.
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run largely from Berlin.9 
Newsweek, after South Africa's 19^3 election, similarly portrayed 
Smuts as defeating Nazism in southern Africa. Smuts was called the 
"grand old man of South Africa"; his foe, Malan, was described by the 
magazine as a "determined implacable Dutchman who seldom jokes or 
laughs yet can sway a crowd by his fanatical oratory" and who was the 
head of a political party supported by the Axis powers. Reviewing 
the course of the war in South Africa under the headline "Nazis Find 
'0u Baas' Smuts as Tough at Home as Abroad," Newsweek said that Hitler 
had looked to South Africa as the most inviting place to stir dissen- 
sion within the Empire. But, it continued, scheming Adolf reckoned 
with Slim [shrewd] Jannie" who had rallied the Parliament behind him 
and built an army "despite the fact that South Africa was for a time 
overrun with spies, fifth columnists, and Nazi propagandists,"'*'^
After Smuts*s government was secured in power in the 19^3 
election and after the war turned against Germany, little more was 
heard of the Afrikaner dissidents who had opposed the war. South 
Africa was not a major theater of the war and it attracted little 
American attention. However, when editors and journalists of the 
American press looked through their files in 19^8 for background in­
formation on the new Prime Minister and the party he represented, 
they found clippings and stories similar to those which have been
9"jFascism in South Africa," New Republic, June 16, 19^1,
P. 809,
^"Nazis Find 'Ou Baas' Smuts as Tough at Hoane as Abroad," 
Newsweek. July 19, 19^3, pp. 28, 31, See also "General Smuts,"
Nation. August lU, 19^3» p. 171J "South Africa: Smashing Mandate,"
Time, July 19, l9*+3, p. 39. The New York Times, July 29, 19^3, p. 9, 
and July 30, 19^3, p. 1^ was more restrained.
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cited; these seemed to put the election results in perspective. The 
Afrikaner leaders who had opposed Smuts and the war were elected to 
office, and to the American press it appeared that they were embarking 
on the Nazi program that the earlier news stories had reported.
In response to the Nationalist victory the New Republic edi­
torialized that South Africa had turned backward and claimed that 
"out-and-out Nazis in the ranks of the Dutch Nationalists who run 
South Africa are beginning to throw their weight around."^ It called 
Nationalism a "brand of extreme Nazi-type reaction." To Time, the 
election meant that South Africa "had suddenly embarked on a per­
verse, isolationist, acutely race-conscious road," under a party
12tainted with anti-Semitism and pro-Nazism. The Nation said that 
the Nationalists who came into office "are not easily distinguished 
from Nazis," and headed a subsequent story with the question "Will 
South Africa Go Fascist?""^
Some developments in South Africa appeared to confirm the 
worst suspicions of these periodicals. Prime Minister Malan released 
from prison Afrikaners who had been put there for opposing the war.
A ban which Smuts had placed on manbership of government officials and 
employees in the Broederbond, a secret organization of Afrikaner 
leaders, and the Ossewabrandwag was lifted. A new race policy was 
announced which sounded to many like Nazi theories. Thus the "pro-
11,,South Africa Turns Backward," New Bepubllc, July 5, 19^8,
p. 9.
■^"These Things Happen," Time, June 7, 19^8, p. 3̂ .
^"Political Power in South Africa," Nation, June 5, 19^8, 
pp. 6l7-l8; "Will South Africa Go Fascist?" Nation, November 6, 19^8, 
p. 516.
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Nazi” label which had originated during the war seemed most appropriate. 
The Nation was able to answer its own question about South Africa's
lligoing Fascist with an editorial on "South African Hitlerism.”
In spite of the existence of a factual basis for the "pro-Nazi” 
label, its use in the postwar period and repeated application to 
Nationalist leaders seriously distorted the realities of South African 
politics. In the context of the war, the charge of "pro-Nazi” largely 
signified opposition to participation in the war. There clearly were 
Afrikaners who hoped for a German victory, but their sympathy was 
prompted by their own long struggle with Great Britain. They had 
long wanted to be independent of the British; having to fight for the 
British seemed to deny their independence. Germany was very far away, 
and the Afrikaners had heard British horror stories about German bar­
barism in the First World War.
The revelations after World War II of the savagery of Nazi 
rule and the hideous atrocities against the Jews gave the label "pro- 
Nazi” intensity and connotations it had lacked in the first years of 
the war. Use of the term after the war suggested that those to whom 
it was applied had themselves favored concentration camps and were 
strongly anti-Semitic. If the Nazis were anti-Semitic and the 
Nationalists were "pro-Nazi," then it followed that the Nationalists 
were also very anti-Semitic. Thus to complete the "pro-Nazi" image, 
American publications exaggerated anti-Semitism in South Africa.
■^"South African Hitlerism," Nation, June 7, 1952, p. 338.
15The American ambassador to South Africa during part of World 
War II recognized this; see Lincoln MacVeagh to F. D. Roosevelt, 
Thanksgiving Bay, 19^2, in Munger Africans Library Notes, XII (March, 
1972), lit.
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To be sure there have been some indications of anti-Semitism 
among some Afrikaners. Examples could be found in 19^8 in campaign 
references to the stock figure of Hoggenheimer and British-Jewish- 
Capitalist-Imperialism. But the American press greatly magnified the 
extent of such sentiments. Time, for example, said that when "Prime 
Minister Daniel Malan's Nazi-aping Nationalist government came into 
power last spring, it promptly launched an anti-Negro, anti-semitic 
propaganda campaign of which Goebbels himself would have been proud. 
Later Time went so far as to claim that Malan's victory had "sent 
Boer hooligans on a looting spree directed at Jewish stores. Simi­
larly, a report in the Nation asserted that the Nationalists were "to 
the last man virulent anti-semites"; no direct actions had been taken 
against South African Jews, it said, because the Nationalists were
1 Q"too weak at this stage to attack the Jews openly," Despite 
signs of anti-Semitism, American publications continued for years to 
link the "pro-Nazi" past of Nationalist leaders with an alleged anti- 
Semitism which might manifest itself in strong measures against South
-*-̂ "How to Advance Communism," Time, December 6, 19^8, p. 32.
^"Of God and Hate," Time, May 5, 1952, p. 37. This report is 
probably derived from an earlier report in "To Relieve the People," 
Time. June 28, 19̂ +8, p. 21. The author doubts the authenticity of 
this story after checking relevant issues of the Cape Town Cape Times 
and the clippings file of the Natal Daily News (Durban, South Africa), 
and after asking several South African political scientists and 
historians about such incidents, Brian Bunting, who discusses anti- 
Semitism in South Africa in his highly critical The Rise of the South 
African Reich (London, 196M, 6U-65, makes no mention of such inci­
dents. W. A, Swanberg in Luce and His Empire (New York, 1972), 26l, 
has noted that Time "was famous for its ability to find unidentified 
politicians or bystanders who would make statements on news events 
providing the very point of view Time sought to promote." It seems 
possible Time made up an event in this instance.
1®R, K, Cope, "White Skin in Dark Continent," Nation, October 
8, 19^9, p. 3U8.
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19African Jews.
Frequently American publications mixed the elements of pro- 
Nazism and anti-Semitism with descriptions of the Nationalist leaders 
that made them appear crude, even comical. Declaring that anyone who 
understood Nazism could also understand South Africa, a writer for the 
American Mercury said that both the Nazis and the Nationalist leaders 
were low-comedy figures through whom history had chosen to work its 
evil:
[Tjhe melancholy truth is that the Broederbunders [sic] are 
lower-case rascals, creatures endowed with, at best, a second- 
rate social and political concupiscence. No Machiavellis here. 
Misplaced farceurs rather. President Malan for instance—  
superficially, a most unwholesome figure, a pretender to first- 
class political venality. But the fellow Is flawed, daubed 
with the irrevocable stain of comedy, having been born . . . 
on a farm called Alles Verloren. . . . Malan's principal aides 
are even less prepossessing. His right bower, Mr. Johannes 
Strijdora, for all his noisy, mainly anti-semitic, demogogy, 
is forever cursed by the fact that he was at one time an 
unsuccessful ostrich farmer. Then there is Doctor Verwoerd, 
who as director of Broederbund [sic] propaganda, must be  ̂
must be accorded first place among these racist comedians.
When Time put Prime Minister Malan on its cover in 1952 and 
printed a feature story on South Africa, it similarly linked unattrac­
tive personal characteristics with political, religious, and racial 
extremism. Malan's chief political attributes were said by Time to be 
his religious zeal and his ability to provide scapegoats for the
^E.g., Thomas Karis, "South Africa," in Gwendolen M. Carter, 
ed., Five African StateB: Responses to Diversity (Ithaca, New York,
1963), 528; "Escape A r t i s t s Time, August 30, 1963, p. 25; see also 
William Henry Vatcher, White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism
(New York, 1965), 60-61.
20Robert de Koch, "Foreign Intelligence: Night Over South
Africa," American Mercury. LXXII (February, 1951), -199. Robert de 
Koch, said the magazine's editor, was a pseudonym of a well-known 
South African Journalist who used the name out of fear of reprisal.
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Afrikaners' depression troubles— Jews and Africans. According to
Time's report, Malan was sin "aging, ailing, absent-minded" religious
fanatic who relied on his wife for political advice and to "wipe his
..21head when he sweated over his meals.
Malan's successor, JohanneB G. Stri^dom was described in simi­
larly unflattering terms. An article in the Nation reported that Malan 
was resigning because of his health and queried, "Could anyone be worse 
than 'the world's most hated man'?" It asserted that Strljdom was 
worse. Malan's followers had been deeply attached to a parliamentary 
system of government, but the men behind Strijdom, said the report,
nowere "in ideology the heirs of the Goebbels Ministry of Propaganda."
Life called the new Prime Minister "a steel-hard, super-fanatical white 
supremacist," while its sister publication, Time, more strongly de­
clared that the Nationalists had elevated "a man with the racist prin­
ciples of Adolf Hitler and some of the Nazi leader's frenzy . . .  a
fanatic apostle of racial segregation who represents the extreme anti-
23British, anti-Negro, anti-Jewish wing of the party,"
As suggested earlier, some of the intensity of the hostility 
of the American press to South Africa's political leadership is attri­
butable to the fact that the news of South Africa came primarily from 
the English-speaking press in South Africa, and to the role some 
Afrikaners played in opposing South African participation in World War
21"0f God and Hate," Time, 32-38,
22R. K. Chase, "Time Against Race; South Africa's 100 Year 
Plan," Nation. April 9, 1955, pp. 306-308.
^"A Hard Man Takes Over in South Africa," Life, December 20,
1951*, p. 21; "Hot Talk and Cool Choice," Time, November 30, 1953,
p. Uo.
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II. However, much American criticism also arose from hostility to the 
Nationalist implementation of apartheid, a policy directly at variance 
with American ideals, if not practice. It was that policy which led 
to the virtually universal condemnation of South Africa.
In the view of many white South Africans, the apartheid policy 
is an attempt to reconcile the white desire fox continued control over 
political and economic matters affecting their lives with the need to 
hold out some promise for the present and future fulfillment of Afri­
can aspirations for self-determination. According to the South African 
sociologists N. J. Rhoodie and H. J. Venter, who have set forth most 
thoroughly the rationale of apartheid, the concept of apartheid has as
its ideal "the comparatively permanent and complete separation of White
okand Black in South Africa." Ultimately each race is to live in its 
own homelands. The idea of physical separation of the races apparently 
did not originate with the Nationalists; however, they did make apart­
heid a key element in their 19̂ +8 campaign, and they were the first to
pqenact a systematic policy of race relations for all South Africa.
plic N. J. Rhoodie and H. J, Venter, Apartheid: A Socio-historical
Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea (Cape 
Town and Pretoria, I960), 22. For a collection of essays by South 
Africans of all races on the subject of apartheid, see N. J. Rhoodie, 
ed., South African Dialogue (Johannesburg, 1972). For several Afri­
can perspectives on apartheid, see Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go 
(London, 1962); Ezekiel Mphahlele, The African Image (New York, 1962); 
and Jordan K. Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid (New York, 1963).
2*5-'See F. R. Tomlinson, Chairman, Summary of the Report of the 
Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas 
(Pretoria, 1955), 101 (hereafter Tomlinson Report Summary); andLeonard 
M. Thompson, "The Political Implications of the Tomlinson Report,"
Race Relations Journal, XXIII (October, 1956), 9-12. See also, L. E. 
Neame, The History of Apartheid: The Story of the Colour War in South
Africa (London, 1962). '
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Americans generally found the apartheid policy abhorrent in practice;
they viewed its ideal as undesirable and unattainable.
As a body of legislation, apartheid consists of dozens of
individual acts, most of which have been passed or amended since 
2619I+8. These regulate virtually all relations between whites and non­
whites and many other aspects of life in South Africa. The bulk of 
these laws makes it rather difficult to discuss them adequately in a 
brief space. Conceptually, it is helpful to observe the useful dis­
tinction that the sociologist Pierre L. van den Berghe has made between 
three types of segregation which are embodied in the acts. He uses 
the term micro-segregation to describe segregation in public and pri­
vate facilities, meso-segregation to refer to physical separation into 
racially homogenous residential areas within multiracial urban areas,
and macro-segregation to identify legislative measures aimed at achiev-
27ing total separation. Others often refer to micro-segregation as 
petty apartheid and macro-segregation as grand, total, or ideal apart­
heid. To give the reader some appreciation of the content of these 
laws and the intensity of American criticism of their implementation, 
the principal features of the major acts will be noted together with 
representative comments that appeared in regard to them in American
26A useful summary is Muriel Horrell, Legislation and Race 
Relations; A Summary of the Main South African Laws Which Affect Race 
Relations (rev, ed.; Johannesburg, 1971), which is published by the 
South African Institute of Race Relations. The Institute also pub­
lishes an annual Survey of Race Relations which gives fuller accounts 
of legislation ancT developments’ within South Africa.
27Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Racial Segregation in South Africa; 
Degrees and Kinds," Cahiers d*Etudes Africaines, VI (1966), 1*08-̂ 09; 
also in Herlbert Adam, ed., South Africa: Sociological Perspectives
(New York, 1971), 37.
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publications ,2®
Among the first of the apartheid acts were the Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act of 19^9 and the Immorality Amendment Act of 1950, 
Together these acts prohibited marriages and illicit intercourse between 
white and non-white individuals. Time declared that South Africa's 
banning such racial mixture was contrary to the law of God,2^ Anne 
Bauer, a free lance writer who toured South Africa shortly after the 
Nationalists began to enact apartheid, likewise criticized South Africa's 
new racial order. Race discrimination was not new in South Africa, she 
noted, but the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts struck her as a 
rigid enforcement of caste and were "legislation for which no precedent 
can be found in the twentieth century, with the possible exception of 
Hitlerian Germany,Others too claimed the acts were unparalleled, 
despite the fact that at the time similar legislation could be found 
in the statute books of some thirty-one American jurisdictions
pQ̂Although it never mentioned apartheid, Alan Paton's novel 
Cry, the Beloved Country undoubtedly influenced many American views on 
South Africa's race policies. See below, p. 79, n. 73. The author has 
also seen or read accounts of television shows dealing with South 
Africa and apartheid. The author has been unable to go into television 
treatment of South Africa in any depth, but it can be said that those 
programs which have come to his attention generally presented a very 
harsh picture of apartheid. For example, In late 195k Edward R. Murrow 
and Fred Friendly did a two-part program on South Africa on the highly- 
acclaimed "See It Now" series. Jack Gould, who reviewed it for the 
New York Times. said it was "not unlike a return visit to darkest 
Nazism." New York Times, December 19, 195*+, Sec. 2, p. 13.
29"Marriage in Africa," Time, April 2k, 1950, p. 85.
^Anne Bauer, "South Africa’s New Racial Order," American 
Scholar. XXI Cwinter, 1951-52), 33.
^Pauli Murray, ed., State Laws on Race and Color (Cincinnati, 
1950), 18, These laws continued to be enforced In some of the states, 
and miscegenation statutes were not declared unconstitutional by the 
United States Supreme Court until Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
The Population Registration Act of 1950 was even more closely 
akin to caste legislation. It systemized the classification of the 
entire population of South Africa into race groups more thoroughly 
than had any previous act in South Africa. A complete register of 
the population was to be compiled and each person was to be issued 
an identity card. The criteria for classification were appearance, 
general acceptance, and repute. Grown men suffered the humiliation of 
having combs passed through their hair to determine their "color" and 
thereby their legal, political, and economic rights. Brothers, noted 
one publication, could be separated if the comb tangled in the hair of 
one and not the other and their lives entirely changed,Another 
periodical said that the act was to "add precision to the barbarism of 
apartheid." It cited the example of a seventy-two year old woman who 
was reclassified to Coloured after her white husband died; the re-
OQclassification meant her pension was cut in half. A writer in the 
Hew Republic called the Population Registration Act "the most virulent 
and arbitrary racism since Hitler . . . .
The Group Areas Act of 1950 is an example of what van den 
Berghe ha® referred to as meso-segregation. It created a Group Areas
However, the Court had invalidated an act similar to South Africa's 
Immorality Act in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 18U (196H). For the 
view that the Immorality Act has served to prevent the exploitation 
of non-white women, see Stanislav Andreski, "Reflections on the South 
African Social Order from a Comparative Viewpoint," in Adam, ed., South 
Africa; Sociological Perspectives, 28.
32"South Africa's Tragedy in Colors," Time, August 29, 1955, p. 
25J "Hair Test for Negroes," Ebony, XI (April, 1956), 27-28.
^"Scruth Africa's 'Stud Book,'" America, July 23, 1966, p. 85.
Alexander Kendrick, "South Africa's Day of Mourning," New 
Republic, March 19, 1956, p. 13.
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Board through which separate areas In urban centers could be marked
off for the residence, occupation, and trade of the different racial
groups. Once an area was designated for a particular group, members
of other groups could not own or occupy places within the area except
by permit. Typical of the American reaction to this was an editorial
in the Catholic magazine America which declared: "No more hellish plan
for dealing humanity out in neat little piles according to pigmentation
35has ever been concocted." Even its more positive aspects were 
strongly criticized. When Africans were moved from shacks to govern­
ment-built houses under the Group Areas Act, Life and the New York 
Times condemned the tactics employed and the motivation for the slum 
clearance
Among the most notorious of the apartheid measures was the so-
called pass law, ironically entitled the Abolition of Kisses Act. It
has been used to control the movement of Africans between trival areas
and urban areas by requiring them to carry reference books showing
their authority for being in a place. Chester Bowles, a former governor
of Connecticut and ambassador to India, wrote in 1957 that the pass law
37was the cruelest of the apartheid regulations. Others said the pass 
system was "a hangover from slavery days" and "symbolical to the Afri- 
cans of their helot status. In the year of the passage of the Act,
^"Other Victims of Apartheid," America, April 23, I960, p. 9̂ .
"African Resettlement," Life, March 7, 1955* PP* 57-60; New 
York Times, February 11, 1955, p. 22.
0*7Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1957), 21.
^"South Africa," Atlantic, CCV (June, i960), 21.
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1952, the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor de­
nounced the Malan government for adhering to "a Hitlerite racial policy
without regard for basic human values or the devastating consequences
39of such a reprehensible course."
Still another piece of legislation which met with widespread
criticism in the American press was the Bantu Education Act of 1953.
The Act transferred responsibility for African education from the
central government and terminated government subsidies to mission-run
schools. Under the Act, African education was to conform to the policy
that Africans could rise only to a certain level in the white community
but to any level in the African homelands. As interpreted by Life,
the government had "limited the education of black Africans to schools
where the curriculum is designed to convince them that they are in- 
UOferior." America claimed the Bantu Education Act was "designed to
prevent the Negro people of South Africa from even aspiring to rise„ Inabove their present state of subjection.
Finally, the most important legislative measures of the apart­
heid program in terms of giving it a unifying concept and a theoretical 
justification have been the acts designed to provide for African self- 
government in African homelands (Bantustans), or macro-segregation. 
Before the Nationalists began their program, previous South African 
governments had designated the lands which were to be reserves for
^Quoted in New York Times, September 15, 1952, p. 3̂.
^"Locked Door to Learning," Life, September 12, 1955, pp.
81-82.
"̂Sfonica Whately, "Educating the Bantu for Serfdom," America, 
September 2U, 1955, p. 6l8; "Apartheid Hits the Schools," America, 
February 25, 1955, pp. ^98-99*
African occupation. In 1951 the Nationalists passed the Bantu 
Authorities Act which provided for the establishment of tribal, 
regional, and territorial authorities for the governance of Africans 
in these regions. Certain executive and administrative powers were 
to be delegated gradually to the various authorities; the powers of 
chiefs, headmen, and tribal councillors were enhanced by the Act. The 
Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 and subsequent legisla­
tion vent further in setting up national self-government units for 
different African groups and in granting limited autonomy to such 
units.
Although ideal apartheid might, as Rhoodie and Venter suggest, 
be regarded as "an enlightened and comprehensive programme, for up­
lifting the Bantu so that they may become an independent national en­
tity," not many Americans have so viewed it.^ Very few Americans com­
menting on the South African plan for macro-segregation have thought 
the policy moral, desirable, feasible, or practical. Homer A. Jack, 
a prominent American religious leader, called a South African Bureau 
of Racial Affairs (SABRA) pamphlet on the concept "SABRA's Mein Kamf." 
Nobody, he said, "can take this SABRA plan seriously, yet nobody took
1̂3Hitler seriously either." Other American observers criticized the 
policy strongly on the ground that under it the overwhelming majority 
of the country's population would be allotted only 13 per cent of the 
land, the poorest land at that. The implementation of the plan for
^%hoodie and Venter, Apartheid, 17.
Ii3Hamer A. Jack, "What is this Apartheid?" Christian Century. 
September 2k t 1952, pp. 1092-91*.
African homelands was seen as an attempt to keep the Africans in a
tribal state, both to keep them from advancing and to prevent them
from becoming a cohesive political force. It was also interpreted as
an attempt to rationalize old-style white domination (baasskap) in an
1+i.effort to pacify world opinion.
One of the most widespread and strongest criticisms of the 
idea of total apartheid was that the white dependence on black labor 
was too great to permit complete separation. The New York Times re­
garded the idea as unworkable, editorializing: "Prime Minister Malan
preaches segregation while every economic force in the country has 
made and makes for ever-growing interdependence between white and
1̂5black." An Atlantic report on conditions in South Africa regarded 
plans for complete segregation as "nonsensical double talk"; it com­
mented that in "its complete divorce from any observable or possible 
facts, the talk of total separation reveals a dreary imperviousness to
k6reality." Similarly, America thought that the efforts to bring out
complete segregation were futile; it stated: "They pass laws against
U7the sea, and as the sea rises they flay it." Others who thought a 
thriving economy and apartheid inconsistent said that South Africa 
had to choose one or the other; they doubted that white South Africa 
would make the economic sacrifices required to accomplish full
E.g., Carter, Politics of Inequality, 92; Anthony Sampson, 
Mew York Times Magazine, May 22, I960, p. 77; Union of South Africa: 
The Great Separation," Newsweek, April 9, 1956, p. 56.
^New York Times, August 21, 195^, P* l6.
^"South Africa," Atlantic, 18.
^"Lament," America, May 1, 1953, p. 89.
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U8separation. The sociologists George E. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger
took this view in their textbook on race relations. They stated:
South Africa is undertaking extensive industrialization. There 
is need for skilled workers, rationally organized into produc­
tive enterprises, and sufficiently well-paid to be able to 
afford the products of their own making. The whites of South 
Africa, therefore, face a dilemma: They can have apartheid or
they can have an expanding, modern industrial society; they 
cannot have both. Having chosen the former, the government now 
faces serious obstacles to the achievement of the latter. 9
In the late 1960s this view was transformed from a criticism of South
African policy to a justification for the continuation of American
economic involvement in South Africa.
Although this brief discussion of apartheid has been able to 
cover only a few of the thousands of reports that appeared on National­
ist race policy after 19^8, it does suggest that Americans had very 
good reasons for criticizing South Africa. The restrictions on non­
whites have been very severe and incidents of injustice and cruelty 
have often occurred. Many white South Africans have been myopic or 
insensitive about the harshness of the administration of the govern­
ment's policies. But has the apartheid program been so ignoble and 
devoid of merit as American criticism of it would indicate? There are 
many decent whites in South Africa who have supported apartheid, and 
they have not understood why they have been presented abroad, in the 
words of the influential Afrikaans newspaper Die Vaderland, as "blood­
thirsty oppressors when we only wish to uphold apartheid from a
k®"Fateful Move in South Africa," America, September 15, 1956, 
p. 557J Anne Bauer, "South Africa's New Racial Order," 37-38; Wolfgang 
Langewiesche, "Will the Boers Take Over South Africa?" Saturday Evening 
Post. May 10, 1952, p. ikk.
George E. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural 
Minorities (3rd ed.; New York, 1965), 188.
Christian standpoint. Even scone of South Africa's severest critics 
have agreed that at least part of the criticism of South Africa was 
unfair and mistaken. Some exaggeration and distortion resulted from 
the fact that Americans' views of South Africa were strongly condi­
tioned hy their views of race relations in the United States.
From the 1930s through the 1960s American studies on race 
relations were generated and sustained by a melioristic interest in im­
proving relations between racial groups, primarily between white and 
black groups. As sociologist Pierre van den Berghe has observed, 
"specialists in race relations became the vanguard of liberal intellec­
tuals eager to expose the folly and crimes of the past."'*1 In exposing 
the "folly and crimes" their work demonstrated less a concern with an 
understanding of race relations than with stigmatizing certain race 
attitudes and beliefs and the practice of racial segregation. A 
pattern of public attitudes on race matters resulted from their publi­
cations which found expression in the national media.^ I. A. Newby, 
a historian who is no friend of the segregationists, commented on the 
general attitudes of American organs of news and opinion on race
Die Vaderland, December 12, 1957, translated in Thought; A 
Journal of Afrikaans Thinking for the English-Speaking,.II, No 7 U, p. 5• 
As T. Dunbar Moodie has observed: "Separate development [apartheid]
is to the Afrikaner believer what their 'errand into the wilderness' 
was to the New England Puritans; it is his mission and calling, his 
salvation and his justification." Moodie, "Power, Apartheid, and 
the Afrikaner Civil Religion," 350*
■*'1Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative
Perspective (New York, 1967), 2.
' The author is relying to a considerable extent on Herbert 
Blumer, "United States of America," in UNESCO, Research in Race Rela­
tions (New York, 1966), 87-133; van den Berghe, Race and Racism, 1-31; 
and Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination: South Africa's
Political Dynamics (Berkeley ,1971), l'(>-20.
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questions in one of his works:
In their zeal to further the Negro's cause, the national press, 
the communications media, and other molders of mass opinion 
invariably present segregationists in the worst possible light, 
and more often than not select irrational persons with a Ku 
Klux Klan mentality to present the anti-Negro point of view.
The result is to ridicule segregationists to the amusement and 
satisfaction of integrationists, but not to help Americans 
understand the appeal of racist ideas.53
The predominant view in the United States as South Africa be­
gan its apartheid policies was that segregation had very detrimental 
effects, both material and psychological, on the group which was segre­
gated. There was a widespread public belief that discrimination or 
segregation of any sort was harmful. The United States Supreme Court
in 1954 held unanimously that separate schools for black and white
54children were inherently unequal. Presumably segregated facilities
of any sort were likewise unequal, and subsequent cases so held. Some
writers took the view that integration could only prove beneficial to
all concerned. Thus, an editorial in the Nation chided the ignorance
of the whites of both the United States and South Africa who continued
to act as though they were being dragged into the future cater­
wauling, haggling, grimacing, hemming and hawing, bargaining, 
resisting, hedging and rolling their eyes. Their attitude 
is only the more curious in that the evidence is now clear 
that integration is good for the nation, good for business, 
good for the arts, for religion, for sports, for labor, for 
education, for government; good also for our immortal souls.55
Americans' views on apartheid were also shaped by their ex­
planations of the reasons for segregation; they thought segregation to 
be the result of racism or prejudice among the dominant group.
A. Newby, Challenge to the Court (Baton Rouge, 1967), viii. 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
^"The 'Whites," Nation, August 10, 1963, p. 6l.
American social scientists treated racism as an ideology and sought 
to dispel the underlying scientific, philosophical, or religious 
rationale for it.^ When racism maintained that black people are 
genetically inferior in intellect, social scientists used scientific 
data to argue that members of all races have essentially the same 
intellectual and social capacities. When master or chosen race 
philosophies were put forth, supporters of integration attempted to 
demonstrate the irrationality of such doctrines or the lack of a 
scriptural basis for them. Racism, in fact, came to be seen not only 
as an indication of ignorance but also as a sin against God. At its 
meeting in Evanston, Illinois in 195^, the World Council of Churches 
declared:
Any form of segregation based on race, color or ethnic origin 
is contrary to the Gospel and is incompatible with the Christian 
doctrine of man and with the nature of the church of Christ. 
Whenever and wherever any of us Christians deny this by action 
or inaction, we betray Christ and the fellowship which bears his 
name. 57
Examples of this attitude often appeared in religious periodicals in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and the attitude in part explains why religious 
groups were in the vanguard of the movement against South Africa as 
well as in the civil rights movement in the United States. It also 
explains the zeal, the fervor, the moral self-righteousness with which 
some attacked South Africa, urging a holy war, as it were, against the 
infidels.
b̂See, for example, I. A. Newby’s "dialogue" with racists in 
his The Development of Segregationist Thought (Homewood, Illinois, 
19^8), passim.
5TQuoted in Harold E. Fey, "Reconciliation in Rochester," 
Christian Century» September 18, 1963, p. 1126.
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The other explanation given for segregation, prejudice, was 
viewed by social scientists as a psychological phenomenon arising from 
basic personality characteristics. It was treated as an outgrowth of, 
or compensation for, a personality deficiency. In the view of social 
scientists who took this approach, prejudice was pathological; the 
prejudiced individual was seen as insecure, disillusioned, and pro­
jecting hate toward another group to compensate for suppressed drives.
The attitude which developed from a focus on prejudice was the view 
that members of the discriminating group were sick people, even 
vicious and brutal. The Christian Century, a periodical which fre­
quently criticized apartheid, gave an example of this attitude when 
it commented on segregationists:
What affects these mixed-up, hag-ridden people is a virulent 
species of mental and emotional illness: an addiction of the
spirit born of a deep illness in the body politic, that iB _ 
no less powerful than the addiction to alcohol or marijuana.
American views on race and prejudice were reflected in their 
interpretations of the factors giving rise to apartheid in South 
Africa. One frequently asserted explanation was that apartheid was 
the implementation of a Herrenvolk (master race) philosophy. Apartheid, 
some Americans concluded, grew out of a white conviction of an Innate 
white biological superiority. The ideology of apartheid, under this 
interpretation, came from a benighted Afrikaner culture or was borrowed 
from Nazi Germany, or it arose out of a combination of the two.
Although he made numerous comparisons between South Africa and 
Germany, John Gunther attributed apartheid to Afrikaner institutions
■^"Behind Dixie's Gentler Standpats," Christian Century,
October 2k, 1962, p. 1290.
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and culture. Gunther, the ubiquitous Journalist who was well-known 
in the 19^0s and 1950s for his InBide series on various parts of the 
world, went Inside Africa in 1953. Describing the South African govern­
ment as the ugliest he had ever encountered in the free world, Gunther 
found its highest officials to be "prisoners of an ideology that must
seem demented to most outsiders, and several are wildly vociferous 
59fanatics." The backwardness of the government Gunther believed, was 
due to the sinister influence of the secret Broederbond of Afrikaner 
leaders and the Dutch Reformed Church. Only Nazi Germany had ever 
had an organization which exerted the sort of influence that the 
Broederbond did, he claimed. The Dutch Reformed Church's role in
60society he compared to that of the Catholic Church in medieval Spain, 
Gunther did not foresee any improvement for South Africa after Malan 
stepped down because Strijdom, who Gunther said believed frankly in a 
master-slave relationship between races, was even more a fanatic than 
Malan: "The difference between the two is almost that between
Hindenburg and Hitler.
Several other American journalists who visited South Africa 
at about the same time as Gunther reached similar conclusions. One 
of these, Oden Meeker, asserted that Malan's belief in white superiori­
ty stemmed from the theological doctrine of "election" by God. He 
noted that the Dutch Reformed Church was against equality, free 
speech, the fox trot, two piece bathing suits, drinking, Christmas
^John Gunther, Inside Africa CNew York, 1955), ^8l, I1U9.
6°Ibid,. U59, 7̂0.
6lIbld., 1+U9.
parties, smoking, and many other aspects of modern life, and said that
the Afrikaner's "messianic, Fundamentalist" approach to problems could
not easily be modified. On the theory of apartheid he commented:
The religion of segregation is nourished by a vigorous school 
of apologetics, and places like the University of Stellenbosch 
are full of men, many of them perfectly sincere men, expatiating 
on the racial-mystical philosophy of apartheid and proving by 
every device of scholarship that 61§gk Africans are twice as 
happy with apartheid as without it.
The other journalist mentioned was Robert St. John, who similarly
asserted that "the heavy hand of the Calvinists [of the Dutch Reformed
goChurchJ has written much of the country's legislation." St. John 
thought Afrikaans was like "baby talk" and described the Afrikaner as 
"an eighteenth century man in a twentieth century world who has some 
of the psychological problems of a nude man walking down Fifth Avenue, 
Mew York, wanting other people to accept him as one of them, though
6knot possessing any clothes."
Similarly blaming religious ignorance for apartheid, Newsweek 
claimed that Prime Minister Strijdom was "convinced that Negroes are 
sons of the scriptural Ham, accursed of God and ordained to be hewers 
of wood and drawers of w a t e r . C h e s t e r  Bowles, who later became 
Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy administration, said that 
apartheid was based on the assumption "that any white man is superior
^Oden Meeker, Report on Africa (New York, 195^)» 63.
^Robert St. John, Through Malan's Africa (New York, 195M, 
69-70. See also, "Down with Santa,” Time, May it, 1951, p* 39.
6kSt. John, Through Malan's Africa, 73-7^.
gc
"African Showdown," Newsweek, July 2, 1956, p. 33.
Ill
to any non-white."^ Another writer, w *o later hecarae the American
ambassador to Burundi, described apartheid as "a political-theological
67doctrine postulating God-given superiority for the white man."
As previously indicated, many reports on South Africa traced
the "pro-Nazi" paBt of the Afrikaner leaders. When Nazi influence on
Nationalist policies was not asserted expressly, it was at least
implied. This interpretation of apartheid was made most explicit and
thoroughly by William Henry Vatcher in his study of the development of
Afrikaner nationalism. Vatcher stated:
Nazi ideas undoubtedly influenced the conception of the proposed 
apartheid policy that helped Malan into power in 19^8. The 
Herrenvolk (master race) philosophy of Hitler Justified control 
by the European (baasskap) and more especially by the Afrikaner, 
since, in the Afrikaner view, English-speaking South Africans 
could not be trusted to carry out such a scheme. Hitler's 
philosophy certainly stiffened Afrikaner pride of race, and the 
Nazi ideas of nationalism corresponded^amazingly to the 
Afrikaner's own unorganized thinking.
This thesis is dubious and lacks firm evidentiary support. ^  Indeed,
more recent scholarship traces the origin of the apartheid concept
^Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America, U8, 66.
67Thomas Patrick Melady, Faces of Africa (New York, 196I1),
163-6I1.
68William Henry Vatcher, White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner
Nationalism (New York, 1965), 60.
^Heribert Adam has called the numerous references that have 
been made to Nazi Germany regarding South Africa "ahistorical and rather 
useless." Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination, 52. Edwin S. Munger 
has similarly referred to the Nazi label as an "anachronistic epithet." 
Edwin S, Munger, Afrikaner and African Nationalism; South African 
Parallels and Parameters (London, 1967). 6k. Bee al&o Pierre L. van 
Berghe, South Africa? A Study in Conflict (Middleton, Connecticut, 
1965), 79; "The Ideology' of apartheid is more a brand of nineteenth 
century colonial paternalism than a form of modern Fascism." Van 
den Berghe does, however, use the term Herrenvolk-democxacy to 
describe South Africa's political order.
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back to English colonial policy in the province of Natal in the nine­
teenth century."^ Nevertheless, the view adopted by Vatcher and others 
was influential.
If Afrikaner culture and nationalism were the sole reason for 
apartheid, it could be argued that Americans might look to the English- 
speaking minority, acting in cooperation with dissident Afrikaners, 
to bring about change in policy through the electoral process. For 
a few years after the 19^8 election this did appear possible. The 
United Party criticized the Nationalists strongly, and vigorous 
protests against repressive legislation were raised by organizations 
formed to work for the defeat of the Nationalist Party and its poli­
cies. ̂  However, even before the strength of the opposition to the 
Nationalists was tested in 1953, American observers doubted that a 
challenge could be successful. A report in the New Republic just 
before the election stated that the controversy between the white 
parties was "not dictatorship versus democracy, but whether political 
supremacy shall be vested in the whole white community or in the 
Nationalist section only."7^ A similarly jaundiced view was taken 
by Life which observed that Malan's opposition "feared not so much a
7®David Welsh, The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in
Colonial Natal. 18U5-1910 (Cape Town, 1971). 318-22. The author be- 
lieves that apartheid can also be traced in part to American segrega­
tion, see below pp. 75-77.
71"1 sailor' Malan's Revolt," Life, June 25, 1951, p. ^5j 
Andrew Boyle,"The Torch Commandos," Commonweal, July 18, 1952, p.
362; "South Africa: White Supremacy," Newsweek, March 31, 1952, p.
h2,
72C. M. W. Gell, "The Choice Before South Africa," New Repub­
lic , February 9, 1953, p. 1̂ .
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loss of dark men's rights but their own. Several, more scholarly
7I4analyses reached virtually the same conclusion.
After the 1953 election, in which the Nationalists increased 
their seats in Parliament, Newsweek commented that the victory had 
"knocked the guts out" of all the opposition. The United Party, which 
non-whites had seen as their only hope, was shattered said Newsweek;
South Africa had rejected the "middle way."^^ Similarly, Basil 
Davidson, a journalist and historian writing in the Nation, observed 
that the defeated opposition had simply been the "moderate racialists," 
and they had suffered a smashing defeat. Both the white and the non­
whites, he commented, had shifted ground with the election, and there
76was little middle ground where they could join. Thereafter, politi­
cal reports on South Africa were generally on the theme of white 
against black, not "good" white versus "bad" white.
The interpretation of apartheid as the product of Afrikaner 
culture was then inadequate. Others were advanced which complemented 
the Afrikaner Herrenvolk interpretation. One of these was the view 
that apartheid was the white response to their fear of the over­
whelming numerical superiority of the Africans. This interpretation
73"One Fifth of a Nation Celebrates," Life, April 21, 1952,
p. 27.
7^ >•H. R. Isaacs, The Dismal Annals of South African Intoler­
ance," Reporter, January 6, 1953, p- 38; Eugene P. Dvorin, Racial 
Separation in South Africa (Chicago, 1952), 191-93.
^"South Africa: Mandate for Malan," Newsweek, April 27,
1953, p. 56.
^Basil Davidson, "Malan's Opposition: Old Wine in New
Bottles," Nation, November lU, 1953, pp. 39^-96.
can be called the "White Laager" thesis.
In frontier days in South Africa, the Boer pioneers would draw 
their ox-wagons into a circle called a laager for protection against 
attack by African tribesmen. American observers in the 1950s and 1960s 
increasingly came to the view that all the whites of South Africa were 
drawing into a political laager. Professor Gwendolen M. Carter 
apparently reached this conclusion in her Politics of Inequality;
South Africa Since 19^8, one of the most thorough and well-respected 
studies of South African politics in recent history. Although Carter 
noted important differences between the United Party and the National­
ists, she found more significant the increasing polarization of senti­
ment between white and non-white. She suggested that their polariza­
tion "could all too easily bring South Africa into the situation of 
an armed camp in which all non-Europeans are so antagonistic to all 
whites that the latter feel forced to stand together on all counts 
as the only hope of self-preservation."*^ William Henry "Vatcher, in 
his study entitled White Laager, likewise saw all whites in South 
Africa coming closer as non-whites increasingly resisted Nationalist 
race policies, although he did find the origins of apartheid in 
Afrikaner nationalism.
There were two types of fear responsible for apartheid which 
were suggested in American publications, personal fear for physical 
safety, and the fear of being "swamped" politically and culturally.
^Carter, Politics of Inequality, 4l8,
^^yatcher, White Laager. 1^9. See also Albion Ross, "South 
African Whites Close Ranks," New York Times, February l1*, 195^, Sec.
U, p. 6$ "South Africa; The Great White Laager," Time, August 26,
1966, pp, 18-25,
^5
The belief that personal fear prompted much of apartheid was asserted
in an important article in Time in 1951 entitled "City in Terror: A
Report from Johannesburg." The Time correspondent presented a grim
picture of conditions in the city, describing increasing terror and
murder in the streets. Apartheid resulted from the fact that the
blacks had suddenly become a major internal foe; the whites were
frightened. Blacks were being separated, the article said, so that
79the Nationalists would know where to bomb if there was trouble.
The idea of personal fear being widespread among the whites of South
Africa was also played up in the repeated statements in the press
that South Africans slept with guns under their pillows and by the
printing of pictures showing white women in South Africa taking pistol
lessons. The Journalist Robert St. John felt that it was this same
fear that made the whites smoke and drink at an abnormal rate:
The excesses seem to be outward manifestation of the nervous­
ness and fear which hang over South Africa. Many South 
Africans do not realize it themselves. Yet fear is here, 
like a London fog, everywhere.
^Alexander Campbell, "City in Terror: A Report from Johannes­
burg," Time, September 3, 1951* pp. 32-33. Originally from Scotland, 
Campbell moved to South Africa and became a Journalist. He was respon­
sible for many of the critical reports that appeared in the Luce 
publications in the early 1950s. Later he became managing editor of 
the New Republic. Apparently, while he was sending highly critical 
material to Time and Life, he was also working for the South African 
Tourist Bureau and writing highly laudatory material on South Africa. 
Cable of Arthur Veysey from Cape Town [to Chicago Tribune], May 21, 
1952, in J. W. van Zijl, Commission chairman, Report of the Commission 
of Inquiry into the Press (Pretoria, 1961+), Annexure XX, 15^1; Meeker, 
Report on Africa, 227.
finSt. John, Through Malan's Africa, 23. Peter Bird Martin, 
"Cities of the World: Johannesburg," Saturday ̂Evening Post, November
26, 1955, p. 88; picture, Newsweek, May 29, 1961, p. V5; "I Dreamt 
I Was in Jo'burg," Time, February 12, 19^5, p. 77; John Hughes, The 
New Face of Africa CNew York, 1961), 207.
Most white South Africans would probably deny that this sort 
of fear has existed or they would say that the press reports have been 
greatly exaggerated. But they would not deny that the second type of 
fear has been the major basis of, and justification for, apartheid. 
Their claim has been that to give the African political rights in 
his present socio-economic position would result in the downfall of
Q-icivilization, as the whites know it, in South Africa.
Some American publications grudgingly conceded that conditions 
prevailing in South Africa might require temporary restrictions on 
human rights and a gradual process of liberalization. However,most 
Americans writing on South Africa denied that there was any real basis 
for white fear over the granting of political rights to the Africans.
A writer in Atlantic said that the whites were clinging to a dream of 
domination, "more frightened of the common daylight than they are of
Qpthe horrors they have themselves evoked." An article expressing a 
similar idea appeared in Christian Century under the title "South 
African Racists Fear the Light." J A white fear of being swamped
0*1 N. J. Rhoodie has stated that "on account of the Bantu’s 
numerical superiority, the White-Black polarisation of interests is 
intimately tied up with White self-preservation, and the Whites will 
continue to fear for their survival as long as the numerical disparity 
obtains in the land of their birth," N. J. Rhoodie, Apartheid and 
Racial Partnership in Southern Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town, 19^9), 
31. See also Rhoodie and Venter, Apartheid, 29-30; Tomlinson Report 
SurmnR.T'yt 101-108; J. D. L. Kruger, Bantustan: A Study in Practical
Apartheid (Queenstown, South Africa, 1951). 12-1U'. For empirical 
data on the nature of South African attitudes, see William Hudson,
G. F. Jacobs, and Simon Biesheuvel, Anatomy of South Afr1ca; A 
Scientific Study of Present Day Attitudes (Johannesburg, 1966), 115.
^"South Africa," Atlantic, 21,
^"South African Racists Fear the Light," Christian Century, 
May 30, 1962, p. 682, See also, George M. Houser, "Treason in South 
Africa," Christian Century, March 6, 1957* P- 288.
was generally regarded by Americans as being irrational, no more than
"paranoid suspicions and repressions" in the words of the historian
8UDavid Brion Davis. This view was reinforced by the publication in 
the American press of interviews with or writings of African leaders 
from South Africa such as A. B. Xuma, Z, K, Matthews, and Nobel Prize 
winner Albert J. Luthuli, leaders who were articulate, educated, and 
reasonable, leaders who asserted that they favored a progressive non-
Q p
racial democracy for South Africa. Gwendolen Carter in her Politics
of Inequality took the position that South African whites had nothing
to fear from the Africans, stating:
In South Africa, in contrast [to the Mau Mau in KenyaJ, non- 
European political organizations seek changes within the 
existing system, not its overthrow. They want a share in 
political power, not to oust the Europeans. They want a fuller 
return for their contribution to the economy, not to change,,, 
its character. They want to become more Western, not less.
The significance of this view was that if white fear was un­
founded, then the primary justification for apartheid was invalid. 
Thus, when a witness before a Congressional hearing on American policy 
on South Africa asserted restrictions on the Africans were necessary 
for white survival, Congressman Donald Fraser quickly rejected the 
argument. He stated that
the non-Europeans in South Africa don't seek to drive out 
the whites, they seek a multiracial society. They are not
RhDavid Brion Davis, The Slave Power Conspiracy and the 
Paranoid Style (Baton Rouge, 1969), 50.
85E.g., Z, K. Matthews, "The African Response to Racial laws," 
Foreign Affairs, XXX (October, 1951), 91-102; Albert Luthuli, "If I 
Were Prime Minister," Atlantic. CCIX (March, 1962), 6l-61*.
86Carter, Politics of Inequality, 379. See also, Karis, "South 
Africa," 507.
1*8
Imprisoned, as the vhites are "by their fear.
Finally, same Americans "viewed apartheid as a vast scheme for 
rationalizing the economic exploitation of the Africans. It was ob­
vious to those looking at South Africa that Africans made up the great 
majority of the labor force, and it seemed that the apartheid legis­
lation simply facilitated a continuation of this fact. A writer in the
Nation declared that the government's race legislation was "a blueprint
88for turning South Africa into one vast slave labor camp.” George
Shepherd, Jr., one of the first of the anti-South African activists,
declared that "exploitation of cheap labor is the taproot of the evil
system of racism."^ Similarly, Sidney Lens, the director of a Chicago
AFL-CIO local union, wrote that there was strong suspicion "that the
total enforcement of pass-book laws is aimed at recruiting slave
90labor for white landowners."
The theme of economic exploitation did not contradict the 
Herrenvolk Interpretation, but rather reinforced it for some observers. 
For example, America combined the two, stating that under apartheid 
the "Bantu are to remain a race of helots upon whose backs the favored
^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United 
States-South African Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Africa, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, P * 3̂ *1 (hereafter United StateB- 
South African Relations).
K. Cope, "South Africa: Racist Caldron," Nation, July
lU, 1951, p. 32. 
goGeorge Shepherd, Jr., "Our Forgotten Trust: South West
Africa," Christian Century, January 22, 1958* P* 99-
^°Sidney Lens, "Passbook Revolution." Christian Century, April, 
6, i960, p. i*07. For similar discussions by other labor union repre­
sentatives see United States-South African Relations, 131-6U,
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of God can build a prosperous economy. However, the views were 
contradictory in that a person who believed that economic exploitation 
was the mainspring of apartheid could not believe that white South 
Africans genuinely intended to bring about complete territorial 
separation of the races.
By the late 1950s, the image of South Africa as a benighted 
land was fairly well entrenched. Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd had re­
placed Strijdom in 1958 but he was regarded as being in the same mold
92as his predecessors, despite his brilliance and more affable nature. 
South African politics seemed to have settled into a pattern. Pro- 
Nazi Prime Minister followed pro-Nazi Prime Minister, and repressive 
measure after repressive measure was ’'jammed" or "railroaded" through 
Parliament. English-speaking whites timidly offered superficial, in­
effective opposition to the harsher pieces of legislation, secure in 
the knowledge that the Nationalists would not be diverted from their 
course. South African, policies were viewed as abhorrent, and Americans 
doubted that change could come about from within the existing political 
system.
Despite the fact that most people writing on South Africa con­
demned apartheid, few Americans called for their government to do any­
thing about South African oppression. South Africa was wicked, Ameri­
cans agreed, but this did not mean the United States should take
^"Easter and Apartheid," America, April l6, I960, pp. 58-59.
^2"God,s Man," Time, September 15, 1958, p. 30. See also 
"Unanimity," Nation, November 2, 1963, p. 270: "To talk of South 
Africa, under the Verwoerd regime, as barbarous, is to slander 
barbarians,"
action to oppose it. In the term "used in the introduction to this 
study, the American image of South Africa lacked an "action compo­
nent." The factors in the United States and abroad that gave the 
image an action component in the 1960s will be taken up next. These 
factors caused South Africa to be perceived as threatening American 
interests.
CHAPTER II
SOUTH AFRICA, UNITED STATES RACE RELATIONS,
AND THE AMERICAN IMAGE ABROAD
Until it became a republic in 1961, the official name of 
South Africa was the Union of South Africa. Americans looking at 
South Africa noted from time to time that there was another U.S.A. in 
the world. In many respects the two U.S.A.'s were similar. They had 
a frontier tradition, gold rushes, and boom towns in the wilderness. 
Both had fought British imperialism. And both had a "color" problem. 
In fact, they were the only two countries in the world in which 
significant numbers of blacks and whites lived together within the 
same country and in which there was a political problem of segrega­
tion. This last point could not help but be noted, and it inevitably 
drew comparisons between the two countries. For many years Americans 
and South Africans, white and black alike, have examined each others' 
societies for relevant ideas on race relations; it is the author's 
belief that the two countries have influenced one another on race 
policies. Others in the world, too, have noted similarities between 
the race problems of the United States and South Africa. The need 
to convince the world that the United States was not like South Africa 
became a reason for the United States to denounce apartheid or to 
take further action against South Africa.
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After the Nationalists assumed power in 19^8, South Africa and 
its policies were in the news, and people began to observe that what 
the Nationalists called apartheid was similar to racial segregation 
in the American South. Thomas Sancton, a journalist who had long 
covered Southern politics, discovered in 19^9 the existence of "South 
Africa's Dixiecrats." What drew his attention to the "fundamental 
parallelism" between the American South and South Africa was a debate 
then underway at the United Nations. The Nationalist victory, he 
said, was "roughly analagous to the rise of the Dixiecrat movement."1 
In the debates at the United Nations the position of the South Afri­
can spokesman was based, in Sancton's view, on the same systematic 
political racism that the Dixiecrats were using to kill the Truman 
legislative programs. "Like our own political racists," wrote 
Sancton,
the white South African leaders subvert every process of law 
and every principle of patriotic honor and civilization to 
the stulifying task of perpetuating human injustice. Point 
by point Mr. Louw {the South African representative] repeated 
the spurious arguments for injustice— using at times the same 
phrasing— which were offered recently by Senators [Richard] 
Russell, [Walter] George, [Allen] Ellender, and others who 
were active in the filibuster.^
Living conditions among African miners in South Africa were almost
indistinguishable from those of the poorer American Negroes in
Southern cities.
Disconcerting similarities did exist, but for Sancton as for 
others in the early 1950s, the similarities were at the same time
Thomas Sancton^ "South Africa's Dixiecrats," Nation, May 28, 
19^9, p. 602.
2Ibid.
reassuring. Although the United States still had a blemished record, 
the federal government had embarked on a different course from that 
taken by South Africa. Despite the similarities it was clear that 
the American race problem was only a Southern problem, one that other 
Americans were working to solve. By comparison with South Africa, 
conditions for black Americans were not too bad and were improving. 
Sancton stated that the standard of living for Southern blacks had 
"risen substantially in the past decade as a result of their employ­
ment in war industries. The living conditions of natives in South
3Africa remain a disgrace to the modern world."
The existence of South Africa's race policies gave proof to 
the belief that the American government was making progress in dealing 
with the race problem. Roderick Peattie, an American geographer whose 
work with the Office of War Information took him to South Africa in 
World War II, said that his first reaction to Richard Wright's Black 
Boy was to cry "For shame, America!" But then he thought of South 
Africa, and it gave him a "grand and glorious" sensation. Such a book 
could not be published there. He viewed race problems as only an 
"infection on the body corporate" in America, while race hatred was 
a "congenital disease" in South Africa. Another visitor to South 
Africa, Pulitzer Prize novelist Martin Flavin, found many similarities 
in the race problems of the two countries; many aspects of the South 
African color line were painfully reminiscent to him of those at home. 
But, like Sancton, Flavin concluded that "there is one important
3Ibid.
^Roderick Peattie, Struggle on the Veld (New York, 19^7), ISO-
51, 151*.
fundamental difference: every step the black man is able to take for­
ward in America has the support of the law— of national law at least; 
in South Africa every step he takes is in violation and defiance of 
i t . E v e n  a publication such as the New Republic which found Ameri­
can progress in race relations very limited could not help but note 
that the "United States is losing its grim distinction as the country 
where racial discrimination is worst. The Union of South Africa now 
seems to be the number one p l a c e . T h e  New York Times similarly 
editorialized that "the racial situation in South Africa makes the 
relationship between our own white and colored races seem simple and 
hopeful indeed.
Ifot only was there a feeling that the federal government was 
bringing about progress, there was also an assurance that the South 
itself was changing. Reporting that while the Klan may have freshened 
up its sheets and the Dixiecrats were successfully filibustering in 
Congress, a writer for Harpers magazine concluded that, nonetheless, 
in the South "there is a transformation going on, on the surface and
Q
deep down." White supremacy, she said, was being attacked on all 
sides and was suffering badly. Christian Century, which only a few 
years earlier had printed articles equating the South with Nazi Germany, 
similarly declared:
^Martin Flavin, "The Durban Deep," Harpers. CXCVIII (April,
19U9), 67.
^"Jim Crow to the Hilt," New Republic, June 12, 1950,jp. 8.
TNew York Times. December 3, 195**, P* 26.
OMary Heaton Vorse, "The South Has Changed," Harpers, CXCIX 
(July, 19^9), 31.
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Racial "barriers are falling throughout America and nowhere more 
noticably than in the south. . . . The progress of the Negro 
in the eighty-five years since the end of the war between the 
states has hardly been equaled in history.°
Within a short time after the 19^8 election, the Dixiecrat 
movement died away, and it seemed to some that by 1952 white supremacy 
was a dead letter in the South. Life said editorially that there had 
been no Northern liberal-Southern Bourbon schism at the Democratic 
convention of 1952 because the issue of civil rights had become 
"unreal." Up until twelve, eight, even four years before, Life ob­
served, the question of Negro rights had united all Southern whites.
But no longer was this true for "the majority of Southerners now know 
it [white supremacy] to be a lost cause. The Bourbons themselves are
adjusting to the new emancipation of the Negro as fast as they have to.
That means pretty fast."1® Now the majority of Southerners and the 
majority of Northerners thought alike on the issue, and the black 
mein was gaining his rights. As a result, concluded Life, white supre­
macy had "lost its political importance, and the Democratic convention 
of 1952 proved it."11
The nagging doubts that remained in some minds seemed to be
dispelled in 195^ by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
12Education. Once and for all the question of civil rights for black 
Americans had been ended, at least as a matter of public law and 
policy. In the spirit of self-congratulation that surrounded the
^"The Walls are Tumbling," Christian Century, September 27, 
1950, pp. 1128-29.
1(̂ "White Supremacy," Life, August U, 1952, p. 30.
11Ibid.
123*0 U.S. U83 (195*0.
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decision, Time hailed Brown as part of "one of the greatest success
stories the world has ever known: the American Negro's 90-year rise
,.13from slavery.
In light of the widespread feeling that the United States had 
made tremendous strides in securing the rights of "black Americans,
South Africa could not help "but seem "backward by comparison. Americans 
writing about South Africa or about the American South grew more posi­
tive about the progress in race relations in the United States and 
noted that the two countries appeared to be moving in opposite direc­
tions .
Americans, said the Catholic magazine Commonweal, enjoyed some
satisfaction viewing the difficulties with segregation In Africa,
particularly in South Africa, "for here was one matter on which our
1^own record was comparatively good." It said the reelection of Malan's
government had meant a further reduction in the rights of the "natives"
and a strengthening of apartheid. Commonweal found that it was all too
easy "to contrast this folly of the Boers with the strides we are making
in this country," although it might be premature "to judge from these
advances-~and from the contrasting directions in the United States and
South Africa on racial matters— that all is well in the matter of
15interracial justice in this country." The magazine said there had 
been marked change within the United States since World War II; there
-^"To All on Equal Terms," Time, May 2k, 195^, p. 21.
"^"Contrasts in Segregation," Commonweal, May 15, 1953, p. 137.
^ Ibid. See also "Retrospect," Christian Century, December 29, 
1951*, pp, 1575-77; and Relnhold Niebuhr, review of Trevor Huddleston's 
Naught for Your Comfort, in New Republic, May 28, 1956, pp. 20-21,
had been notable advances for black Americans in employment, housing, 
health, and education.
The belief in American progress in race relations caused some 
to feel that the United States could serve as a model for South Africa 
and could thereby encourage liberalization of South Africa's policies 
by America's good example. The contrast itself suggested that progress 
in race relations was possible and that South Africa might be deserving 
of some sympathy. Noting the "astounding progress" of the United 
States against racial injustice, the editors of America expressed the 
belief that this progress could be the basis for encouraging the 
Christian-minded in South Africa. They made the same point a few 
weeks later after the Urban League issued a report showing that more 
blacks were working in firms which had not previously employed blacks; 
at about the same time Tuskegee Institute announced that it was dis­
continuing its lynching report. Commenting on these announcements, 
America observed that while the color bar was preventing Africans from 
getting skilled jobs in South Africa, "precisely the opposite situation 
is coming to prevail in the employment field in this country. The 
professor at South Africa's Stellenbosch University who had recently 
said a change in his government's race policies was necessary should 
look to the United States as a model to be emulated; the magazine 
stated that a "study of the practical benefits American business and 
industry find in fair employment practice may indicate to him what
^"UN Report on South Africa," America, November 1^, 1953, p.
167.
17"Tuskegee and Urban League Reports," America, January 16, 
195k, P. 390.
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direction such a change in policy should take."-*-® The editors of 
America later quoted favorably South African Bishop Denis E. Hurley's 
statement that "America's magnificent show against segregation . . . 
is bound to affect South Africa as well.-*"̂
C. Vann Woodward, one of the most thoughtful and sensitive 
students of Southern history, made what was probably the most signifi­
cant statement of the contrast between the differing directions of the
20American South and South Africa in his Strange Career of Jim Crow.
The third of the four chapters of the book was entitled "The Man on the 
Cliff," a phrase taken from the writings of Alan Paton. Woodward 
showed that the American South and South Africa were identified by 
observers as being very similar in the early part of the twentieth 
century. The two regions had seemed to be following essentially the 
same policies. Now, however, the similarities were coming to an end 
and they could no longer be identified together; the two were travel­
ing along different paths into the future:
At some point along their parallel ways it is now clear that 
the paths of the South and of South Africa diverged. At the 
time of the First World War it had seemed that both regions 
were going roughly the same way. But by the time the Second 
World War was over it was very plain that they were no longer 
traveling together. Indeed, as the tragic destination of 
South Africa became more and more apparent, and as more hope­
ful events transpired on the other side of the Atlantic, it 
began to seem as if the two great regions might be traveling 
in opposite directions .̂-*-
l8Ibid. , 391.
"Archbishop Hurley Speaks," America, January 19, 1957, p.
*+55.
pnC. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York,
1955).
21Ibld., 108.
Woodward suggested that the South might glance back at South Africa,
the country with which the South had once identified itself and had
seemed to see eye to eye, and perhaps it would observe South Africa
with more pity and less reproachfulness than others:
The South no longer identifies herself with South Africa and 
no longer has reason to fear the madness of self destruction.
The South somewhere along the way took a different path. It 
has joined the spectators who are watching the tragic dilemma 
of the mem on the cliff.^2
If all of America's race problems had not been solved, it at 
least appeared that the great steps necessary for their solution had 
been taken and the future was quite bright. The course that South 
Africa was following proved it. To be sure, there were some dissenters 
in the early and mid-1950s, some who were highly critical of the 
American record on questions involving race. But they could be dis­
missed, as Life magazine did, as "opportunistic liberals" trying to
23make political capital by turning civil rights into a moral issue. 
Foreign criticisms were acknowledged to have some validity, but 
editorialists and writers asserted that Communist propaganda was wildly 
distorting the facts to serve its own purposes. Of course the United 
States had problems but what country did not; the Communists were 
exaggerating the few incidents of racial injustice all out of propor­
tion. Or so it seemed.
The events of the latter part of the 1950s began to undermine 
the earlier confidence and optimism that many Americans had felt about 
race relations in the United States. The growth of the civil rights
22Ibid., 152.
23"White Supremacy," Life, 30.
movement and the national trauma of the process of desegregation are 
immense subjects in themselves and cannot be treated adequately in 
a study such as this. However, one component of this bears strongly 
on the present subject and must be emphasized; that is the important 
role that the awareness of foreign opinion played in the American 
realization of a need for reform.
Americans, reputedly isolationist, have throughout their 
history been acutely conscious that they were but one country among 
many others, and that people in those other countries were observing 
and passing judgment on them. Americans have often equated power with 
virtue and moral integrity; because of this and their desire to find 
abroad reassurance of their own essential goodness, they have always 
wanted to have foreign approval of their institutions and their way 
of life. The words of John Winthrop written aboard the Arbella were 
but the first of many over the centuries which demonstrated this 
American sensitivity to the opinions of people in other countries:
"wee must Consider that wee shall be a Citty vpon a Hill, the eies of 
all people are vppon vs; soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our 
god in this worke wee haue vndertaken and soe cause him to withdrawe 
his present help from vs, wee shall be made a story and a byword
2kthrough the world . . . ." One of the convictions that sustained
Abraham Lincoln through the Civil War was his faith that the war was
to vindicate democracy in the sight of all mankind, as he so eloquently
25indicated in the Gettysburg Address. Woodrow Wilson in his appeal 
pliJohn Winthrop, "A Modell of Christian Charity," in Loren 
Baritz, ed., Sources of the American Mind (New York, 1966), I, 11.
25see Allen Nevins, The Statesmanship of the Civil War (rev. 
ed.; New York, 1962), 137-
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to the voters to return a Democratic Congress in 1918 told the American 
people that he sought their support not for the sake of a political 
party, "but for the sake of the nation itself in order that its in-
p/Tward duty of purpose may be evident to all the world."
In light of this tradition of wanting foreigners to believe 
that the United States was upholding the democratic principles that 
it professed, it is not surprising that one of the key arguments of the 
Department of Justice in its brief to the Supreme Court on the question 
of school segregation was that it was hurting the American image 
abroad:
It is in the context of the present world struggle between 
freedom and tyranny that the problem of racial discrimination 
must be viewed . . . .  Racial discrimination furnishes grist 
for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubt even 
among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion 
to the democratic faith.^7
Not only was American prestige damaged by segregation, but it was
pAaiding communism everywhere in the world. The Brown decision briefly 
seemed to end that threat. As Newsweek expressed it, segregation in 
American public schools had become a symbol of inequality to people 
all over the world and was a weapon of world communism; now, with
°"President Wilson's Appeal to the Voters to Return a Demo­
cratic Congress," in Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American 
History (7th ed.; New York, 1963), II, 152.
27Quoted in C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 
(2nd rev. ed.; New York, 1966), 132.
pQSee Max Beloff, "No Peace, No War," Foreign Affairs, XXVII 
(January, 19^9), 22U; and Hans J. Morgenthau, "United States Policy 
Toward Africa," in Calvin W. Stillman, ed., Africa in the Modern World 
(Chicago, 1955), 321, 325.
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29Brown, "that symbol lies shattered."
The optimism that accompanied Brown was soon undermined by a
30worsening of race relations in the South. In 1955 there were three 
lynchings of blacks in the state of Mississippi, the first such in­
cidents in the United States since 1951. One lynching in particular 
received world wide attention, that of Emmet Till, a fourteen year old 
boy who allegedly had whistled at a white woman. The next year, the 
ugly incidents that accompanied desegregation of the public schools in 
America began to occur. Vicious mobs arose and rioted when Autherine 
Lucy attempted to enter the University of Alabama in February 1956.
The actions of the mob ultimately had the desired effect of postponing 
the integration of the University, but it also led to hostile criticism 
of the United States from abroad. Later in the year mob action opposed 
the integration of public schools in Clinton, Tennessee, with the same 
effect on world opinion.
Such events as these and the resulting foreign criticism could 
not be dismissed simply as the product of Communist propaganda. Ameri­
cans began to doubt they were making as much progress as they had pre­
viously imagined, and they were increasingly concerned that this was
29"Supreme Court: Historic Decision," Newsweek, May 2k, 195^,
p. 26. It is interesting to note the priorities indicated by even so 
strong a supporter of the civil rights movement as Christian Century.
In a report which contrasted the good news of 195k from the United 
States with the news of Strijdom becoming Prime Minister in South 
Africa, it commented that "there is satisfaction that the courts 
should have moved against racial segregation, partly because this 
brings our social practice somewhat more into accord with our democratic 
pretensions, but even more because of the improvement in the position 
from which we can deal with the world of color." "Retrospect,"
Christian Century, 1576.
30See C. Vann Woodward, "The New Reconstruction in the South," 
Commentary, XXI (June, 1956), 501-508.
hurting the United States abroad,.̂ " Americans had told the world that
their country was the home of freedom and the hope of the oppressed
everywhere. The uncommitted peoples of the world were told to look
to the benefits of American democracy as their model for a new order
and not to the virtual enslavement of communism. What conclusions
could they draw from the examples of Emmet Till and Autherine Lucy?
America editorialized in 1956 on "U.S. Racial Bias and Asia," saying
that bias was not only a moral evil in itself, but was also damaging
the United States in Asia and thus did not even make good common sense.
"Ask any U.S. Information Service employee," the magazine suggested,
whose task is to make known to Asia’s colored millions the 
virtues of American democracy. . . . That these tensions are 
blown up out of all proportion both by the Communist and 
Asian press is quite beside the point. They exist. The fact 
of their existence does us untold harm throughout Asia.32
The argument that the United States should make reforms at home to
aid its foreign policy and fight communism was most clearly stated by
George F. Kennan in an article in Harpers in 1956 entitled "Overdue
Changes in Our Foreign Policy." Kennan wrote that "we are all aware
^Polling data confirm this conclusion dramatically. A 
National Opinion Research Council poll taken in 19^7 asked respondents 
"Do you think the way Negroes are treated in this country has any
effect on the attitudes of people in foreign countries toward us?"
Thirty-four per cent of adult Americans felt that it did; but forty-
six per cent felt that it did not. A Harris poll of 1963 asked a
similar question. In it, seventy-eight per cent believed foreign 
attitudes towards the United States were adversely affected by Ameri­
can race policies and only eight per cent believed that they were not. 
Polling data on foreign attitudes indicate that the seventy-eight 
per cent were correct. See Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: World Opinion
of U.S. Racial Problems," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXII (Summer, 
1968}, 299-312.
^2"U,S. Racial Bias and Asia," America, May 12, 1956, p. 152. 
Only Asia is mentioned; Africa was not considered by many Americans 
to haye any bearing on the civil rights question until several years 
later. See also "Contrasts in Segregation," Commonweal, 137-38.
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of the vicious distortions and exaggerations peddled hy the Communists 
throughout the world about the state of race relations in this country.'1 
He had no desire to condone such irresponsibility that caused the 
Communists to mislead other people, but he had to ask if Americans did 
not "pour oil on these fires" instead of putting them out. The prob­
lems that remained were difficult and there was no quick, easy solution 
to them. But he wanted Americans to think about
the effect on hundreds of millions of colored people in other 
lands of direct reports from this country of what goes on here 
in the field of race relations. What do we suppose is the 
effect of the news photograph of Authurine Lucy's car surrounded 
by the mob with a man jumping up and down on its roof, apparently 
trying to break it in with his heels?— and all this purveyed to 
the world as an example of what happens to a colored girl who 
tries to get a higher education in this country? That one 
photograph is worth more to Communists than all the lies they 
could invent in a decade.33
If foreign opinion had seemed important in 1956, it assumed_ 
much greater significance the following year, for it was then that the 
most traumatic events in race relations in almost a century began. It 
was then that news media all over the world reported that in cities in 
various parts of the South black children attempting to go to formerly 
all white schools were cursed, threatened, intimidated, spat upon.
Little Rock became the symbol of it all, for it was there that the 
situation became most critical. Arkansas's governor, Orval Faubus, 
called out the national guard, ostensibly to maintain order but in 
actuality to maintain segregation in defiance of court ordered integra­
tion of Little Rock's Central High. The Justice Department sent the 
F.B.I. in to investigate why the integration order was not being carried
■^George F. Kennan, "Overdue Changes in Our Foreign Policy," 
Harpers. CCXIII (August, 1956), 31-32.
out. Finally the national guard was withdrawn and the handful of 
black children attempted to enter the school. Mob demonstrations 
prevented the integration, and President Eisenhower felt it necessary 
to take the step that several months earlier he had declared unthinkable 
he sent a thousand paratroopers to Little Bock and put the Arkansas 
national guard on federal, service to prevent the mob from obstructing 
integration any longer.^ Both Americans and foreigners were dis­
abused of Illusions they may have entertained about the state of race 
relations in America. Time magazine stressed the importance of the 
situation for foreign affairs, stating that Faubus and his followers 
were giving aid and comfort to Communists, Reviewing foreign criti­
cisms of the United States for the Little Rock incidents, the magazine 
observed that ’’millions of brown-skinned Asians, unaware of great U.S. 
constitutional issues, saw only dark-skinned American children being 
held away from school by rifles of white American s o l d i e r s . T h e  
editors of America asked the people of Little Rock to "remember that 
not only the eyes of the nation but the eyes of the whole world are 
intently watching them. For Little Rock is, alas, not the least of 
the battlefields of the Cold War." Policy makers were even more 
acutely aware of the enmity and hostility engendered abroad by Ameri­
can racial incidents. When Vice President Nixon made a visit to Latin 
America, mobs in Venezuela shouted at him "Little Rock! Little Rock!"
The State Department was flooded by dispatches from American embassies
^Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade (New York, 1965), U0-l*7»
•^"What Orval Hath Wrought," Time, September 23, 1957, p. 13.
^"Issue at Little Rock," America, August 30, 1958, p. 5̂ 2.
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and consulates all around the world describing the damage done to Ameri­
can prestige. ^
The incidents of racial animosity did not end with Little 
Rock; instead, they continued and were exacerbated. The South became 
still more recalcitrant. The rest of the country grew increasingly 
disturbed about the South's unwillingness to accept the change that 
had been decreed for it and about what this signified for American 
and foreign conceptions of the meaning of America. This had consid­
erable significance for American thinking on South Africa.
After 1956 parallels continued to be drawn between the United
States and South Africa, but now there was a marked difference. As
Americans began to realize that their own racial problems were more
serious than they had previously thought, attention was drawn to South
Africa to emphasize the worst qualities in American life, not to show
the favorable contrasts between race policies in the two. In other
words, South Africa became the paradigm of racism, the vision of evil
of what the United States was or could be. Thus when Daniel Friedenberg
reviewed John Gunther's Inside Africa for the Mew Republic he did not
praise the United States for its liberalism while condemning apartheid,
but instead asked the reader:
Have you had a single sleepless night over the murder of Till 
in Mississippi? Has your hand shaken when you read that a 
minister in the South was shot down in broad daylight because 
he urged his fellow citizens to vote, and that no one has even 
bothered to search for the killers? . . . Is it really Inside 
Africa or more likely InBide Ourselves?-̂
■^Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York, 1963), 0̂*1.
oft
0 Daniel M. Friedenberg, review of John Gunther's Inside Africa, 
in Hew Republic, October 31, 1955, p. 2h,
The shift in comparisons could also be seen in the Christian 
Century early in 1956 when it commented on a new book by a South 
African Dutch Reformed Church theologian which denied any Biblical 
sanctioning of segregation. The magazine suggested that it be read by 
"the fomenters of our own southern apartheid . . . .  If they can't be­
lieve northern 'radicals' on this, maybe they can learn from equally 
conservative, equally embattled South Africans."^ The Nation, edi­
torializing on "Arkansas and Another Union," suggested that if 
Governor Faubus was feeling lonely in his struggle to maintain "apart­
heid— Arkansas variety," he might roam the corridors of the United 
Nations with his South African "companions in distress.Calling 
attention to the fact that white South Africans had sent Faubus $18.75 
to help him fight integration, the editors said that the racists in the 
United States and in South Africa should get together just to ex­
change such pleasantries as "How would you like your daughter to marry 
«Ula Kaffir? Continuing in the same vein a few months later, the 
Nation discussed the effort being made in Arkansas to make integration 
and communism synonymous. The tactic was "in the savage repression 
pattern of the Union of South Africa." American Jim Crowism had con­
tributed to apartheid and was now, the magazine said,
39"Sign of Hope in South Africa," Christian Century, February 
8, 1956, p. 165. In discussing the Group Areas Act, the same publica­
tion said that the "logic of the white supremacists in the United 
States points in the same direction." "South Africans Take A Step in 
Segregation," Christian Century, September 5S 1956, p. 1013.
^"Arkansas and Another Union," Nation, October 25, 1958» P*
282.
^Ibid. "Kaffir" is the South African equivalent of the term 
"nigger."
aping apartheid racism. Once again Governor Faubus has 
obligingly confirmed the most serious charges of his most 
severe critics. As rapidly as circumstances will permit, he 
is busily proving that he is a racist in the Strydom mold.
This same issue of the Nation contained a long article by Anthony 
Sampson on "Little Rock and Johannesburg," Sampson had just completed 
his study of the recent treason trials in South Africa, The Treason 
Cage, and was now reporting on how strongly similar the South and 
South Africa were; he concluded that "the resemblance is astonishing."^^ 
He found the same brooding atmosphere, the same stock phrases and 
shibboleths, the same obsession with race, the same type of character 
in both Southerners and Afrikaners, the same consciousness of defeat 
in the Civil War and the Boer War, and other similarities. If any­
thing, the South came off worse in the comparison:
If there seemed to be a difference, it was th&t West Ninth 
Street in Little Rock was more, not less, segregated than 
Victoria Road, Sophiatown [an African shanty town Just out­
side Johannesburg]. A white mein was a rarer sight In Red's 
Pool Hall than in the Back 01 The Moon in Sophiatown. In 
Little Rock, if you wanted to have lunch with a Negro, you
had to bring sandwiches into your office. No one there whom
I met had heard of a white man meeting a black man at dinner, 
as white and Negro sometimes meet in the smart liberal homes 
in Johannesburg. Even in material things, the Negroes in 
West Ninth Street seemed more forlorn, more left-behind than 
the Sophiatowners. The clothers were shabbier, the furniture 
more shaky, the young men less confident and less articulate—  
unmistakably downtrodden. . . . Even the regional headquarters 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People in Little Rock seemed more defensive, and less confident, 
than the African National Congress.
As the American civil rights movement grew in intensity in the
^ " ' K 1 as in Kremlin," Nation, January 10, 1959, p. 21,
^Anthony Sampson, "Two Souths: Little Rock and Johannesburg,"
Nation, January 10, 1959, p. 23,
Ibid. , p. 2l+.
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early 1960s references to South Africa in connection with the South
continued to "be made hut now with a greater sense of alarm at the
parallels. Both South Africa and the American South were, said a
writer in the Kew Republic, "caught in a rule of 'rednecks. ' A
study of the attempt to redraw the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama,
in such a way as to exclude most of the blacks from the voting district
and the case that followed was entitled Gomillion v. Lightfoot;
1*6Apartheid in Alabama. One Catholic priest's sermon against racism
in Mississippi occasioned the statement by the editor of America that
"in a solution that reminds one of South African apartheid, whites [in
Mississippi] are trying to overcome their fears by systematically
wrefusing to allow Negroes their human and civil rights." The
British writer D. W. Brogan, writing on "The Impending Crisis of the
Deep South" in Harpers, drew the distressing parallel that both the
South and South Africa were Joined in the same siege mentality; both
1*8were trying to shut out a hostile outside world. An even harsher 
statement was an article by the civil rights activist Father Daniel 
Berrigan comparing Selma, Alabama, with Sharpeville, South Africa, the 
site of the massacre of sixty-nine Africans by police. For Berrigan,
1*5̂David Cort, review of Peter Eitner's Death of Africa, in New 
Eepublic, May 30, 1960,p. 19, v ‘....*....’' 1
^Bernard Taper, Gomillion v. Lightfoot; Apartheid in Alabama 
(New York, 1962).
w "Courage in Mississippi," America, July 6, 1963, p. 2.
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon similarly declared that Birmingham, 
Alabama, was like South Africa when Martin Luther King was Jailed 
there in 1963 for leading demonstrations against segregation. David 
L. Lewis, Kingc A Critical Biography (New York, 1970), 16.
k®D. W. Brogan, "The Impending Crisis of the Deep South," 
Harpers, CCXXX (April, 1965), 1^8.
the brutality was essentially the same in both cities; both were
h9"stereotypes of brutal power." Alabama and South Africa were again 
likened to one another in an editorial on the assassination of Prime 
Minister Verwoerd in 1966. The Mew Republic said that there was no 
possibility for change in South Africa because all the leaders were 
fanatical and whoever was selected to succeed Verwoerd "will strive 
to promote the kind of race policy that George Wallace would in 
Alabama, if the state and the federal government let him.""^
By the mid-1960s people were concluding that race problems 
were not simply confined to the South; increasingly they were per­
ceived as a national phenomenon. Now South Africa came to be held up 
by some liberals as a vision of evil for the whole nation. Thus a 
"T.R.B." column in the New Republic in 1966 editorialized on "Vorster 
and Dirksen." The columnist made use of the association with South 
Africa to condemn Senator Dirkserfs position on the open-housing pro­
visions of the Civil Rights Act of 1966. As if to show that liberals 
could use smear tactics as well as Joe McCarthy could, the article 
preceded discussion of the bill with the statement that:
In South Africa a racist pro-Nazi prime minister, Vorster, 
succeeded a racist pro-Nazi premier, Verwoerd. In Grenada,
Miss., a crowd of screaming white men, swinging ax handles 
and chains, forced a 12-year-old Negro school child with 
a broken leg to crawl away from school while police stood by.
After this, the editorial began going over Dirksen's stand in leading
^Daniel Berrigan, "Sfelma and Sharpeville, Commonweal, April 9 
1965, p. 71.
50"Death of Apartheid?" New Republic, September 17, 1966, p. 9 
^"Vorster and Dirksen," New Republic, September 2k, 1966,
p.
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the opposition to the open-housing provision. Dirksen was little
different from Yorster in the columnist's view:
It is not the color of tenants in Chicago that he objects to, 
he explains; it is their conduct. (South Africa's new premier 
says he doesn't object to blacks either; it's just their general 
inferiority. )■*
As the Hew Republic pointed out, desegregation was now moving 
from Atlanta and Birmingham to Boston, Detroit, and Chicago. The 
phenomenon of racial housing segregation was nationwide, and its 
existence led to a national legal conference on equal opportunity in 
housing at Berkeley, California, in 19^5. The immediate cause of the 
conference was California's Proposition 1^, a measure requiring 
community approval before any low income housing projects could be 
built in that particular community. The book which resulted from the 
conference was entitled Apartheid American Style. The author indicated 
that although the United States did not have the systematic laws that 
South Africa had, the effect was virtually the same because minority 
groups almost without exception found that they did not have free 
choice of residence in any part of the nation. The California bill 
had to be viewed in that context, said the author, for "Proposition lU 
can only be fully understood if it is seen as the latest in a long 
series of devices developed by the real estate industry to support and 
develop the American style of apartheid.
South Africa became the vision of the real America, the 
brutal, hidden America of the imagination that sometimes emerged from
52Ibid. (emphasis in original).
"^John H. Denton, Apartheid American Style (Berkeley, 1967),
36.
the psyche and shoved itself to the world as it really was. Thus
Stanley Kauffmann, after reading Ernest Cole's House of Bondage,
claimed that "the Afrikaners are acting out the unacknowledged dreams
„5l).and fantasies of many white Americans. When Ramsey Clark was
Attorney General, he and his aides envisioned the possibility of a
few black militants conspiring together to kill whites simultaneously
in a number of American cities. Their fear was that this would lead
to immediate wide spread suppression of blacks throughout the country.
Clark said grimly that if this were to happen, then the United States
would more closely resemble South Africa than any other country.^
Every effort had to be made to avert that prospect. More recently,
an article in the New York Post declared the need to defeat President
Nixon was a moral imperative because Nixon was moving the country ever
closer to a totalitarian police state. The article found that it was
significant that the only two countries in which the free 
press is under attack from its elected government are South 
Africa and the U.S.A. It's significant that in both these 
countries, the intellectuals, the artists, the "communicators" 
and the socially active clergy are considered "enemies of the 
regime." There are other parallels, including South Africa's 
secret police and controlled courts. I, for one, find the 
Nixon Administration frightening.5°
Similarly, a Carolina Symposium debate on busing between Senator Sam
Ervin and constitutional law authority William W. Van Alstyne produced
 ̂Stanley Kauffmann, "Hue and Cry," New Republic, October 28, 
1967) p. 22. Cole's book, a Book-of-the-Month Club selection, con­
sisted of pictures which he, a young African, had taken of the condi­
tions under which Africans lived in South Africa. Ernest Cole, with 
Thomas Flaherty, House of Bondage (New York, 1967).
55Richard Harris, Justice; The Crisis of Law, Order and 
Freedom in America (New York, 1970), 76.
56New York Post, November 15, 1971, quoted in National Review. 
December 3, 1971, p. 1335*
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the statement by Van Alstyne that President Nixon's proposed mora­
torium on busing would "lock in apartheid in the neighborhood school 
system."
What is the significance of all of this? In domestic matters, 
it is possible that the existence of South Africa's policies and the 
fact that they were regarded with almost universal opprobrium served 
to encourage a more liberal approach to race relations in the United 
States than had previously characterized American views and policies. 
The phenomenon of cross-national political linkages has been noted 
and discussed by various political scientists, in particular by James 
N. Rosenau.-^ Stripping the concept to its essentials and disregarding 
distinctions between different types of linkages, the theory is that 
events and ideas in one country influence thought and action in 
another country. Political scientists are familiar with the phenome­
non, and historians have also from time to time demonstrated the 
principle in their writings. For example, Bernard Bailyn has effec­
tively shown that the polemics of English "country" politicians and
publicists influenced profoundly thinking among the American colonists
59which ultimately led to the American Revolution.  ̂ Likewise Ernest R. 
May has discussed at length how English thinking on colonialism had 
an impact in the 1890s on American thought and policies on
-^Durham, North Carolina, Morning Herald, March 31, 1972, p. 1.
^James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area," in 
James N. Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York, 
1967)> 26-36. See also the later work he edited, Linkage Politics: 
Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New 
York, 1969).
59Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts^ 196?), 3^-35.
imperialism.
Examples of cross-national awareness and linkages can be found 
between the United States and South Africa over a long period of time, 
the impact has been more greatly marked in South Africa than in the 
United States simply because there has been a much greater awareness 
of America in South Africa, but there can be no doubt that the phe­
nomenon has existed for both countries. In action the effect of the 
principle is not to bring about a revolutionary change in an individ­
ual's thinking but rather to reinforce, encourage, or substantiate 
a preexisting attitude or mode of thought.
Alfred H. Stone, a Mississippi plantation owner and polemicist 
for segregation, found justification for his views on race relations 
by looking to South Africa. Stone's book, Studies in the American 
Race Problem, showed a great awareness of race policies in South 
Africa, which he said he followed with as close attention as the prob­
lems confronted nearer home.^ Developments there supported his 
"fundamental proposition that the attitude of the so-called Anglo-
Saxon people toward the Negro the world over is essentially the same
62tinder similar conditions." The parallel developments in the two 
regions as well as in other parts of the world convinced him that 
segregation was part of a fundamental law of human relations, not a 
perverse phenomenon confined to the American South. Stone said in
^Ernest R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay
(New York, 1968}, Chapters VI, VII, IX.
^Alfred H. Stone, Studies in the American Race Problem (New 
York, 1908), 322-23.
62Ibid., 6.
essence that the North should not criticize the South for its policies,
for the South was only acting according to universal and immutable
63principles— as proved by South Africa. Events in South Africa were 
discussed to show that the disfranchisement of the black American was 
a wise policy, as were other forms of segregation.
If South African segregation may have influenced or justified 
American segregation for individuals like Stone, American segrega­
tion also had an impact on South African race policies. Sir George 
Campbell, an Englishman, toured the South in 1878 in an effort to 
obtain useful information which might aid Eritain in dealing with 
the black masses in its southern African colonies. In the South he 
found that social segregation was growing; the implications for 
southern Africa were clear when he discovered that a ’'certain friendly 
familiarity and association was possible and common . . . when the
6Uparties met on acknowledged terms of superiority and inferiority.”
Maurice S. Evans likewise visited the United States for insight into
dealing with racial problems. He found the South strikingly similar
to his own South Africa, and that the problem of both was the same.
The South he felt had lessons to teach South Africa. The Southern
experience convinced him that the Native should not be given the
65vote in South Africa. ' Similar lessons were learned by a South 
African visitor to the United States in the early 1930s, J. E.
63rbid. , U05-U06. 
6USir George Campbell, "Black and White in the Southern 
States,” Fortnightly Review, XXV (April, 1879), 588-607.
^Maurice g. Evans, Black and White in the Southern States;
A Study of the Race Problem in the United States from a South African 
Point of View (London and New York. 1915). 280-83.
Holloway. He found that prejudice, in the final analysis, had 
nothing to do with race or color. He noted that black Americans were 
freely admitted to hotels and theaters in the North until large 
numbers of blacks moved into an area, then attitudes hardened, 
friction grew, and segregation became the usual solution. After dis­
cussing the development of race riots in Northern cities, he con­
cluded :
The Americans, who have followed a policy of assimilation of 
Negroes with better conditions for its complete fulfilment 
than any nation is ever likely again to have, are as far from 
a solution of the problem of social and racial assimilation 
as we are in South Africa . . . .  The failure of assimilation 
in its final stages in America, and the inter-racial bitterness 
which the failure is bringing in its wake, is, to my mind, 
a serious warning of the danger of pursuing a policy of 
assimilation in this country.
Still another South African visitor’s views may have directly
influenced the growth of the apartheid concept. Two ministers, J. G.
Strydom and Johan Reyneke, made a tour of the Southern states in
1938 to study segregation there. The visit convinced Strydom that
separate development was the only possible solution to South Africa’s 
67problems. ' Strydom's advocacy of a separation policy played an 
important role, according to Rhoodie and Venter, in the growth of an 
intellectual rationale for apartheid. More directly, the Minister of 
the Interior made use of the American legislation prohibiting mixed 
marriages as an argument for similar legislation in South Africa. On
fl flDDJ. E. Holloway, American Negroes and South African Bantu 
(.Pretoria, 1932), 25-26. Holloway later became the South African 
Ambassador to the United States.
^N. J. Rhoodie and H. J. Venter, Apartheid: A Socio-
hlstorical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid 
IdeaCCape Town ancT Pretoria, I960). 162 .
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May 25, 19^9, he told the House of Assembly:
Look at the experience of other countries in this 'very same 
sphere of mixed marriages. Is it not something for the other 
side to think about that in thirty out of the forty-eight 
States of the United States they have legislation on similar 
lines to this? Is that not an argument to show that it is 
no reason for discarding such legislation, because it is 
not so effective as one would like it to be? I take it the 
difficulty is as great there as it is here, but thirty states 
have decided on legislation on these lines; thirty states 
have found it necessary to take legislative steps to keep 
down this social evil. And let me remind hon. members that 
the numerical position in the United States of America, in 
those thirty states is not a half or a quarter so serious 
as the position in South Africa.
In more recent years American racial disorders and rioting have
69served as additional justification for apartheid. Many more ex­
amples of this phenomenon at work in South Africa, encouraging both 
conservatism and liberalism in race questions, could be cited but 
that is beyond the scope of the present study.
In a sense, most of this chapter has been devoted to demon­
strating how South Africa may have encouraged greater liberalism in 
the United States. Each time that a writer compared apartheid in 
South Africa with segregation in the United States, it was with the 
purpose of showing what the United States should not be like.
68  ̂South Africa, House of Assembly Debates. vol. 68, col. 61+93
(May 25, 19^9).
69̂Even very liberal white South Africans had reservation about 
integration because of the American experience. Denis Cowen, a noted 
law professor at the University of Cape Town, told an audience at 
Cornell's law school that "when I see the travail of the United States 
in making integration a reality, and when I think of the different 
proportions of the South African population, I am almost tempted to 
believe that total partition or separation might be the only way of 
establishing peaceful race relations in South Africa, despite my own 
strong preference for the way of integration." Denis Cowen, "Cry, the 
Divided Country," Hew York Times Magazine, May 17, 1959, p. 75. See 
also A. S. Mathews, Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (Cape Town, 
1971), 309.
Beferences to South Africa were made to encourage Americans to follow 
or continue on a different course of action. A striking example of 
the phenomenon was furnished by a Christian Century editorial on the 
195^ American school desegregation decision. The magazine was strong­
ly opposed to letting the parochial schools in the South become segre­
gation academies. It warned that to allow this to come about
would make the church the last bulwark of racism in a society 
which is rapidly moving toward integration. It would bring 
Christianity into discredit in the United States in exactly 
the way it is being compromised in South Africa. It would 
Invite the terrible judgment of racial strife which is hanging 
over that continent.
Beviewing the provisions of some of the segregation legislation in 
South Africa5 the New York Times said that South Africa "may be a 
lesson to us as we try to make headway against segregation, bias, and 
prejudice in this country . . . . If we are rightfully shocked by 
what is happening in South Africa we must be more than ever determined 
that no part of it can ever happen here."^
The mere fact that news items appeared in the press and else­
where on South Africa's racial problems may have drawn more attention 
to American race problems.^ A writer in This Week magazine took note
^"The Desegregation Decision," Christian Century. June 15, 
1955, PP. 702-703.
71New York Times, May 27, 1957, p. 30. A few months later 
Christian Century similarly declared that South Africa was "a standing 
object lesson in how not to do things. For us the answer to this ne­
gation of human rights must be the positive pursuit of integration in 
all aspects of our common life," "Using the Human Gauge," Christian 
Century. October 9, 1957, pp. 1191-92.
721 Beading through the materials on South Africa in American 
publications, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that South 
Africa was used to indicate criticism of the United States indirectly. 
For example, the New Republic would sandwich editorials on South 
Africa between similar ones on American racial injustices. See New
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of this in 1950 in a discussion of Alan Paton's Cry the Beloved Country 
and the opening of a Broadway musical "based on it, Lost in the Stars.
He stated that Paton’s story was immensely popular and that it had 
"made Americans understand something of what life is like for the 
11,000,000 people of many races and origins in South Africa. And as 
they have set the hook down or walked away from the theater, they have 
felt a hit more conscious of our own problem over here . . . . An 
article in Time on apartheid led a reader to call for more liberal 
American laws:
I am struck by too many unhappy similarities in attitude between 
white South Africans and Americans. I hope that with the aid of 
enlightened governmental legislation within the next generation,
I shall never again hear statements similar to the one made by a 
four-year old neighborhood child to the effect that she is glad 
not to be colored because "Negroes aren't people!"7^
Allard Lowenstein, who later became a Congressman, wrote in his 
book, Brutal Mandate, that the fact "that each new racial atrocity in 
the United States encourages South Africa's misbehavior should provide
Republic. December 31, 1951» p. 7. Time placed a critical article on 
the Bantu Education Act just before one on Georgia's resolution to 
revoke for life the license of any teacher who in any way supported 
teaching integrated classes. Time, August 15, 1955, pp. 28, 30. See 
also Christian Century, April 8, 1953, pp.
^Howard Young, "Dixie in South Africa," This Week, February 
26, 1959, reprinted in Negro Dipest, VIII (June, i950")"j" 29-31 • Paton's 
novel was very popular In the United States; by 1968 the book alone had 
sold more than 1.2 million copies, according to statistics provided 
by the publisher, Charles Scribner's Sonsj Theodora Poulos to author, 
October 30, 1969. The novel and the play reached millions of other 
Americans after being made into a motion picture. Although Cry the 
Beloved Country was probably the single greatest source of information 
for most Americans about South Africa, it did not suggest that it was 
important that the United States take any action against South Africa, 
Rather, its effect seems to have been simply to increase American 
awareness of race problems in both the United States and South Africa,
^Letter of Fredi Hubler from Old Tappan, New Jersey, to the 
editor, Time, September 2, 1966, p. 6,
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added incentive— as if any should be needed— to speed progress at 
home."^5 Attorney General Ramsey Clark's fear of the United States 
becoming like South Africa encouraged him further to take steps to 
avoid the possibility. Although there is as yet little to support 
it, it seems possible that South African apartheid at least indirectly 
influenced Brown v. Board of Education. The United Nations had dis­
cussed racial segregation in South Africa since 19h6 and the General 
Assembly had gone so far as to resolve in 1950 that racial segrega­
tion was necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination. If 
this meant then that South Africa stood in violation of Article 55 
of the United Nations Charter, presumably so too did the United States. 
It was obvious to some people that if the United States did not bring 
its domestic policies in line with the United Nations declarations on 
South Africa, the United States could be very embarrassed,
A more direct influence of South Africa on American policies 
can be seen in several of the opinions of Justice William 0. Douglas 
in cases involving American civil rights questions. Holding up South 
Africa's policies as the very epitome of evil, Douglas argued in two 
"sit-in" cases that the United States must not accept apartheid, "When 
the doors of a business are open to the public," he said, "they must 
be open to all regardless of race if apartheid is not to become in­
grained in our public places." Apartheid, he went on, was "foreign to
"^Allard K. Lowenstein, Brutal Mandate: A Journey to South 
West Africa (New York, 1962), 22^.
76See, for example, the petition to the United Nations by the 
Civil Rights Congress, William L. Patterson, ed., We Charge Genocide 
(New York, 1951), xiii, 38-39; "South Africa Challenged,' Nation,
August IT, 19̂ -6, p. 172.
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our constitution."77 jn another case he asked why "should apartheid 
he given constitutional sanction in the restaurant field?" He feared 
that to allow private companies to discriminate would he "fastening 
apartheid on America."^ No douht Mr. Justice Douglas would have 
cast his vote the way he did even if he had never heard of South 
Africa; nonetheless, the vision of evil in South Africa reinforced his 
views and gave at least rhetorical strength to his argument.
What has been discussed thus far is how South Africa's policies 
may have stimulated the white conscience in America to do something 
more about American segregation. The extent of the influence was not 
very great, hut it was at least one factor among many others at work.
Black Americans also equated South African apartheid with American 
segregation, and the effect of this was probably to encourage greater 
militancy among some.
Black Americans have seldom argued that conditions for the
black man were better in the United States than in South Africa.
Rather the American South and South Africa were both examples of white
racism, and the two were generally associated together in any writing
on South Africa. This can be found in some of the earliest issues of
the publication of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, the Crisis, which began in November 1910. A report
in 1913, for example, stated that the
Union of South Africa, in imitation of the United States, and 
especially the southern section thereof, having decreed that a 
white skin is always to be the sine qua non to the realities 
expressed by the hifeh-sounding phrases about "life, liberty
^ Lombard v. Louisiana. 373 U.S. 267, 28l, 283 (1962).
7QBell v. Maryland, 328 U.S. 226, 25^, 271 (196U),
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and the pursuit of happiness," has been so Industriously 
pointing to the black man the way to become white that the 
government of the South African Union has had to make a special
investigation of the so-called black peril . . .  .79
Another article, this one by a black South African, was entitled
"James Crow in Africa," and was preceded by the statement of the
editors that the story showed "the almost dead parallel between ,}im~
crow methods in South Africa and America, even to the attempts of
native African 'leaders' (even as some American Negro ’leaders’) to
80persuade their brothers to accept a segregated colony." The same
author, Jameson G. Coka, had another article on political segregation
the next year and it was preceded by a similar statement: "American
Negroes should recognize easily the situation described by Mr. Coka
and the pronouncements of South African whites, for the same political
filphilosophy, with but few exceptions, holds away in Dixie."
Other black publications likewise equated the United States 
and South Africa. An article by Ernest Cole was printed in Ebony 
together with pictures from his book House of Bondage; Cole stated that 
the pictures would show why he felt somewhat at home in the United
DpStates. c A letter to Ebony said that the article and the photographs
brought to me a startling revelation of the inhuman conditions 
perpetrated by South Africa's racist minority white regime. The
^ " F o r e i g n :  South Africa," Crisis, VI (September, 1913), 231.
80Jameson G. Coka, "James Crow in South Africa," Crisis, XLI 
(September, 193M, 267. For linkages between black Americans and 
black South Africans, see Peter Walshe, "Black American Thought and 
African Political Thought in South Africa," Review of Politics. XXXII 
(January, 1970), 51-77-
8lJameson G. Coka, "Political Segregation in South Africa," 
Crisis, XLII (September, 1935), 266.
^Ernest Cole, "My Country, My Hell," Ebony, XXIII (February, 
1968), 69.
similarity is quite evident in America's racist attitude toward 
her "black minority. Who is the carbon copy of whom?®3
One of the chapters in South of Freedom, by the black journalist Carl
Rowan, was entitled "Apologies to South Africa." Why the apologies?
Because he found that Birmingham, Alabama, and not Johannesburg or
8UCape Town, was the world's most race-conscious city. American civil 
rights leader James Farmer described how on his visit to Africa
people repeatedly asked him what the difference was between apartheid
and American segregation. He attempted to explain that segregation 
was not official policy in the United States as it was in South 
Africa. He was himself not convinced that there was a great distinc­
tion and commented that those with wham he talked "were not particular­
ly impressed by the argument, but then most of the people I know in
BeMississippi aren't impressed by it either,"  ̂ The antipathy that
most black Americans felt toward South Africa was indicated by Rayford
Logan's statement that an "increasing number of American Negroes [were
becoming] more hostile to the Union of South Africa than to any part
86of the world except the state of Mississippi."
^Letter of W. C. Jones and C. L. Billings from Chicago, to 
the editor, Ebony, XXIII (April, 1968), 20.
^Carl T. Rowan, South of Freedom (New York, 1952), 158.
Q r
James Farmer, Freedom-When? (New York, 1965), 1U2. The 
Black Muslim leader, Malcolm X, told a British audience in 1961* that 
there was no difference between American segregation and South African 
apartheid, Cecil Northcutt, "Mission to South Afriea," Christian 
Century, December 16, 1961*, p. 1550; New York Times. August 23, 196U, 
p. 8&. And Ralph Bunche was quoted in 1967 as declaring: "The
ghettos in America are like the reserves in South Africa." "The Negro 
in America," Newsweek, November 20, 1967* p. 39.
86Rayford W. Logan, "The American Negro's View of Africa," in 
John A. Davis, ed., Africa Seen by American Negroes (Dijon, 1958), 221.
The way in which knowledge of South African apartheid may 
have influenced black action on civil rights matters in the United 
States was indicated by the reaction of one reader of Ebony to an 
article there by a Coloured South African. After reading Peter 
Abraham's discussion of the effects of the Bantu Education Act, a man 
from Pittsburgh wrote: "Think of what it would mean to those black
peoples today if the Negroes here in America commanded such power and 
respect that we could demand such an injustice not be allowed to pass
,,87undone. Of a more direct effect on black Americans were the events
surrounding the killing of sixty-nine Africans in Sharpevllle in
March i960. Following the shootings, the regional director for the
NAACP in Atlanta, Georgia, told a reporter that "more and more of our
people are talking about South Africa and relating what is happening
88there to their own situation." An incident more grimly indicating
the influence of the Sharpevllle events took place in Portland, Oregon
on April 3, i960. On that date, three blacks assaulted several whites
killing one of the whites. The blacks told that they had been reading
about both South Africa and the American South and had wanted to do
89something about it. Indeed, Sharpeville taught some blacks the
^Letter of Robert E. Butler from Pittsburgh, to the editor, 
Ebony, X (July, 1955), 6.
88Ruby Harley, quoted in "South Africa: Showdown Comes,"
Business Week. April 9, I960, p. 29.
®^McKay, Africa in World Politics, U05. In Philadelphia at
about the same time, a white boy was stabbed to death by a gang of 
twelve black youths. The city's mayor, Richardson Dilworth, partly 
attributed the murder to Sharpeville, stating that the "shooting of 
NegroeB in South African race riots and the arrest of American Negroes 
demonstrating against discrimination at lunch counters in the southern 
states have their effects In Philadelphia." Philadelphia Evening 
Bulletin. March 2h, i960, p. 3 [the quotation is a paraphrase of the
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folly of using nonviolent means to seek Justice from the white man.
One of the letters of Angela Davis to George Jackson clearly showed
this. The black revolutionary wrote:
Above all, we do not want to repeat past errors . . . .  Con­
cerning nonviolence: the specter of Sharpevllle, South Africa-—
thousands machine-gunned, kneeling in the streets, protesting 
apartheid, nonviolently. Nonviolence . . .  is a philosophy of 
suicide.90
The similarities between the United States and South Africa 
were also important because this had significance for American foreign 
policy. People both in the United States and abroad felt that apart­
heid had much in common with American segregation. When American race 
relations worsened in the latter part of the 1950s, it could be said 
of the United States, Just as Alan Paton had said of South Africa, "the 
world looks at us in astonishment, wondering what madness has possessed 
u s .’'9-1- In the eyes of the world there were two men on the cliff, both 
the United States and South Africa. Many Americans were concerned 
about their image abroad and wanted the world to know that they were 
opposed to racism. The United States government felt it had to make 
it clear that the country opposed segregation. But in the dialogue 
between the world and the United States the world could challenge 
American sincerity by pointing to American failure to oppose apartheid 
in South Africa. A country without race problems could say that it 
did not condemn apartheid because it was an internal matter within
Mayor’s remarks by the newspaper].
^Quoted in "Trials: T̂ rom Angela With Love," Newsweek, May
8, 1972, p. 38.
91Quoted in C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 
(.2nd rev. ed.; New X&Rk, 1966), 122.
South Africa's own Jurisdiction. But the United States was open to 
the charge that it failed to say anything because it really was not 
committed to ending segregation and was still infected with racist 
notions. So there was considerable incentive, both at home and 
abroad, for the United States to try to disassociate itself from the 
other "man on the cliff."
CHAPTER III
THE NEW AFRICA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN RACE WAR
If worsening American race relations provided an argument for 
a more critical policy toward South Africa, that argument was strength­
ened by an apparent increase in the importance of Africa to the United 
States and by a widespread belief in the imminence of a racial blood 
bath in South Africa. The way in which these latter two developments 
came together was indicated in an article in Commonweal in 1955 which 
stated:
Africa today stands before the Gates of Destiny, the keys of 
which are held by Mr, Strijdom. These could open to a glorious 
future of progressive endeavor, but in the implement of 
Apartheid they may prove to be the Gates of Hell, leading to 
a conflagration of hate and bloody revenge. In its atavistic 
urge to savagery, such an outbreak could not only engulf 
the Union of South Africa but sweep through the whole con­
tinent, utterly destroying a century of civilizing.1
For many years observers of South Africa in the United States and
elsewhere have predicted the outbreak of a violent and bloody race war
in South Africa.^ A crisis in South Africa in i960 following a
■*\D. C. Johnstone, "Diamonds and Fear: The Afrikander, Unseeing, 
Uncomprehending, Holds in His Hands the Future Civilization in Africa," 
Commonweal, March 11, 1955, p. 599.
^See Martin Legassick, "Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa," 
in Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, eds., The Africa Reader (2 vols.; 
New York, 1970}, II, 381: "Hardly a book has appeared on South Africa
in recent years which does not predict the inevitability, or strong 
likelihood, of a violent confrontation between the white minority and 
the oppressed African majority; a confrontation usually described as
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violent incident at the police station at Sharpeville, a town near 
Johannesburg, made many Americans believe the war had entered its 
first stages. This crisis occurred at the same time that numerous 
African countries were becoming politically independent, Americans 
thought it important that the new countries should not come under the 
influence of communism, but South Africa seemed to pose a threat to 
these countries and to American Interests in them.
The race war thesis resulted from a combination of simple 
mathematics and elementary political wisdom. The reasoning was as 
follows. Blacks outnumbered whites in South Africa four to one; 
numerical strength was overwhelmingly with the former. Like all men, 
the blacks deeply resented segregation and the denial of their rights. 
When men are denied their rights, they rise up in revolt, seize the 
powers of the state, and restore rights to themselves. Since segrega­
tion and the denial of rights was increasing rather than decreasing in 
South Africa, a bloody race war was inevitable. Added to this analysis 
was the feeling that evil is visited with retribution; the wages of 
sin is death. In much this spirit, the New York Times declared that 
the 1953 election which increased the Nationalists' strength was a 
"Victory for Evil," and stated:
That the vastly outnumbered white man has a practical problem 
of enormous difficulty and complexity in South Africa is not 
denied, but that it should be rationalized into the monstrous 
doctrine of racism is wicked. Therefore, there will be a day 
of reckoning for these men, since human beings will not endure
a 'bloodbath,' but which would lead to African rule." Making the same 
point but coming to a different conclusion from Legassick about the 
inevitability of the blood bath is Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial 
Domination (Berkeley, 1971), 13-15*
3injustice and the loss of freedom interminably.
The predictions of the inevitable war began years before 
apartheid became a word in the international vocabulary, but they be­
came more widespread when the Nationalists began the implementation of
ktheir race policies. Apartheid would, it seemed obvious, only 
exacerbate the existing tension and racial friction.'* Observers 
looking to events in South Africa for confirmation of the dire pre­
dictions found substantiation.
Just a year after the Nationalists had taken office, race 
riots occurred in Durban, a coastal city with a large Indian popula­
tion. Several hundred people were killed, and millions of dollars 
worth of damage done to property. The rioting by the Africans was 
directed, however, at the Indians and not at the whites of Durban.
How was this to be explained? Since both the Indians and the Africans 
had been subjected to apartheid, it would have seemed that they would 
be making common cause against the whites. The interpretations had to 
fit in with the image of black-white conflict; thus, it was generally 
concluded that the Africans were venting their frustrations against 
the whites and apartheid by turning upon the Indians. The Africans 
did this because the Indians were unable to retaliate but still were a 
more privileged group than the Africans. Life took this position,
^New York Times, April 17, 1953, p. 2h.
^See, for example, Christian Century which thought in 19^^ 
that the racial situation was moving rapidly to the breaking point. 
"Racial Tension Growing in South Africa," Christian Century, December 
6, 19U, p. 1403,
^"Political Power in South Africa," Nation, June 5, 19^8, pp.
617-18.
stating: "Fearing the whites, Durban's Zulus had struck blindly at
the more vulnerable Indians. The Nation even hinted darkly that the 
whites had encouraged the African rebellion against the Indians:
"There is good reason to believe that much of the hostility between 
these two unfortunate groups was deliberately fanned by their over­
lords , who dread the Negro masses and who have a score to settle with 
the Indians for bringing South Africa's condition to the attention of 
the United Nations.
Incidents continued to occur throughout the 1950s which re­
inforced the theme of conflict and provided the basis for predictions 
of the coming holocaust. The forecasts of violence appeared in all the 
major news magazines and in the reports of traveling journalists. Many 
people believed that the Passive Resistance Campaign of 1952, supported 
by leaders of the African National Congress and the South African 
Indian Congress, would erupt in violence. Time announced that the 
"restless and politically awakening Negroes" had scheduled nationwide 
demonstrations\ it stated that "the possibility of civil war hovered 
over South Africa, and a desperate decision faced Daniel Francois
QMalan, who had sown the whirlwind." The government put about eight
^"South African Racial Hatreds Erupt in Riots," Life, February 
7, 19^9, P. 27.
^Editorial, Nation, January 29, 19^9, pp. 11^-15. The 
Christian Century also suspected that government agents provoked the 
rioting. "South Africa's Race Riots a Warning," Christian Century, 
February 2, 19^9, p. 132.
Q"Reaping the Whirlwind," Time, March 31, 1952, pp. 37-38. See 
also C. L, Sulzberger's report in the New York Times, January 21, 1953, 
p, 7, and Sulzberger's diary in C. L, Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles 
Memoirs and Diaries 193^-195^ (New York, 1969}, 822. The diary entry 
seems to indicate that the explosion in South Africa would come later 
than suggested by the newspaper report.
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thousand of the protestors in jail, and no civil war qxupjted. A
visiting American journalist, Eobert St. John, felt that instead of
quelling revolt, the government's action encouraged revolution: "By-
listing and banning and hog-tying the . . . men of moderation, Malan
9was inviting the bloodbath everyone feared." Oden Meeker, another 
American writer, discussed the defiance campaign in his Report on 
Africa. He praised the leaders for remaining non-violent, but he re­
peated the warning in Paton's Cry, the Beloved Country that when the 
whites some day turn to loving, they will find that the blacks have 
turned to hating.'*'̂
Many other reports of events also emphasized conflict in South 
Africa. Rioting at an African beer hall was seen to have been caused 
by apartheid. The killing of a nun by Africans, and the eating of her 
flesh by her murderers, also demonstrated the race hatred that apartheid
was breeding.-*"** A bus boycott in 1956 by Africans that was accompanied
12by noting received attention in the American press. Relocation of 
African families from the slums around Johannesburg to government-built 
housing led to some incidents of violence in the mid-1950s. Newsweek 
reported one such moving under the headline "South Africa: Racial
Showdown." The lead sentence of the story was: "The fuse of racial
^Robert St. John, Through Malan's Africa (New York, 195*0, 298.
■*-̂ 0den Meeker, Report on Africa (New York, 195*+), 260-68.
11Indicating how far some Americans would go to present the 
Africans in a favorable light, one writer commented on this act of 
cannibalism that it represented "admiration for the victim because it 
express[ed] a desire to absorb the spirit of the fallen one." John 
Considine, Africa, World of New Men (New York, 195*+), 271.
1^E.g., "The Commuter^," Time, July 9, 1956, p. 26.
1 *3hatred burned shorter in South Africa last week. Harold Issacs,
an American journalist and political scientist, gave the following
statement on conditions in South Africa in a 1953 report:
With the police under orders to shoot first and investigate 
afterward, killings, riots, and pillage have occurred.when­
ever trivial incidents have fanned into quick flame the 
highly combustible accumulation of fear, terror, and des­
peration on both sides.
Over and over such stories as these appeared in the major news media,
each reinforcing the predictions of coming massive violence. The
forces of racial conflict were, as the Christian Century expressed it
IS"driving implacably toward national doom."
The conflict in South Africa came to be perceived by American 
observers as having importance to the United States for several rea­
sons. One of these was that apartheid and racial friction could en­
courage communism within South Africa. Soon after the Nationalist 
victory in 19W  the New Eepublic said that the denial of rights to
Africans would create a situation that was "tailor-made for Moscow 
l6propaganda." Newsweek featured a story in 1955 on Soviet plans for 
world conquest and indicated that the opponents of apartheid in South 
Africa would be given full support by the Kremlin."^ America, which
■^"South Africa: Racial Showdown," Newsweek, September 10,
1956, pp. kk, k'f.
ikHarold R. Isaacs, "The Dismal Annals of South African In­
tolerance," Reporter, January 6, 1953, p. 37.
1^"Tragic South Africa," Christian Century, June 22, 1955, pp
726-27.
"South Africa Turns Backward," New Republic, July 5, 19^8,
p. 9.
^"The Route of Conquest," Newsweek, November 28, 1955» p. 5^
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was critical of the Bantu Education Act because it cut off subsidies
to parochial schools, warned that "unless a genuine Christianity can
fill the moral vacuum [created by the secularization of the schools],
idit will be filled by a fanatic nationalism or communism." Another
writer asserted that South Africa's Suppression of Communism Act was
19forcing well-meaning liberals into the arms of communism.
Conflict in South Africa appeared to be important to the United 
States also because it seemed to threaten other parts of Africa. As 
colonial powers relinquished their authority in Africa and new coun­
tries appeared throughout the continent, .American interest in Africa 
increased greatly. Americans felt they had a special relationship with 
Africa and were intensely optimistic about the future of the new states. 
However, it was feared by many observers that South Africa's racial 
conflict could have disastrous consequences for Africa and for Ameri­
can interests in Africa.
The new American interest in Africa was reflected in many ways 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The articles and issues of period­
icals devoted to Africa grew in number. Foreign policy organizations
turned their attention to African issues, and new Africa-oriented
20organizations were formed. African studies programs were instituted
■^"Apartheid Hits the Schools," America, February 12, 1955, p. 
U99. See also ’̂ Biack Extremists in South Africa," America, February 
27, 195k, pp. 551-52.
■^John Scott, "Last Chance in Africa: An American View,"
Atlantic, CCIII (April, 1959), 92.
20A partial listing of such organizations by Vernon McKay in 
1963 included the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy 
Association, the African-American Institute, the African Studies 
Association, the American Society of African Culture, the Africa 
League, the Africa Research Foundation, the African Service Institute,
at major American universities.*^ The State Department in 1958
created a Bureau of African Affairs and the office of Assistant Secre-
PPtary of State for African Affairs. President Kennedy stressed the
importance he attached to Africa hy announcing the appointment of G.
Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
23before any other State Department appointments. The New Republic 
reflected on the new "climate of opinion" on Africa in i960 in a 
passage that bears quoting at length:
The new African-consciousness in the US begins at the grass 
roots; i960 has been named "Africa year" in American churches, 
and every Sunday School class and Ladies Aid circle from Pine 
Creek, Oregon, to Eagle Creek, Maine, has been conscientiously 
holding study sessions on the political situations below the 
Sahara. Congressmen’s offices have been flooded with requests 
for data on the awakening continent. These discussions are 
augmented by materials received by local churches from their 
missionaries, who convey an image of Africans as individuals 
with aspirations comparable to those of anybody else.
The over-familiar stereotype of African nationalists as 
potential Mau Maus has been broken down by the appearance on 
American television this year of such impressive leaders as 
Tom Mboya and Julius Nyerere— whose cultured British accents, 
remarkable social presence, and obvious intellectuality have 
relieved thousands of viewer-voters of many of their anxieties 
about post-independence Africa. American magazines have been 
outdoing each other to bring out bigger and better "special 
issues" on Africa. This is one case, then, where public opinion
the African-American Students Foundation, the Foundation for All 
Africa, and the American Committee on Africa. Vernon McKay, Africa 
in World Politics (New York, 1963), 253-51**
21Ford Foundation, Report of the Committee on African Studies 
(New York, 1958), 6; "African Studies Programs in US Universities," 
Africa Report, IX (October, 196H), 40.
^Vernon McKay, "The African Operations of the United States 
Government," in Walter Goldschmidt, ed., The United States and Africa 
(rev. ed.; New York, 1963), 273-75*
23Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F.
Kennedy in the White House (New York, 1967)» 511-12•
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i8 very nearly abreast of the experts in recognizing that 
Africa deserves an independent American appraisal.^
In the great outpouring of literature on Africa that accompa­
nied this strong interest, there was a new image of Africa. Americans 
writing on Africa knew that they were dealing with a dramatic new 
force in world affairs. They struggled to reject older images of 
Africa— images of savage natives in primordial rain forests and 
jungles— and to replace them with an image which would better fit the 
post-colonial era. In the new image, the Africans were a progressive, 
democratic people. Now that colonialism was ended, the great weight 
holding the Africans down had been removed and they could unite to 
confront the tasks before them. It seemed that they were creating a 
new civilization on a pristine continent where the beauty of nature
remained unviolated, and that they would avoid the excesses of commer-
25cialism and industrialism that had characterized Western development.
The new image of Africa was significant not only because it 
made South Africa appear all the more backward and foolish in its 
fears, but also because Americans believed the "new" Africa to be very 
important to the United States. The economic and strategic importance 
of Africa were asserted by Rupert Emerson, a Harvard political scien­
tist and former government official, in the American Assembly’s
^"Censure of South Africa," New Republic, April 4, i960, pp.
4-5-
25See, for examples, Gonsidine, Africa: World of New Men,
54-56; John Hughes, The New Face of Africa (New York, 19^1), 1-5;
Thomas Patrick Melady, Paces of Africa (New York, 1964), 1-6. For 
criticisms of the "conventional wisdom" of the 1960s on Africa, see 
Stanislav Andreski, The African Predicament (London, 1968), 13-14; and 
Russell Warren Howe, The African Revolution (London, 1968), 25, 39-40.
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collection of essays on The United States and Africa:
The stake of the West and of the United States in Africa is 
great. Negatively, the primary concern is to ensure that the 
Communist "bloc secures neither the prestige nor the material 
gains that would flow from enlisting Africa, or any substan­
tial part thereof, in its camp. Strategically, the vital 
importance of North Africa to Europe was demonstrated in 
World War II, and Dakar, offering potential command over 
South Atlantic shipping lanes, juts out as the nearest 
point for an invasion of the Western hemisphere. . . .  To 
a crowded Europe, Africa holds the promise of a frontier 
land still susceptible of great expansion, both as a market 
and as a source of raw materials, plus an almost unexplored 
industrial potential. Its riches in strategic and other 
minerals are impressive. In industrial diamonds, columbium, 
cobalt, chromium, and berylium, Africa either heads the 
list of world producers or stands close to the top*, it is 
a significant producer of tin, manganese, copper and anti­
mony; and its large reserves of iron ore and bauxite are 
just beginning to be tapped.^6
Newsweek called Africa "the richest prize on earth.
Africa also seemed important to the United States because to 
some Americans Africa was a test of the American character. For many 
generations Americans had held themselves up as a nation of revolu­
tionaries , men and women dedicated to the cause of human freedom every­
where. How real could this claim seem in the postwar world, when the 
United States was proving itself committed to the status quo in coun­
try after country? Communism now claimed to be representative of the 
revolutionary spirit that was so much a cherished part of the American 
heritage. The United States had already lost Asia; it had made a
26Rupert Emerson, "The Character of American Interests in 
Africa," in Goldschmidt, ed., pie United States and Africa, 28-29.
See also, Bichard L. Conolly, Africa's Strategic Significance," In 
C. Grove Haines, ed., Africa Today (Baltimore, 1955), 55-63; and 
Kenneth T. Young, Jr., "New Politics in New States," Foreign Affairs, 
XXXIX (April, 1961), 503.
^"Colonialism: The West's New Challenge," Newsweek, October
31, 1955, p. U6.
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sorry record for itself in Latin America; commitments in Europe had 
forced it into an uneasy complicity in the policies of the colonial 
powers with possessions in Africa. Now, with Africa coming to inde­
pendence, it seemed that the United States had one last opportunity 
to demonstrate its continuing commitment to all that it said was its 
heritage. Africa was America's challenge to prove to itself and to 
the world that it was in reality what it claimed to be. Americans be­
lieved they had a special identification with Africa because ten per 
cent of the American people were from Africa and because Americans and 
Africans shared the same ideals, the same revolutionary spirit and 
purpose. Over and over this appeared in writings on Africa.
Chester Bowles, whose views on South Africa have already been 
mentioned, said that Africa's anti-colonial revolution was based on 
"our traditionally American principles." He felt that, because of the 
revolutionary origins of the United States, "we have a clear moral, 
ideological, and— one might say— historical responsibility to play a 
constructive role in Africa or repudiate one of the most basic elements 
in our American history." Adlai Stevenson similarly asserted that 
it was up to the West to determine whether the future of Africa, "the 
most innocent of all the continents," would be good or evil.
Stevenson said that "what is being tested is, in the last analysis, the 
moral capacities of our s o c i e t y . A  writer in the Christian Science
28Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1957), vii, l’oS.
29Adlai Stevenson, "The New Africa: A (Juide and a Proposal,"
Harpers, CCXX (May, i960), 5̂ . See also W. Averill Harriman, "What 
the Africans Expect of Us," New York Times Magazine, October 9, I960, 
pp. 21, 116-17•
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Monitor thought that "the United States should he uniquely equipped 
to understand African problems and aspirations— having in its early 
years faced many of the same."30
If Africa's new countries appeared to hold a promise and 
challenge for the United States, South Africa seemed to pose a threat 
to American interests in several different ways. To begin with, South 
Africa's continued existence as an apparent vestige of colonialism 
stood as an obstacle to good relations between the United States and 
the rest of Africa. The United States, many felt, could not maintain 
normal relations with South Africa and still expect other African 
countries to be friendly toward the United States. Rupert Emerson 
asked if the United States "looks the other way when South Africa 
elbows its African majority aside, can it expect better than a suspi­
cious neutrality when it seeks to rally Africa's people to the free
31world's standards? He felt that Africa had yet to be convinced that 
the American concern for freedom and equality embraced the black man 
as well as the white. Similarly an article in Africa Today arguing 
for a stronger American policy on South Africa said that the "great 
significance of Southern Africa for us lies in the fact that it in­
volves issues of racial and political justice so stark and so closely
related to our own greatest shortcomings that our failure to respond
adequately raises doubts about the sincerity of our avowed commitments,
Opat home as well as abroad." Thus South Africa stood in the way of
^°Christian Science Monitor. April 8, I960, p. 2k.
-^"Emerson, "The Character of American Interests in Africa," 35.
32John jMarcum, "Southern Africa and United States Policy: A
Consideration of Alternatives," Africa Today, XTV (October, 19&7)> 12-13.
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convincing Africans that the United States really did "believe in human 
freedom; and if Africans could not "be convinced of this, it was feared 
they might choose communism over democracy.
A more direct threat to Africa seemed to arise from the threat 
of a race war originating in South Africa. A special issue of Life 
magazine in 1953 pointed out the dangers to Africa which South Africa 
posed. One article said that apartheid was turning the blacks of South 
Africa into a cruel and bitter people, and it raised the possibility 
that
these aroused Negroes, linking hands with their brothers all 
over the continent, may yet blow all hopes for Africa sky- 
high. There is still time to avert this, but not too much 
time. In Africa, both white and black stand at a fateful 
crossroads. Working together, they can pass from darkness 
to light. If they clash, Africa will pass back into jungle 
night.33
A Foreign Policy Association pamphlet in 1952 said that any aggressive
action by South Africa in the event of a war between the West and
communism would arouse concerted African resistance "and automatically
create in Africa a major ally for the Communist foe. Chester
Bowles feared that a racial explosion in South Africa would "turn
much of Africa against the white man, create new tensions in Asia and
35hasten the swing to Communism throughout the world." Newsweek
spelled out the threat to American interests even more starkly and 
graphically than did Bowles in this special "box" from a feature story
^Alexander Campbell, "Africa: A Continent in Ferment," Life,
May U, 1953, p. 10.
3UHarold R. Isaacs and Emory Ross, Africa: New Crises in the
Making, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 91 (New York, 
1952)7 55.
■^Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America, 66-67.
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on South Africa:
Powder Keg;- Seasons Why
The Problem; The Determination of Prime Minister Strijdom 
and his South African Government to enforce total segregation of 
12 million blacks, impose complete control by 2.8 million whites.
The Danger: Strijdom's policies could touch off an African
explosion which would lay the continent's vast untapped wealth 
and human resources open to Red ambitions.
The Stakes: South Africa is the free world's largest uranium
producer, source of U0 per cent of its gold, ll+ per cent of its 
diamonds. Ultimately in the balance are the loyalties of all 
Africa's 210 million people; its natural resources which now 
supply the U.S. with 60 per cent of its cobalt (jet engines, 
super-hardened steel); 36 per cent of its chrome (steel alloys 
and platings); and 35 per cent of its manganese (alloys for 
aircraft components).3°
The Seattle Times similarly saw South Africa as aiding communism in
Africa. It put South Africa and the Soviet Union in the same category,
stating that the policies of both were exacerbating the political
atmosphere throughout Africa. Apartheid, it said, "can be compared
*3*7to tightening the lid on a steaming teakettle." Still other Ameri­
cans took the view that South Africa was so great an affront to the 
rest of Africa that the work of nation-building could not progress
until white domination was ended there, or that the Africans of the
38new countries would invade South Africa to end apartheid.
South Africa's threat seemed to some Americans to extend even 
beyond the African continent. As early as 19^8, the Christian Century 
warned that "the storm that will eventually burst over South Africa
36"African Showdown," Newsweek, July 2, 1956, p. 33.
37Seattle Times, February 27, 1959 (clipping provided to the 
author by the newspaper).
^"Double Game in Africa," America, July 6, 1963, p. G.
Mennen Williams, Africa for the Africans (Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1969), 
2k, 205.
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is not likely to "blow itself out until it has loosed a cloudburst of
h39blood over that continent, and over most of the other continents.  ̂
Malcolm Ross, the former chairman of the Fair Employment Practices 
Commission, told a 1951 conference in New York that violent conflict 
in South Africa "would harm race relations all over the world. 
Communists would be the only ones to benefit,"^ Such fears increased 
after a series of events in i960 made a race war seem inevitable and 
imminent.
No one knows for sure exactly what happened outside the 
Sharpeville police station that Monday afternoon, March 21, i960.
The guns spoke only briefly, and many of the demonstrators at the 
back of the crowd did not even hear them at first. But before the 
day was over, the whole world had heard them. Had the Africans thrown 
stones and begun an attack on the police station, or had they been 
protesting peacefully, waving their hated passes? Had the gunfire 
been started by a nervous and inexperienced young policeman, or had 
it been a callous massacre, a premediated plan to show Africans that 
they should not attempt further protests? The result was the same 
regardless: sixty-nine Africans were dead and over two hundred lay
wounded. Whatever actually took place within the crowd and the ranks 
of the police, the nationwide anti-pass campaign organized by the 
newly-formed Pan African Congress and its dreadful yield outside the
^"South Africa's Witches' Brew," Christian Century, November
10, 19^8, pp. 1198-99.
ilOMalcolm Ross, "Emotional Aspects of the Civil Rights Issue," 
in Iyman Bryson, ed., Foundations of World Organization; A Political 
and Cultural Appraisal (New York. 1952), 108.
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police station made Sharpeville a household word on five continents,^1 
When Sharpeville occurred, there were already a number of 
foreign correspondents in South Africa, for Africa was big news in 
i960. Prime Minister Verwoerd had announced in January that there 
would be a plebiscite to determine if the country should become a 
republic. Only two weeks later the British Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan, told the South African Parliament while on a widely pub-
|lplicized tour that the "winds of change" were sweeping through Africa.
The anti-pass campaign had been announced in advance; reporters had 
been sent to cover it or had been instructed to stay for it after 
covering the other events. One reporter was able to take pictures of 
the crowds fleeing the police at Sharpeville and pictures of two 
policement with guns standing over the field of dead. These photo­
graphs were featured prominently in many papers and news magazines 
and added immeasurably to the sense of horror and outrage that people 
everywhere felt.
There was immediate and widespread condemnation of South
ItOAfrica throughout the world. Even before most‘editorial writers in
the American press had time to assess the situation, their papers
were reporting that Lincoln White, the State Department's press
officer, had told an Indian journalist at a press conference that:
The United States deplores violence in all its forms and hopes 
that the African people of South Africa will be able to obtain
^For a study of world reactions to Sharpeville, see Peter 
Calvocoressi, South Africa and World Opinion (London, 196l).
^2New York Times, February 5, i960, p. 26.
1*3 ,Calvocoressi, South Africa and World Opinion, 3-4. On the
United States, see ibid., 6-8.
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redress for legitimate grievances by peaceful means. While the 
United States, as a matter of practice, does not ordinarily 
comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it 
enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic 
loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the 
demonstrators in South Africa.^
Editorials appeared in newspapers all over the country simi­
larly condemning South Africa; they were given a continuing opportunity 
to do so because the crisis in South Africa went on for weeks. Huge 
demonstrations were staged by Africans in several cities in South 
Africa. An African work boycott began in many areas, and, when the 
police responded sharply, headlines such as "Whips Drive Africans to 
Their Jobs" appeared in American papers.^ A state of emergency was 
declared by the South African government; this was followed by an 
assassination attempt on the life of the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, 
by an unstable English-speaking farmer.
The crisis was seen as the inevitable result of apartheid.
The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin said that "with the inevitability 
of a Greek tragedy, the South African policy of apartheid . . .  is 
producing the ugly fruits that nearly everyone but its sponsors had 
foreseen."^ To the New York Herald-Tribune "it was obvious that the
harsh injustice of the South African government must sooner or later
11U7exhaust the stoic patience of the Negroes of the Union . . . .
It was, said the Washington Post, "a warning inscribed in blood,"
U U Quoted in Washington Post, March 23, i960, p. 6. On the 
background of this statement, see McKay, Africa in World Politics, 
299-300.
k5New York Herald-Tribune. April 5» I960, p. 6.
U6Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, March 23, I960, p. 2.
^New York Herald-Tribune, March 2k, i960, p. 16.
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that an entire people "cannot he kept in permanent subjucation and
denied all outlets for peaceful redress without inviting exactly the
hQcalamitous incident that has now occurred." In a statement re­
leased by the AFL-CIO, George Meany declared: "These official mur­
ders— they can be called nothing less— are the bloody fruition of a 
program of terror and inhuman racialism.
The events in South Africa seemed to have a special signifi­
cance for the United States. The same publications commenting on the 
South African racial problems were reporting on the discussions in 
Congress of a new civil rights bill for the United States and on civil 
rights sit-in demonstrations that were taking place in the South and 
in cities of the Ncrtheast. The Toledo Blade said that the American 
protest to Sharpeville "offers an occasion to ponder the relative 
barbarism of suppression in a frontier African nation and the more 
sophisticated means of glossing over the problem at home."'*1"1 The New
York Herald-Tribune took Sharpeville as a reminder that the United
States waB not moving fast enough in civil rights, and observed that
"it is no use pretending that there are not a good many white Ameri-
51cans who would feel at home in South Africa." Unless South Africa's 
racial policies were tempered, the newspaper asserted, it was "more 
than likely that the temper of racial disputes will be sharpened in
liftWashington Post, March 23, 19^0, A lU.
^Quoted in Washington Post, March 2U, 19^0, A J.
■^Toledo Blade, March 2h, i960 (clipping provided to the 
author by the newspaper).
■^New York Herald-Tribune, March 2U, i960, p. 16.
105
many places . . . .We, too, have explosive situations that a spark 
52might ignite." Calling South Africa a "Sick Country," the New York
Times said that "there was no doubt whatever that the trouble in
South Africa was a contagious malady that might sweep across frontiers
Just as other diseases do."-^ Two days later the Times made it clear
that it was the United States' frontiers that it was worried about:
What happens in South Africa touches half a continent immedi­
ately. It crosses the frontiers of every Asian country. It 
affects our own country, where the Federal courts and the 
Federal Executive are committed to the doctrine of equal rights 
before the law, but Southern Senators invoke the Constitution 
to prevent the passage of laws which make the Constitution 
effective.
"South Africa's Southern Colonels" thus threatened the United States.55 
Repeatedly the point was made in American publications that 
Sharpeville was not a single historical event but simply the beginning 
of a larger one; it was only a prelude to the race war that would 
follow and become ever larger and bloodier. Time, for example, re­
ported as things calmed a bit, that "it was clearly Just the end of
a skirmish; few doubted that the real battle lay ahead— perhaps not
56too far ahead." The St. Louis Post-Dispatch asserted that the more
the whites intimidated the moderates, the more likely it was that the
leadership of the Africans would fall to younger and lawless elements 57
52rbid., March 31, i960, p. 20.
^New York Times, April 1, i960.
^Ibid. , April 3, i960, Sec. p. 10.
55rbid., April U, i960, p. 28.
eg
"The Assassin of Milner Park," Time, April 18, I960, p. 2b.
57St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 5, i960 (clipping provided to 
the author by the newspaper).
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The Denver Post expected the violence to spread and to have effects 
elsewhere in Africa: "Each outburst of violence, each new edict that
pushes down on non-whites in the Union makes it harder for native 
African politicians to the north to advocate programs of moderation
rQtoward the white man."5 In a similar vein the Toledo Blade said that
59'the stakes in the rising nationalism of Africa are global."
The relative peace which came to South Africa after Sharpeville 
was repeatedly said to be a deceptive calm. The government's strong 
measures were seen as simply encouraging further extremism among 
Africans, as demonstrated by the formation of the militant organiza­
tions Poqo and llmkhonto we Sizwe— both rejecting nonviolent tactics—
after the banning of the Pan African Congress and the African National 
6 0Congress. But there were no more large scale African demonstrations 
and consequently nothing was to replace Sharpeville as the image of 
violent conflict in South Africa. Sharpeville continued to be used 
as the symbol of this conflict, both as a manifestation of the exist­
ence of racial turmoil and as a sign“of the imminence of the coming 
blood bath. A decade after Sharpeville newspapers and magazines con­
tinued to run pictures of the field of bodies at Sharpeville; they
58Denver Post, March 2k, I960 (clipping provided to the author 
by the newspaper).
■^Toledo Blade, April 12, i960 (clipping provided to the 
author by the newspaper).
60The New Republic said that the formation of Umkhonto signi­
fied "a final turning away from hope that peaceful change might be 
accomplished by traditional protest and reconciliation." "South 
Africa Underground," New Republic, February 12, 19f>2, p. 11. See 
also "Hate Against Hate.*1 Newsweek, April 8, 19^3, p. Ul; and James 
S. Coleman, "The Character and Viability of African Political Systems," 
in Goldschmidt, ed., The United States and Africa, 70.
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warned of the possibilities of "another Sharpeville massacre."
Sharpeville not only convinced many that a race war was 
likely in South Africa but it also persuaded some that action against 
South Africa was desirable or necessary. It was Sharpeville more than 
anything else that set in motion a movement in the United States for 
some type of action against South Africa.
CHAPTER IV 
THE MOVEMENT FOR AMERICAN ACTION AGAINST 
SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID
In the first decade of apartheid in South Africa under the 
Nationalist Party, few Americans felt that it posed any problems for 
the formulation of American policy. Apartheid did not seem to in­
volve Americans directly or touch strongly on American interests.
Even for those who became very interested in the racial situation in 
South Africa, the only action that seemed to be called for was to make 
the American public aware of apartheid and on occasion to extend pri­
vate aid and encouragement to some of the "victims" of South Africa's 
policies. Sharpeville, worsening American race relations, and the 
appearance of new African states made stronger action seem appropriate. 
However, even before Sharpeville there were some Americans who called 
for action against South Africa's race policies. Several black Ameri­
can groups became critical of American policy on South Africa at an 
early date, and a broader "public" became interested in a policy de­
cision on one occasion when it directly involved black Americans.
Black Americans, as suggested earlier, have long had a very 
harsh attitude regarding South Africa. It represented to them in an 
acute form the racial supremacist views and denial of rights which 
they faced in the United States. Because they believed the two 
systems to be related, black Americans began to attempt to influence
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policy on South Africa in an organized way with the formation of the 
Council on African Affairs in 1937. The Council was established under 
the guidance of Max Yergan, a black sociologist who had spent a number 
of years working in South Africa, and Paul Robeson, a black activist 
singer and actor."*' At its inception, the Council announced that it 
had three purposes to accomplish: to give aid to the struggles of
the African masses; to disseminate information concerning Africa and 
its peoples; and to influence the adoption of governmental policies 
designed to promote the advancement and freedom of African people and 
preserve international peace.2
To further its goals, the Council on African Affairs pub­
lished a monthly bulletin, New Africa. South Africa received much 
attention in the pages of New Africa. During World War II the
bulletin focused on the oppression of the Africans by the South Afri­
can government rather than on that government's participation in the 
war. That is, unlike most other American publications which concen­
trated on the conflict between the "good” followers of Prime Minister 
Smuts and the "bad" Afrikaner Nationalists, New Africa portrayed an 
oppressive white government without differentiating significantly be­
tween the white groups. It printed stories of police brutality and 
described the government police as being like the German
•̂ Council on African Affairs, The Job to be Done (n.p., n.d.),
6 (pamphlet collection, Perkins Library of Duke University).
2Ibid.
3The author examined most of the issues of New Africa and its 
successor Spotlight on Africa for the period from 19^ through 1952 
in the files of the New York City Public Library.
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kGestapo- Even as the war was drawing to a close, Hew Africa de- 
picted South Africa as being on a course toward Fascism and turmoil.^
The Council on African Affairs attempted to influence racial 
policy in South Africa and American policy towards South Africa in a 
variety of ways. It tried to make information on South Africa more 
widely available and opposed South African injustice editorially. It 
supported efforts to raise funds for Africans living there. It re­
ported that it "repeatedly urged South African officials to remove
cthe burden and shame of the pass regulations freon African society."
An example of such urging occurred in 19^ after race rioting took 
place in Johannesburg. Max Yergan, the executive director of the 
Council, wrote the South African minister to the United States,
S. F. N, Gil, a long letter deploring the rioting. In part, the 
letter stated:
Whether such riots occur in the Union of South Africa, in the 
United States, or elsewhere, they are a matter of concern to 
all democratic peoples of the United Nations who are fighting 
to destroy the concept of racial inferiority and the practice 
of racial oppression. Continued failure to take effective 
action against these evils, it appears certain, spells disas­
ter for both Europeans and non-Europeans in South Africa.7
Officials of the Council on African Affairs had meetings with
^See, for examples, the articles in New Africa, III (February,
19UU), 2. New Africa evidently had good sources of information. It 
regularly quoted from South African papers and publications, and it 
made references to correspondents in South Africa.
5"Pro-Nazis in South Africa Heading Country Toward Fascism and 
Chaos," New Africa, III (October, 19^*0, 1.
6New Africa, III (May, 19^0, 1-2.
7Max Yergan to S. F. N. Gil, in New Africa, III (December,
19M0, 1.
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State Department officials during World War II and sought to influence 
postwar planning on African questions. In April 19^5 the Council 
issued a memorandum for consideration by the delegates to the con­
ference drawing up the United Nations Charter. Entitled The San 
Francisco Conference and the Colonial Issue, the pamphlet called for 
an end to colonialism and declared principles of international respon-
Qsibility for colonial peoples. In furtherance of these principles, 
Yergan wrote Edward R. Stettinius, soon to become the American dele­
gate to the United Nations, voicing strong objections to the inclusion 
of South Africa as a member of the temporary trusteeship committee of 
the United Nations.^ Although unsuccessful, such efforts did call 
attention to the issues of race before the United Nations.
In the postwar period, the Council on African Affairs grew 
increasingly radical, and it was placed on the Attorney General's list 
of subversive organizations in 19^8. The Council continued to urge 
United Nations action on South Africa, but, in a pattern to be re­
peated by other organizations two decades later, it became more highly 
critical of American policy on South Africa and American business 
activity within South Africa. "Apartheid in South Africa," said one 
Council pamphlet, "pays big dividends to the few— not only in that
^Council on African Affairs, The San Francisco Conference and 
the Colonial Issue (New York, 19̂ +5) (pamphlet collection, Perkins 
Library of Duke University).
^Max Yergan to Edward R. Stettinius, in New Africa, IV 
(November, 19^5), 1.
10,IU. N. Approval, of Indian Resolution in Blow at Racialism 
Throughout the World," New Africa, V (December, 19^6), 1; "U. S. A. 
Blocks U. N. Action on South African Discrimination Issue," New Africa, 
VI (December, 19^7)* 1.
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country and in Britain, but alao in the United States of America."11 
The author of the statement, Alphaeus Hunton, the Council's Secretary, 
asked: "How much of the blood of South Africa's oppressed black
people is on America's own hands?"1^
The reason for the Council's concern over South Africa was 
repeatedly given in its publications: the struggle of black South
Africans and of black Americans was the same struggle, not only against 
the same racial ideas, but also the same economic forces and individu­
als. The enemy was white American capitalism, and it was, in the 
Council's view, responsible for black oppression all over the world.
An editorial in Spotlight on Africa, the successor to Mew Africa, 
stated in 1952:
The South African government is aiding in "preserving democ­
racy" in Iforea by sending its Jim Crow air force to help kill 
Koreans. South Africa is a part of President Truman's "free 
world." Yes, dozens of America's biggest auto, oil, mining and 
other trusts have highly profitable holdings in that country.
. . . Hence it is clear that in raising our voices against 
the Malan regime we simultaneously strike a blow at the re­
actionary forces in our own land who seek to preserve here, 
in South Africa, and everywhere else the super profits they 
harvest from racial and national oppression. United support 
for our brothers' struggles in Africa is an integral part of 
our task in achieving freedom for all Americans and peace for 
the world.13
The Council on African Affairs portrayed the Passive Defiance 
Campaign of 1952 in South Africa as part of the struggle of black 
Americans for equality and dignity. It printed the text of an African
1 Alphaeus Hunton, "Postscript for Americans," Resistance 
Against Fascist Enslavement in South Africa (Mew York, 1953), U8 
(pamphlet collection, Perkins Library of Duke University).
12Ibid.
^Spotlight on Africa, XI (February 25, 1952), 1.
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National Congress and South African Indian Congress memorandum to 
the United Nations concerning the campaign and appended to it a post­
script urging American action. Answering the question of why Americans 
should respond, the postscript's author said: "If you hate Jim Crow,
if you hate fascism, that is e n o u g h . T h e  problem of the United 
States, he continued, could not be divorced from that of South Africa: 
"Can the octopus of racism and fascism be killed by simply cutting off 
one menacing tentacle?"-*^ The Council's Spotlight on Africa put it 
more forcefully:
A people's victory in South Africa will mean a victory for 
PEACE— a decisive set-back to those interests in Washington, 
whose profits-and-war schemes depend upon racial and rational 
oppression. On the other hand, the defeat of the Civil Dis­
obedience Campaign in South Africa will mean OUR defeat, too—  
a set-back for OUR struggle for democratic rights.l6
The increasing radicalism of the Council led to defection from 
its ranks by its more moderate members, including Max Yergan, and to 
further harassment by governmental officials. Finally, it was dis­
solved in 1955.̂
In the meantime, however, other civil rights groups began to 
take up South Africa as a cause. The National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, for example, began demonstrating more 
concern over South African issues at the United Nations and American 
policy on South Africa. In 1955 the NAACP challenged American policy
llfHunton, "Postscript for Americans," 48,
15Ibid.
^Spotlight on Africa. XI (June 24, 1952), 1.
^On the Council on African Affairs, see also Mark Solomon, 
"Black Critics of Colonialism and the Cold War," in Thomas G. Paterson, 
ed., Cold War Critics (Chicago, 1971)» 205-239.
llU
by demanding that a United States Navy ship, the Midway, refrain from 
calling on South African ports where black American sailors would be
-| Qsegregated. Although the Navy rejected the demand, the NAACP 
found some degree of support in the press because it was a situation 
in which South African apartheid directly affected American citizens.
The New York Times agreed with the NAACP, editor dalizing that either 
South Africa should have agreed to waive apartheid in respect to
19American sailors, or the Midway should have stayed out of Cape Town.
That an element of national self-interest was beginning to be perceived 
in policy questions on South Africa was seen in the argument in support 
of the NAACP position made by Canmanweal. It observed that "surely a 
refusal by the U. S. to allow its personnel to be humiliated by South
Africa's apartheid laws would be a striking demonstration to the
world's non-white peoples of the official opposition of the United
OQStates to racism." It was, however, obvious that if the United States 
government attempted to accede to the NAACP demand, it would have been 
put in the incongruous position of demanding of Cape Town, South Africa, 
something it could not demand of the Midway1s home port of Norfolk, 
Virginia, or of other naval installations at Charleston, New Orleans,
pHand other locations in the South.
^®New York Times, January l6, 1955, p. 9.
^New York Times, January 17, 1955, p. 22.
Qn "Apartheid and the Navy," Commonweal, January 28, 1955,
p. 1+U6.
21On this, see the letters to the New York Times of Warren 
Goodman, January 19, 1955, p. 26, and Hob E. Hurst, January 2k, 1955,
p. 22.
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Apart from one or two other Isolated instances, there were 
few questions raised publicly about American policy on South Africa 
until the end of the 1950s. For those disturbed by apartheid, American 
progress in race relations in the early 1950s seemed to offer the 
possibility of progress elsewhere. America, it seemed, could do more 
to end unjust race practices in South Africa by its good example than 
in any other way. And interference in the internal affairs of a 
friendly, non-Communist country was unprecedented. There were individ­
uals and groups who voiced concern over South Africa, but they directed 
their efforts at making Americans aware of South Africa's race problems 
and into alleviating the conditions of some of those suffering from 
apartheid in South Africa. In the late 1950s, they began showing 
greater concern over American policy.
One such group was the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), one 
of the oldest and most important of the Africa-concerned organizations. 
The ACOA had contacts with many people in the United States interested 
in Africa. The Committee's techniques of operation were typical of 
special interest groups operating on limited budgets. Its publications 
illustrated changing views on policy of liberal Americans concerned 
about South Africa.
The American Committee on Africa was founded in 1953 by a 
group of liberal-minded persons who had broad experience in the civil 
rights movement in the United States. These included Donald Harrington 
of the International League for the Rights of Man, Rayford Logan, a 
professor at Howard University, Harold Isaacs, a professor at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, George Carpenter of the National 
Council of Churches, Walter Offutt of the NAACP, Homer Jack, an
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Evanston, Illinois minister, and George M. Houser, formerly executive
director of the Congress of Racial Equality and national projects
22secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Houser, the son of 
American missionaries, had been secretary of another organization 
formed the previous year by some of the same people who founded the 
ACOA. Called Americans for South African Resistance, it had been 
organized to arouse American interest in the Passive Defiance Campaign 
of 1952 and attempted to do this through demonstrations and mass 
meetings. J The ACOA, on the other hand, expected to engage in less 
direct tactics. It planned to act, its founders stated, principally 
"as a clearing house for information about present day political and 
economic events in Africa in order to create a concern for intelligent
oiland constructive American action in Africa." Although it thus 
claimed all Africa as its interest, its major emphasis from the be­
ginning was on South Africa,
In its first years, the American Committee on Africa acted as 
a "clearing house" for information rather than as a policy advocate.
It attsnpted to reach a broad public by writing letters to the editors 
of various publications, and it published its own periodic newsletter,
Africa Today, I (April, 195*0, 1. For much of the material 
on the ACOA, the author is indebted to the assistance of several of its 
personnel who sent materials to the author. In addition, the author 
visited the Hew York offices of the ACOA and received further such 
assistance in June 1972.
23Letter of George M. Houser to the editor, Nation, November 
29, 1952, pp. 503-50U; letter of Jim Peck to the editor, Africa Today, 
III (May-June, 1956)* 13; Peter Weiss, "American Committee on Africa: 
Rebels with a Cause," Africa Today, X (November, 1963), 38-39*
^Africa Today, I (April, 195*0, 1*
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Africa Today. It held conferences and coordinated meetings with other
liberal groups, including, among others, the NAACP, the International
League for the Rights of Man, the Congress of Industrial Organization,
Americans for Democratic Action, the Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom, the National Ethical Union, and the American Jewish 
25Labor Committee. It set up informational activities for visiting 
African leaders, including controversial South African figures such as 
the Reverend Michael Scott, a spokesman against South African control 
of South West Africa, Peter Abrahams, a Coloured writer, and Ellen 
Heilman of the South African Institute of Race Relations. It undertook 
special projects to assist South Africans. After the passage of the 
Bantu Education Act, for example, it set up a fund to support mission­
ary schools that might otherwise have lacked sufficient funds for 
operation. When a number of opponents of apartheid were arrested and 
tried for treason in 1956, the ACOA raised money for a Defense and 
Aid Fund to help defray defense costs and to support the families of 
the defendants.
In addition to these activities, the American Committee on 
Africa began to establish contacts with public officials. ACOA person­
nel met with members of Congress and with othar elected and appointed 
government officials to provide them with information on African 
issues. Officials were also given the opportunity to present their 
views in ACOA publications. Thus the ACOA carried on informational 
activities on three levels: it attempted to filter information down
to a broad public; it attempted to work through other opinion influen­
cing organizations; and it reached "up" to embrace policy leaders and
25Africa Today, I (October-November, 195*0, 1-2.
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makers.
With the passage of time, the American Committee on Africa 
began to express increasing concern about American policy on colonial 
Africa and South Africa. Writers in Africa Today began asking harsh 
questions about American policy. Harold Isaacs, for example, wrote an 
essay for a 1957 issue in which he predicted disaster for the "blind"
racists of South Africa. He asked what the United States should do if
the showdown came. Isaacs had no answers but urged "Let's start 
groping, hard."^
In the same issue another author indicated how the image of
South Africa was becoming tied up with the American image abroad and
American policy on South Africa. Commenting on the world wide pub­
licity given to the denial of a glass of orange juice to an African 
diplomat in a road-side restaurant in Delaware, the author of Africa 
Today's "Talking Drums" column stated:
It is fitting in an issue devoted to the dangers and evils 
of South African racialism that we should state for the record 
our increasing opposition to all manifestations in the United 
States of racial discrimination and segregation. Our situation 
might be comparable to South Africa if the attitude of the 
citizens of Mississippi prevailed in all America. Fortunately, 
it does not, however, not because we are more virtuous but 
simply because the Negroes in other areas are in a minority 
rather than a majority. We have yet to prove to the world that 
America has any better claim to fulfilling the rights of man 
than the Union of South Africa.^
Increasingly it seemed necessary to such people to state "for the
record" official American opposition to discrimination and segregation
26Harold E. Isaacs, "South Africa: Alternatives to Disaster,"
Africa Today, TV (November-December, 1957)* 6.
^"Talking Drums," Africa Today, IV (November-December, 1957),
U9-50.
in both South Africa and the United States.
The implications of Isaacs's article and the "Talking Drums" 
statement began to be formulated into specific policy proposals by 
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, a member of the ACOA's 
National Committee, in a subsequent Africa Today issue. Senator 
Humphrey was critical of the fact that for years the American govern­
ment had annually been foregoing the opportunity "to make clear where
we stand on the racial issue" by failing to denounce South Africa at
28the United Nations. He continued:
lOjn the issue of apartheid our representative failed to get 
up on his feet before the nations of the world to point out that 
we in the United States, administratively, legislatively, and 
judicially, have recently launched a new effort to eliminate 
segregation in a wide variety of fields from schools to public 
transport. We might have made it perfectly clear that we be­
lieve in putting one's own house in order first on this matter, 
but that deliberately putting it in disorder by cultivating 
racism, whether under Hitler or as apartheid, is an evil 
humanity will not tolerate.
Senator Humphrey claimed that communism threatened Africa, and urged
that the United States should do all it could to forestall the
advance of communism. Opposing apartheid officially was one way of
hindering the spread of communism into Africa, said Humphrey.
As these articles in Africa Today indicated, changing condi­
tions in the United States and Africa were leading some Americans to 
argue that a more critical policy on South Africa was necessary. 
Criticism of apartheid could, it was believed, convince foreigners 
of American "sincerity" on civil rights issues and also forestall the
oAHubert H. Humphrey, "U, S., Africa, and the U. N.," Africa 
Today, V (January-February, 1958), 9, 20.
29Ibid.. 20.
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spread of communism. Given the assumptions of these articles, the 
arguments for policy change were plausible, indeed persuasive.
Apparently personnel in the Department of State thought so too, be­
cause in 1958 the United States made its first important change in 
policy on South Africa.
Prior to 1958, the United States carefully avoided taking an 
official stand against apartheid at the United Nations. Official 
statements indicated that the United States opposed every form of
racial discrimination, but the proper method of dealing with it was to
30let each member state work to solve it in its own way. The United
States generally abstained from voting on resolutions dealing with
South African apartheid. However, in October 1958 the United States
voted in favor of the perennial resolution denouncing apartheid, on
this occasion one expressing regret and concern that South Africa had
31not responded to United Nations appeals to revise its policies.
Much of the announcement declaring the American position was devoted 
to the race problems of the United States and explaining how the 
government was moving to a multiracial society without discrimination.^ 
Thus both domestic and foreign political developments combined to 
produce a shift in American policy on South Africa.
30See, far example, the statements James W. Wadsworth in 
Department of State Bulletin, January 3, 1955, pp. 32-36. For further 
details on the development of American policy on South Africa from 19^5 
to 196b see Sanford David Greenberg, "United States Policy Toward the 
Republic of South Africa, 19^5-196k," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University, 1965).
31United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 12^8 (XIII)
(1958).
^Department of State Bulletin, November 2k, 1958, pp. 81+2-M.
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For a brief period, the decision to Join in the criticisms of 
South Africa at the United Nations seemed an adequate change in policy 
to meet the country's foreign policy needs. However, the Sharpeville 
crisis of March-April i960 brought about new and much stronger demands 
for changes in American policy on South Africa.
As discussed earlier, the State Department reacted immediately 
to Sharpeville with a strong statement deploring the African deaths. 
Through its immediate criticisms of the police shootings, the State 
Department was able to seize the initiative in responding to the 
crisis in South Africa. That is, the government's statement preceded 
the public outcry against the police actions; it was not made in 
response to American public opinion. Not only did Lincoln White 
deplore the incident in his news conference a day after it occurred, 
but the American ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, 
acting in his capacity as President of the Security Council, called 
the Security Council into session to consider the situation. The 
American Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, at a press confer­
ence also put the United States on record as opposed to South Africa's
actions and policies and in favor of United Nations discussion of the 
33matter.
Although the United States was thus issuing rather extraordi­
nary statements on the internal affairs of another state, there were 
few, outside the South, who disapproved of them and many who commended 
them. The Seattle Times, for example, commented on the government's
^Washington Post, March 23, I960, A 1; March 25, I960, A 1; 
March 26, i960, A 5• New York Times, March 26, i960, p. 2.
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statements:
It is necessary and fitting that all major nations of the 
free world make clear, not only that they regret the "blood­
shed in South Africa, but that they abhor the doctrines that 
led to the bloodshed.3*»
The Seattle newspaper suggested that apartheid should now come to mean 
the segregation of South Africa from the rest of the world. The New 
York Times likewise saw nothing to criticize in the government state­
ments. It went so far as to editorialize that international pressure 
would be required to "cure" the "sickness" of South Africa.^
Some groups and publications not only commended the American 
response but went on to call for stronger policy measures. In a 
declaration signed by many prominent citizens praising Secretary 
Herter's statements, the liberal Americans for Democratic Action called 
for taking the further steps of halting gold purchases from South 
Africa and recalling the American envoy to South Africa.^ Similarly, 
Christian Century called for a boycott of South African gold, sug­
gesting that this could be a means of averting civil war In South 
Africa. Proclaiming that the United States had the means to "bankrupt" 
South Africa, the periodical declared that if the United States
"^Seattle Times, April 6, i960 (clipping provided to the 
author by the newspaper).
■^New York Times, April 1, i960, p. 32. The Christian Science 
Monitor urged that it was no longer enough to condemn apartheid. ,ri"f" 
Americans," it said, "take a forward position against it in the United 
Nations, they obligate themselves to offer clear Ideas far a pertinent 
American policy." Christian Science Monitor, April 12, i960, p. 18. 
Approving of United Nations debate on apartheid, the St. Louis Post- 
Dispatch said that South Africa *s objections to such discussions 
carried "a vague echo of states' rights." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
March 31, i960 (.clipping provided to the author by the newspaper).
36New York Times, April 17, I960, p . 9.
123
refused to buy gold,
the Verwoerd governnent -would have to yield or fall. . . .
A boycott threat by Washington and London might end the mad­
ness which threatens to plunge South Africa into a blood bath.
If the threat is not heeded, an imposition of a boycott on gold 
would soon paralyze the country which threatens world peace 
more seriously than any other.’’
The close correspondence between American race problems and 
American views on South Africa was effectively symbolized in a Joint 
demonstration by the American Committee on Africa and the Congress of 
Racial Equality. After picketing a New York City Woolworth's store in 
protest against Woolworth's exclusion of blacks from lunch counters 
in the South, leaders of the two organizations marched directly to 
the South African consulate in New York to picket it in protest
nOagainst the Sharpeville shootings.
In addition to its demonstration, the American Committee on 
Africa held an Emergency Action Conference on South Africa in coopera­
tion with representatives of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of 
America, Americans for Democratic Action, the American Society of 
African Culture, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the 
Jewish Labor Committee, the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People, and the United Auto Workers. The avowed purpose 
of the Conference, which was held in New York City at the Carnegie 
International Center on May 31 and June 1, I960, was to find ways to 
bring about change within South Africa. The Chairman of the Confer­
ence was Jackie Robinson, the first black to play major league
^"Stop Gold Purchases from South Africa," Christian Century, 
April 6, I960, p. U05.
^®New York Times, March 2k, i960, p. 8.
baseball. In his opening statement Robinson toM the participants 
that
America, however removed from South Africa, has the task of 
aiding in the establishment of real democracy there. . . .
I see the struggle against race supremacy and racial inequality 
as world-wide. The fight against Jim Crow here is part of 
the same struggle in South Africa.^
Die Conference made a number of recommendations for actions 
against apartheid. These included a consumers' boycott of South 
African products sold in the United States, discouraging American 
tourism in South Africa, a ban on South African participation in the 
Olympic games, nondiscrimination by American businesses operating 
in South Africa, having local groups sponsor conferences on South 
Africa, and calling for donations to the Defense and Aid Fund which 
had been Bet up several years earlier. As for government policy, 
the Conference commended the State Department for its condemnation of 
Sharpeville. It urged that the President and Congress by joint 
resolution declare that United States policy was opposed to apartheid, 
that both major political parties pledge themselves to seeking an end 
to apartheid, that State Department operations in South Africa be 
integrated, that aid be given to refugees from South Africa and South 
West Africa, and ihat r'no future purchase of gold or strategic 
materials from South Africa will be made where there are alternative 
sources of supply.
A shortcoming of the Conference was that it adopted an all- 
inclusive approach to its calls for action against South Africa, a
39""American Committee on Africa, Action Against Apartheid (New 
York, i960), 1 (pamphlet in possession of the author).
125
broad listing of all types of measures that might be taken to show 
disapproval of South Africa's policies. The organizations supporting 
these proposals lacked the means of following up on their exhortations 
except through educating their members about South Africa. It should 
be noted, too, that there was an assumption implicit in the proposals 
that the government, with some prompting from the public, could be 
induced to take a much stronger policy against South Africa. It is 
interesting to observe that the Conference expected the South African 
government to continue to provide the United States with strategic 
materials even after harsh policies would be adopted.
The Emergency Action Conference represented only one of 
several phases through which the movement for action against South 
Africa went after i960. Before proceeding with the subsequent phases 
of the movement, it should be pointed out that participants in the 
movement, although united in their hostility to South Africa, were 
not entirely in agreement on the ultimate purposes of the movement j 
that is, they were not clear on the rationale for action against 
South Africa. Lack of clarity on the point did not necessarily lead 
to disruption between the critics of South Africa, for they often 
could agree on method if not ends. But to understand better how 
changing perceptions of South Africa, Africa, and United States race 
problems were linked to changing views on policy, it is necessary to 
understand the different reasons given for the movement for action 
against South Africa. These have been touched upon already and will 
emerge again in the materials that follow. But for purposes of 
clarity they will be summarized briefly,
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First, there was the argument from national self-interest.̂
Because of its poor image abroad, the United States needed to show the 
world that it was truly opposed to racism. If the United States 
opposed racism at home, it also had to oppose it abroad. Only by 
effective opposition to South Africa’s race policies could the 
American image be rehabilitated abroad and the spread of communism 
to the strategically important continent of Africa be forestalled.
A significant problem which inhered in this rationale was that no 
opposition to apartheid could be considered adequate until apartheid 
was ended. Each step in opposition required further steps in order 
to prove the United States's sincerity.
A second rationale for a stronger American policy against 
South Africa was that it could help bring about change within South 
Africa. This argument proceeded partly from humanitarian and ideo­
logical concerns and partly from considerations of self-interest.
American policy, some felt, could be a means of convincing the whites 
of South Africa that their racial policies were futile and had to be 
abandoned in favor of advancing human freedom. Alternatively, it was 
believed by some that the United States could encourage black South 
Africans in their struggle, and once majority rule was established 
the new leaders would be favorably disposed towards the United States.
The difficulty with this rationale was that it depended upon a belief 
that American policy could bring about a change in policy in South 
Africa or that majority rule was soon forthcoming.
1*1For an essay linking views of South Africa with a variety of 
policy alternatives, see Vernon McKay, "American Attitudes Toward 
Apartheid," in Philip W. Quigg, South Africa: Problems and Prospects
(New York, 1965}, **0-1*8.
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The third principal rationale for a stronger American policy 
against South Africa was essentially moralistic. Some participants 
in the movement for action against South Africa, particularly those 
with strong religious affiliations, believed that it was necessary for 
the United States to disassociate itself from South Africa so as to 
avoid complicity in the evil system of apartheid. The argument was 
that the United States should ’’disengage” itself from South Africa so 
that it was no longer upholding an unjust regime and no longer prof­
iting from the economic and racial policies of the South African govern­
ment. This element of the movement against South Africa came to focus 
on American business activity there, and it continued as a rationale 
for urging group action even after the other two became less per­
suasive .
In the same year as Sharpeville, a book was published which 
evidenced aspects of each of these rationales and which brought 
together, in a sometimes exaggerated form, many of the ideas preva­
lent about South Africa upon which the movement for a stronger 
American policy depended. This book was The Death of Africa by Peter
h2Ritner, an executive editor at the Macmillan publishing company.
In Ritner's view, the Afrikaner was cruel, perverted, even 
bloodthirsty. South Africa's government he described as ”a constitu­
tional freak, the only polity left which is based on readings from
1̂3ancient scriptures.” The country was governed "the way the
United States would be run if only Daughters of the Confederacy had
^Peter Ritner, The Death of Africa (New York, i960).
3̂Ibid.. 27.
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the suffrage.Ritner declared that the Afrikaners had decided 
that they would "prefer to die horribly rather than surrender the
1*5pleasures of kaffir-beating.
It was Ritner’s belief that the continent of Africa was so 
important to the United States that it should set up an Institute 
of African Affairs within the American government with eight billion 
dollars a year in funding. The Institute should then "build itself 
up to become the virtual world center of all things African.
One might have thought somewhere in Africa would have been more con­
venient for the Africans. It was in the national self-interest of 
the United States, he believed, to look out for the well-being of 
Africa. South Africa's impending race war threatened all of Africa 
and Ritner wanted the United States to step in and impose a settlement 
as the only way a total disaster could be averted.
Indeed, Ritner viewed forcing a settlement of the race prob­
lems of South Africa as an admirable goal, Ritner wrote of riding 
in a chauffeur-driven car along a South African highway. When the 
African driver continued calling him baas he told the driver to stop 
it; he was an American and did not like being called baas. The 
driver then pulled off the road and stopped to tell Ritner he had 
not realized that Ritner was an American. When, the driver asked 
him, were the Americans coming to South Africa to aid the Africans? 





It had "been a long time since I had heard the word "American" 
used like this, like a sort of invocation of the Great Spirit; 
Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt used it this way, and so did this 
African man. He knew almost nothing of our country, hut he did 
know of the radiant glories of our dream which has so changed the 
world— though not yet his world. To this man, and to hundreds 
of millions of men like him around the world, America shall 
forever be the great and gentle Paladin of the North, feeder 
of children pid liberator of fathers. What more does anyone 
ask of life?^7
Ritner's dream of being a liberator of course involved freeing 
Africans from racism, but there was an economic element in his view­
point that was not fully spelled out, though it did emerge as an 
important rationale for action later. Ritner was antagonistic to 
what he called the New Capitalism, an economic development which 
stood in contrast to Old-Fashioned Business. "As everyone knows," 
he said, "the chief structural difference between the New Capitalism 
and the Old has been the substitution of the business decisions of 
one individual, who possessed the resources he was hazarding, of the 
decisions of a group, hired to manage these resources in behalf of 
a faceless multitude of shareholders." Hostility towards the New 
Capitalism itself became a basis for sanctions against South Africa.
In the initial phase of the movement for action against South 
Africa, groups and individuals sought to demonstrate personal opposi­
tion to apartheid. They also urged the United States government to 
criticize apartheid, either on its own or together with other coun­
tries through the United Nations, and to take steps to manifest the 
criticism through some token demonstration of disapproval. It soon 




reluctant to go beyond verbal condemnation of South Africa’s race 
policies, and with this the movement entered into a new phase. Rather 
than calling for new American initiatives, activist groups and pub­
lications now criticized the United States government for its inac­
tion, focusing on the government’s unwillingness to Join in the 
policies urged by a majority of the countries at the United Ifations.
With the addition of many new African states to the General 
Assembly, the United Nations had quickly gone beyond a policy position 
to which the United States would agree. This became clear in the 
spring of 1961 when the initial draft of General Assembly Resolution 
1598 was offered for passage. The draft condemned apartheid policies 
and stated that the General. Assembly "considers it to be the responsi­
bility of all members of the United Nations to take separate and 
collective action to bring about the elimination of these poli-
llQcies . . .  ̂ Paragraph Five, the key provision of the Resolution,
recommended that all states consider taking the following steps to 
eliminate apartheid:
(a) !fo break off diplomatic relations with the Government of the 
Union of South Africa, or to refrain from establishing such 
relations;
(b) To close the ports of each State to all vessels flying the 
South African flag;
(c) To enact legislation prohibiting the ships of each State from 
entering South African ports;
(d) To boycott all South African goods and to refrain from ex­
porting goods to South Africa;
(e) To refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft 
belonging to the Government and companies registered under 
the laws of the Union of South Africa.50
^United Nations, General Assembly, 15th Session, Official 
Records: Annexes. II (Agenda Item 72), 7.
g0Ibld.
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The United States was quite unwilling to approve of this.-’-*' A vote
was taken on this draft; forty-two members favored it, thirty-four
52opposed, and twenty-one abstained. Thus the draft failed because two- 
thirds had to approve it for passage. A much milder paragraph was 
substituted for Paragraph Five and this draft was approved.
The American delegate to the United Nations, Francis T.
Plimpton, explained to the Assembly why the United States opposed the 
proposals of Paragraph Five. Although the United States condemned 
apartheid, the United States believed, he asserted, that the measures 
proposed
simply will not accomplish what they are intended to do. If 
sanctions as extensive as these were to be approved and carried 
out, the effect could be an internal explosion in South Africa,
The relationship between American domestic problems and 
foreign policy on racial matters was again demonstrated when Ambassador 
Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana opened discussion of Resolution 1598.
He began by throwing down, in essence, a challenge to the United 
States on 1598. He did this by reading to the Assembly a letter he 
purportedly received from an American calling himself Count Albert 
von Hohenzollern. The letter read:
Dear head nigger:
The white people of the world should boycott all you 
niggers and put you cannibals out of business. What right 
have you half-ape niggers to dare to question the policy 
of South Africa on racial segregation. Furthermore, we 
don't need you niggers here in the U.S. to tell us how to 
run our business, and we are getting fed up with supplying 
you black apes with blackmail for your nigger friendship.
(signed) A white American for South Africa.
United Nations, General Assembly, 15th Session, Official Records: 
Plenary Meetings, April 13, 1961, p. 267. It was in poor taste to 
read this, but the implication was clear: if the United States did 
not support the stronger draft of Resolution 1598, it would be 
refusing to repudiate the views of the letter.
52Ibid., 273-7^.
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the "brunt of which could be borne by the very Africans we are 
striving to help. Beyond that, the peace of the whole conti­
nent of Africa could be in jeopardy,?3
Plimpton argued that adoption of the stronger draft of the resolution
would not "bring an end to apartheid or improve the lot of the victims
of that abhorrent policy.
The shift in attitude among the anti-South African activists 
produced by the American position was seen in a new pamphlet published 
in 1962 by the American Committee on Africa. Commenting on the fail­
ure to get the necessary two-thrids majority for the first draft of 
Resolution 1598, the authors of the pamphlet said that the key to the 
defeat was the opposition of the United States and the abstention of 
South American states favorable to the United States. Although they 
expressed a hope that the United States might change its position, 
they said that the United States was showing the Afro-Asian states 
that it was not willing to "go beyond pious words of 'regret* con­
cerning the situation in South Africa."^-’ In so stating, they were 
echoing the question put by Ambassador Usher of the Ivory Coast in 
the General Assembly; "What is the purpose of deploring, of depre­
cating, if nothing is done to end this catastrophic state of affairs?"-^
■^Department of State Bulletin, April 2U, 1961, p. 603.
^ Ibid.
55Colin Gonze, George M. Houser, and Perry Stujrges, South 
African Crisis and United States Policy (New York, 1962), Hi "(pamphlet 
in possession of the author).
^United Nations, General Assembly, l6th Session, Official 
Records; Plenary Meetings. November 28, 1961, p. 888. Putting it 
even more strongly that same day was Mr. Amonoo of Ghana who criticized 
the "apostles of moderation" who opposed sanctions because they had 
"economic, military, diplomatic and political interests in sustaining 
the white regime in South Africa. Moreover, there are blood ties
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The ACOA critics were unwilling to accept the arguments ad­
vanced by Ambassador Plimpton against sanctions. Engaging in a dia­
logue of sorts with the American government, the pamphlet's authors 
attempted to counter each of the points Plimpton had made in the 
General Assembly. Although his speech had been a "model" of condemna­
tion of apartheid, words were no longer enough. In reference to 
American ostracism of Communist states such as Cuba and China, the 
pamphlet stated that "in a period when examples of the use of economic 
and diplomatic sanctions by the U.S. are multiplying, the condemnation 
unaccompanied by action could not be taken seriously,
Since these critics did not find Plimpton's arguments convin­
cing, they sought the reasons for American opposition to sanctions 
elsewhere. They placed the blame for it on American military relations 
with the South African government and on American economic activity 
within South Africa. They noted that the United States Navy made good 
will stops in South Africa and participated in training exercises with 
the South African Navy, and that the American military was becoming 
deeply involved with South Africa through the installation of space 
tracking stations in South Africa. They also observed that American 
economic involvement in South Africa had increased substantially in 
recent years. The pamphlet urged that military relations with South 
Africa be curtailed or terminated entirely, that further private 
American loans and investments be discouraged, and that economic 
sanctions be adopted against South Africa. By these measures, the
between them and South Africa." Ibid., 885.
^Gonze, Houser and Sturges, South African Crisis and United 
States Policy, U5, 56-58.
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United States could contribute to the breakup of the South African 
government and commit itself "as the champion of equality and freedom" 
while there was still time.'*® However, the authors did not think it 
likely that the United States would do so.
Others joined with the American Committee on Africa in criti­
cizing the United States for its position at the United Nations on 
the sanctions questions. In 1962, the United Nations, despite American 
opposition, mustered the two-thirds majority necessary to pass a 
resolution (General Assembly Resolution 176l) containing the provisions 
for sanctions found in Paragraph Five of the rejected draft of 
Resolution 1598. Attempting to shame the United States for its vote 
against this resolution, Stephanie Gervis, the United Nations corre­
spondent for the Village Voice, commented that without the backing of 
the United States, Britain, and France, the resolution could not be 
effective. She stated:
Ironically enough, the very democracies that taught the Africans 
the principle of majority rule are now about to instruct them in 
the art of breaking it, because there is little doubt on either 
side that those who did not vote for the resolution will not 
implement it— or least not the paragraph on sanctions.59
The New Republic also noted a disparity between American words 
condemning apartheid and American actions on South Africa. Although 
admitting to doubts about some aspects of economic sanctions, the 
editors declared that the case for ending arms sales to South Africa 
was impeccable. The magazine stated editorially:
^ Ibid. , i(5-58, 62.
59stephanie Gervis, "Sanctions and South Africa," Commonweal,
January 18, 1963, p. ^32.
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The Nationalist policies seem bent on plunging the whole of 
Southern Africa into a blood bath. Are the NATO allies, 
through their sales of arms, to provide support for those very 
policies of apartheid for which they so eloquently proclaim 
their loathing? If this course is pursued, the Africans can 
turn in only one direction for aid. And the Communists surely 
will provide it. ®
A few weeks later another writer in the New Republic commented that
the sooner the United States began cooperating with the African states
at the United Nations "to demonstrate that its exhortations about
democracy match its exertions for democracy," the sooner the United
States would get out of "low gear" in Africa.
Criticisms of American policy such as these at home and abroad 
probably had an effect on policy makers. William C. Attwood, for 
example, in his memoirs of his experiences as a diplomat at the United 
Nations and in Africa during the Kennedy and Jchnson administrations, 
wrote that he never understood why the United States never took the 
initiative with a resolution that it could support "without always 
appearing negative and reluctant." Even though he believed sanctions 
were impractical, he felt "morally and politically, we needed to do 
mare than deplore apartheid in speeches that many Africans considered 
hypocritical in view of our massive investment in South Africa.
The element of posturing on Southern African policies for purposes 
of placating world opinion came out in Attwood*s comments about when 
he persuaded the Ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, to take a different,
^"Investment in South Africa," New Republic, December 1, 1962,
p. 9.
^Richard Dale, review of Allard Lowenstein's Brutal Mandate, 
in New Republic, December 22, 1962, p. 2h.
^2Willlam C. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks; A Personal 
Adventure (New York, 1967), 139"VoV
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stronger position on a South West Africa resolution at the United 
Nations;
lOjur African and Asian friends were delighted. Our vote cost 
us nothing-— we supported a moral principle without committing 
ourselves to a course of action— and gained us considerable 
goodwill and publicity.
Something of the same spirit— the triumph of form over sub­
stance— was present in an American decision to support an arms embargo 
against South Africa. The United States first decided it would adopt 
a policy of providing South Africa only with arms that could not be 
used to enforce apartheid. This was a category of weapons that was 
very difficult to define, and it satisfied few people who wanted the 
United States to adopt a stronger policy against South Africa. In the 
summer of 1963, the United States decided to go further and support a 
total arms embargo of South Africa, even though this was contrary to 
a treaty with South Africa. According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
who apparently took part in the arms embargo decision, the State 
Department favored a United Nations resolution that all member states 
refrain from supplying South Africa with arms that could be used to 
suppress the African population. President Kennedy, in what Schlesinger 
described as a "brilliant stroke," went a step beyond this. The 
President proposed that the United States declare unilaterally, as a 
matter of national policy, that it would supply no more arms to South 
Africa so long as the policy of apartheid was enforced.^ Such an 
embargo policy, effective January 1, 196^, was announced in August,
^3Ibid., lUl.
6kArthur M, Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days; John F.
Kennedy in the White House (New York, 1967), 537.
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1963, and in that same month the United States voted in favor of 
Security Council Resolution S/5386 calling upon all states "to cease 
forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and
65military vehicles to South Africa . . . ."
Although American support for Resolution S/5386 was a step 
further than any previous policy change by the United States on South 
African policy, it was still far short of the more stringent measures 
that the General Assembly had called for only a year earlier. In 
short, it was unlikely to satisfy any critics of American policy. Just 
a few days before the American vote on S/5386 a group of black Ameri­
cans, with William M. Worthy of the Baltimore Afro-American as spokes­
man, staged a protest at the United Nations against American policy. 
Worthy was given the opportunity to meet with Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson, and Worthy presented him with the protest group's demand
66that South Africa be expelled from the United Nations. American
support of S/5386 was considerably less than Worthy had demanded.
Typical of the critics of the American position was the response of the
Nation to S/5386;
The Security Council's recent approval of a resolution barring
the shipment of arms and ammunition to South Africa is no
answer to the challenge posed by that country's maniacal 
pursuit of its apartheid policy. At best, it can provide a 
temporary respite. . . . Bloodshed on a scale that would 
constitute war by any standard is inevitable unless the United 
Nations takes more drastic action than it has so far shown
^United Nations, Security Council Resolution S/5386 (1963).. 
The New York Times, August U, 1963, Sec. p. 8, apparently had 
doubts about the wisdom of United States support of this measure.
It is clear that the Times did not think the United States should go
further.
66"United Nations: Boycott or Death," Newsweek, August 5,
1963, pp. 3U-35.
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any signs of doing. ^
The Nation suggested that the United States support economic sanctions
against South Africa, a naval blockade of its ports, and the severing
of diplomatic relations.
The effort to promote American participation in United Nations
sanctions against South Africa reached its high point in 1965-1966.
Strongly anti-South African groups made their views known and urged
American support of United Nations measures in several different forums
that should be noted as indicative of the strength of the movement for
action against South Africa.
As usual, the American Committee on Africa was in the forefront
of organizations in opposition to South Africa. By 196  ̂it had taken
steps to set up a Consultative Council on South Africa, a "clearing
house" consisting of more than thirty major American church, union,
68civil rights, and student groups. The ACOA served as Secretariat 
of the Consultative Council, Representatives of some thirty-eight 
participating organizations met in Washington on March 21, 19^5, the 
fifth anniversary of Sharpeville, to take part in a national confer-
6qence on "The South African Crisis and American Action." These
6?"A Wrong Remedy," Nation, August 2h, 1963, p. 8l.
68American Committee on Africa, Annual. Report: 1961 (New
York,
69Included among the group were representatives of the ACOA, 
the National Council of Churches, the Catholic Interracial Council, 
the American Jewish Congress, the AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers, 
the National Farmers Union, the United Federation of Teachers, the 
Congress of Racial Equality, the National Student Association, the 
NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom, the student division of 
the Young Women's Christian Association, Students for a Democratic 
Society, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and Americans
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representatives listened to Congressmen, ministers, exiled South 
African leaders, union officials, academics, and others who appeared 
as speakers or took part in group discussions 1®
The purpose of the national conference appears to have been 
twofold; to educate and to advocate. The conference was to make the 
participants, the groups they represented, and the general public more 
aware of the nature of the South African race policies and the char­
acter of the white ruling class. The conference took the position 
that South African apartheid was "a totalitarian system strongly 
reminiscent of Hitlerism.Speakers stressed the intractibility of
the whites and said that change in South Africa could only c one from
72outside pressure. A warning was issued by the conference that if 
change were not brought to South Africa, apartheid would "lead 
inevitably to violence and bloodshed and possible escalation into 
world conflict."^
for Democratic Action.
70Virgil E. Lowder, "U. S. Conference on South Africa," 
Christian Century, April 21, 1965, PP* 508-510; Conference "Program" 
(copy made from a collection of materials on the Conference lent to 
the author by the American Committee on Africa).
71Mia Aurbakken, "What Did the Conference Accomplish," Africa 
Today, XII (March, 1965), 13-lU; "National Conference Requests Economic 
Sanctions Against South Africa" (press release by David Apter and 
Associates of Washington for the national conference in possession of 
the author).
72E.g. , Leslie Rubin, "The White Man in South Africa— The 
Politics of Domination, Isolation and Pear," 2-3 (paper among the 
materials on the conference lent to the author by the American 
Committee on Africa).
^"National Conference Requests Economic Sanctions Against 
South Africa" (press release); Aurbakken, "What Did the Conference 
Accomplish."
I*t0
Another educative function of the conference was to make the 
public more aware of American involvement in South Africa through its 
trade and investment policies. The American Committee on Africa had 
begun to attempt to fulfill this function in 1963 after the United 
States had adopted an arms embargo against South Africa. The ACOA's 
annual report for 1963 had commented on the embargo and said that 
the organization should now turn to focus its campaign "on awakening 
Americans to the extent of their economic involvement with South
7hAfrica."J Its efforts did produce some results. For example, in 
March 196U the ACOA published a special issue of Africa Today on 
"United States Policy on South Africa: Partners in Apartheid" which
contained information on American business activity in South Africa.
Several months later, the editors of the Catholic publication America 
called the attention of their readers to this ACOA report and ob­
served :
This country has opposed the use of economic boycott by the 
U. N. to force South Africa to change its racial policies.
Question: To what extent have American business interests
determined our attitude?
Other publications responded similarly to such reports by anti-South
77African activists. Now, at the 1965 national conference, several 
papers and discussions were directed at American trade and financial
' American Committee on Africa, Annual Report: 1963 (New
York, 196U), n.p. (brochure in possession of the author).
75 United States Policy on South Africa: Partners in
Apartheid," Africa Today, XI (March, 196*1).
^"Boom in South Africa," America, May 9, 196*t, p. 622.
^E.g., "Stop South Africa Now," New Republic, May 16, 196U,
pp. 3-U.
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involvement, and others touched on the subject tangentially.7®
The views of South Africa's policies and American business 
activity in South Africa presented by the speakers were the pre­
conditions of, and basis for, arguments for stronger measures against 
South Africa. After covering these views, the conference turned its 
final discussions to the question of what the United States and the 
participating groups could do to bring about change with regard to 
South Africa.
Peter Weiss, a New York attorney and President of the American 
Committee on Africa, criticized the United States strongly for its 
policy on South Africa at the United Nations. "So far as the South 
African issue in the United Nations is concerned," Weiss told the 
conference audience, "the United States haB been the country that 
Just can't say yes."79 He reviewed the "sorry record" of the United 
States on the issue and rebutted the arguments made by American 
officials against collective measures. In a statement which demon­
strated how each further step the United States took on the issue 
became simply the basis for arguing that more steps had to be taken, 
Weiss said:
[ijf we determine, as a matter of national policy, that the 
government of South Africa is so repressive, so insensitive to 
world opinion, as to warrant the drastic and unusual measure of 
placing a ban on the sale of arms through private channels,
7 E.g., Julian P. Friedman, "American Business and Financial 
Involvement in South Africa"; Edward Marcus, "The South African 
Economy," (papers among the materials on the conference lent to the 
author by the American Committee on Africa).
79Peter Weiss, "U. S, Policy and South Africa," 2 (paper 
among the materials on the conference lent to the author by the 
American Committee on Africa).
how can we go on denying that the situation warrants the with­
holding from South Africa of other forms of private American 
assistance which the South African minority used to perpetuate 
its reign of terror against the overwhelming majority of the 
citizens of that country?®0
Weiss and the others at the conference urged that the United
States take steps to implement the United Nations proposals for
sanctions against South Africa. Referring to the war in Vietnam,
and raising the specter of the United States coming down on the "wrong
side" in a similar war in South Africa, Weiss asked:
Iljf we fail to "bring the Nationalists to their senses by the
withdrawal of American economic support and by collective 
action through the United Nations, thereby making an armed 
uprising inevitable, how many Chinese guns, Soviet ambulances 
and Algerian volunteers will we allow the African freedom 
fighters to receive (in the absence of any support from us), 
before we decide that theirs is "a Communist-inspired war of 
liberation"?®1
Weiss's statement assumed, of course, that economic sanctions
or other forms of international ostracism could "bring the Nationalists
to their senses." A year earlier a similar conference had been held
in London which had concluded that sanctions could be effective and
82would not work undue hardship on the countries imposing sanctions.
8°Ibid., U.
8lIbid., 10. This fear that the United States would be on the 
"wrong side" once the South African blood bath began was prevalent 
among supporters of sanctions. See Victor Ferkiss, Africa's Search 
for Identity (New York, 1966), 31U; Theodore Rozak, "What It Means 
to be an American," Nation, October 25, 1965, P* 277; Stanley Meisler, 
"Our Stake in Apartheid," Nation, August 26, 1965, p. 73; testimony of 
George M. Houser in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs 
United States-South African Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Africa, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess,, 1966, pp. 193-9^ (herafter United 
States-South African Relations).
QpU£See the collection of papers resulting from the London con­
ference in Ronald Segal, ed., Sanctions Against South Africa (Baltimore 
I96U), especially Elliot Zupnick, "The Impact of Sanctions on the 
United States," in ibid., 186-96.
Others besides Weiss at the American conference attempted to show that 
the proposed sanctions could be effective. For example, Alvin W.
Wolfe, an anthropologist at Washington University, spoke on "The 
South Africa Trade and International Sanctions" and declared that if 
the United States, Great Britain and West Germany "would so much as 
breathe the threat implied in the word 'sanctions,1 South Africa's
O neconomy would not hold a candle against that 'wind of change.'" J It 
was necessary to believe this would be the effect of sanctions in 
order to support sanctions, if the focus of such support was on 
bringing about reform within South Africa. For if economic sanctions 
would not cause the whites to change their policies, then the non­
white population might well be the hardest hit by sanctions, Just as 
the American officials argued. Those at the conference were not 
radical enough to argue publicly that sanctions should be used to bring 
about a "cleansing" blood bath in South Africa from which majority 
rule would result.
There was, however, another reason why a person could support 
sanctions even in the absence of a belief that sanctions could bring 
about change in South Africa. This was the belief that moral principle 
could not condone the United States continuing to support a racist 
regime or to participate in profits realized from an undemocratic and 
oppressive society. Several speakers asserted this point, but it was
®3jvivin W, Wolfe, "The South African Trade and International 
Sanctions," k.(paper among the materials on the conference lent to the 
author by the American Committee on Africa). See also "Stop South 
Africa Now," New Republic, May 16, 196k, pp. 3-^: "if the United
States and Britain quit filling iPrime Minister Verwoerd's] pockets 
whilst Bhaking a finger at him, he might take them seriously enough 
to introduce reforms also."
Ikk
the conference chairman, the Reverend James A. Pike, who made it most 
clearly. He argued at the close of the conference that the United 
States must impose an economic "boycott on South Africa as a matter of 
conscience even if this did not "bring about an immediate change in 
South Africa's racial policies. This rationale could sustain an 
argument for sanctions even after the efficacy of sanctions became 
very doubtful. And, to be sure, even some of the sharpest critics of 
South Africa had doubts about sanctions.
In the same month as the national conference on the South 
African crisis and American action, a study was published which raised 
very serious questions about the feasibility of sanctions as a method 
of promoting constructive changes in South Africa's racial policies.
The whole range of options open to the United Nations on the South 
African issue were examined in depth in a study sponsored by the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Apartheid and United 
Nations Collective Measures.^ The foreword to the study indicated 
that it had been prompted by the fear of a revolution in South Africa 
and the effect of such an outbreak of violence on world peace. The 
contributors examined the nature of South African society (though 
specifically declining to "pause to make the case that apartheid is 
wrong, undesirable, and at odds with international standards of human
fill°""National Conference Requests Economic Sanctions Against 
South Africa," 3 (press release). Similarly, George M. Houser told 
the House Subcommittee on Africa that even if sanctions did not bring 
change to South Africa, "they would help to save the soul of our own 
country," United States-South African Relations, 19^.
Qc
?Amelia C. Lelss, Apartheid and United Nations Collective 
Measures (New York, 1965).
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rights and Justice"), its amenability to internal and external pres­
sures for change, and the steps and measures available to the United
8 6Nations should its members wish to anploy them.
No specific recommendations for American or United Nations 
policy on South Africa were made by the contributors to the study. 
Nevertheless, they did make it fairly clear that they believed that 
collective measures against South Africa could be justified under the 
United Nations charter, and that South Africa did constitute a threat 
to world peace through the application of its racial policies. But 
looking on the objective of sanctions as "inducing or forcing the 
government of South Africa to remove racial barriers to full and equal 
participation in the political, social, and economic life of the coun­
try," the contributors were skeptical about the ability of sanctions
ft*7to fulfill their objective. As one of them viewed it:
While there are numerous uncertainties present, the greatest of 
all is the psychological response of white South Africans. Based 
on purely economic calculations and assuming determination on the 
part of the South African government to resist the measures taken, 
it becomes reasonably clear that no single economic measure would 
be likely to have a sufficiently powerful impact to force 
aquiescence IsicJ. Indeed, South Africa could probably hold out 
against a complete boycott and embargo reasonable [sic] well for 
several years, possibly longer.
86Ibid., 5, passim. For other discussions of sanctions, see 
Gwendolen M. Carter, "United States Foreign Policy Toward South 
Africa," in Marian D. Irish, ed., World Pressures on American Foreign 
Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, I961*)» 118-29; and the essays 
in William A. Hance, ed., Southern Africa and the United States (New 
York and London, 1968).
OnJLeiss, "A Summation," in Leiss, ed., Apartheid and United 
Nations Collective Measures, 156.
88William A. Hance, "Efforts to Alter the Future: Economic
Action," in ibid., 130.
Ih6
Given the likelihood of white intransigence in South Africa
even in the face of economic sanctions and the probability that some
countries would not comply with sanctions, the study's contributors
felt it necessary to look into the possibility of a naval blockade of
South African ports and armed invasion of the country. The study went
so far as to calculate the number and types of warships and aircraft
necessary, the numbers of men required for amphibious and air assaults,
the costs of these for varying periods of time, and the casualties
expected (19,000 to 38,000 killed and wounded among the United Nations
forces alone) so as "to defeat the South African military forces and
break the will of the government and the people to resist in order that
1.89the political system could be altered to meet the U.N. demands. 
Concluding that collective military measures were practical from a 
purely military point of view, Amelia Leiss said that the major ques­
tion about the use of such force was political. Summarizing, she 
stated: "Put simply, U. N. collective action will be feasible when
and if those states with the capacity to carry it out I i.e., the United
States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France] make the political
90Judgment that it is required."
Although the Carnegie study did suggest the need for some type
of collective action against South Africa, supported the legitimacy of
such action, and tried to show the feasibility of strong measures, its
®^Leiss, "Efforts to Alter the Future: Military Measures,"
in ibid., 150.
90Leiss, "A Summation," 156. There was also a United Nations 
report by a special committee which came to about the same conclusion 
as the Carnegie study. See New York Times, March 2, 1965, p. 6; and 
March 20, 1965, p. 10.
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overall effect was to cast doubt on the efficacy and desirability 
of the United Nations proposals. This was because it indicated that 
change could be brought about in South Africa only with considerable 
bloodshed and with considerable sacrifices on the part of the Western 
powers.
Others who were hostile to South Africa backed away from 
sanctions because of these considerations. Peter Ritner, for example, 
who had earlier called for strong measures against South Africa, now 
reassessed his position. Several months after the publication of the 
Carnegie study he said he found something "faintly unedifying" about 
the elaborate plans which had been drafted to involve the whole world 
in the destruction of South Africa's whites. Commenting further, he 
stated:
Even the most extreme anti-Afrikaner agrees that to achieve its 
aims such a campaign Iof sanctions^ will require an unparalleled 
degree of synchronized action on the part of all the other 
nations of earth. Here is something like the whole world 
falling upon the city of Philadelphia. Is the world justified 
in taking so lofty a line?91
One of the reasons why Ritner changed his mind about sanctions was
that now he believed the Afrikaners to be very "tough" and would resist
change strongly.92 Great bloodshed would be required to bring change.
Ritner now decided that time should be the great liberator, not the
United States.
Despite such misgivings about sanctions on the part of some of 
^Peter Ritner, "The Problem of Sanctions," Commonweal, May




the anti-South African activists, further efforts were made to induce 
the United States to go along with the United Nations proposals. These 
efforts yere perhaps encouraged by steps taken by the United States 
government with regard to South Africa in mid-1965, a time at vhich 
relations betveen the tvo countries became more strained than at any 
time Bince the American statement deploring Sharpeville. In Hay 1965 
the United States cancelled a visit by the aircraft carrier 
Independence after the South African government indicated that black 
crew members would not be particularly welcome.^  A belief that the 
United States might try to integrate some of its South African facil­
ities led Prime Minister Verwoerd to announce that black Americans
would not be welcome as personnel in the American space-tracking 
95stations. The South African government was also disturbed by an
American decision to hold multi-racial diplomatic receptions and other
official functions, by American blocking of the sale to the South
African air force of French-made jets which employed American-built
engines, and by the Canadian government's blocking of sales of Ford
Motor Company's Canadian subsidiary's four-wheeled vehicles to the
South African government on the ground that this would violate the 
96arms embargo. Because of the growing differences, the American 
ambassador, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, was recalled to the United 
States for consultations and an intensive review of American policy
^Nfew York Times, May lU, 1965, p. 3; "South Africa Bars 
American Negroes," New Republic. July 10, 1965, p. 8.
^New York Times, June 29, 1965j P* 8.
^ Natal Daily News, July 16, 1965 (all citations to this news­
paper are from the paper's clippings files in Durban, South Africa).
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in August 1965.^ These developments would have indicated the 
possibility of significant changes in American policy.
An additional factor which suggested to anti-South African 
activists that change in American policy could be forthcoming was the 
prospect of a judgment against South Africa by the International 
Court of Justice with respect to its administration of South West 
Africa. South Africa had acquired South West Africa, a former German 
territory, as a Class C Mandate at the end of World War 1.^® After 
World War II South Africa made a request at the United Nations that 
it be allowed to incorporate South West Africa as an integral part of 
its own territory. This proposal met with strong opposition and was 
defeated because of concern over South Africa's racial policies. The 
United Nations then began to assert that it had jurisdiction over 
South West Africa, and South Africa denied the competency of the United 
Nations to treat on the subject.
The issue of South West Africa was still unresolved in i960 
when Ethiopia and Liberia, the only African states which had been 
members of the League of Nations, took the question to the Interna­
tional Court of Justice. They sought a binding decision that the 
League Mandate was still in force and that South Africa had failed to 
live up to its obligations to provide for the material and moral 
welfare of its indigenous population. Two years later the Court ruled, 
by a vote of eight to seven, that it had jurisdiction to hear the
9?Natal Daily News, August 2, 1965; August 7, 1965-
987 On the background of the South West Africa question see 
generally Ruth First, South West Africa (Baltimore, 1963); Allen Ray 
Newman, "South Africa and the Post-war Question of the Incorporation 
of South West Africa," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North 
Carolina, 1967).
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case. The litigation then proceeded in very lengthy inquiries with 
volumes of evidence produced hy South Africa's legal team. Ethiopia 
and Liberia were represented by an American attorney, Ernest A. Gross.
By 1965, people were anticipating an imminent decision by the 
International Court, and many expected it to be adverse to South 
Africa. Critics of South Africa believed that once such a verdict 
was rendered there would be no legal barrier under Article II, 
Paragraph Seven of the United Nations Charter (the paragraph pro­
hibiting intervention in the internal affairs of member states) to 
collective United Nations actions, since the United Nations would then 
clearly have authority over South West Africa, The United States, it 
was felt, would have to go along with United Nations measures with 
regard to South West Africa. This in turn, particularly if opposed 
by South Africa, could be the basis for further activities against 
South Africa itself. A clear statement of this scenario for action 
was made by Elizabeth S. Landis, an attorney and an official of the 
ACOA, in an editorial in Africa Today. Writing in reference to the 
possible refusal of the South African government to accept United 
Nations control of South West Africa, she stated:
Such a refusal would send the enforcement problem to the 
Security Council under Article 9^ of the Charter; and the 
Council, like Eisenhower at Little Rock, might feel obliged 
to vindicate the Court's authority by drastic measures. . . .
The moral for the United States is clear. In the event of a 
potentially favorable decision, it must cut through legal 
technicalities, bureaucratic inertia, and Europe-oriented dogma 
to help implement the Court's decision swiftly and effectively.
For the second time in a single generation our country may have 
the chance to prove b^ action its belief in equality and the 
brotherhood of man. Domestically we are gingerly grasping 
the opportunity. Internationally we can do no less: indeed,
with the experience in our own country to guide us, in both 
purpose and compassion, we must take the lead in helping to
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99end the blight of apartheid in southern Africa,-7,7
It was against this background that the Subcommittee on Africa
of the House of Representative's Committee on Foreign Affairs held
hearings on American policy on South Africa, According to the
Chairman of the Subcommittee, Representative Barratt O'Hara of
Illinois, the hearings arose from his own embarrassment over the
American position on South Africa when he served as a delegate to the
United Nations. Stating this and the purpose of the hearings, he
opened the inquiry with the following;
As a delegate to the United Nations, I was called upon to 
present the position of the United States as regards apartheid,
I stated, as had other delegates from the United States to 
previous General Assemblies of the United Nations, that it was 
a practice which the American people could not condone.
Yet despite that positive position on the immorality of 
apartheid, our Government took the position that apartheid 
did not constitute a threat to peace, the kind of threat 
that would properly bring the matter of sanctions before the 
Security Council of the United Nations. This resulted in a 
growing misunderstanding with the emerging nations of 
Africa. . . . Whether that position is valid or not I do 
not know. That is the reason these hearings were scheduled.
A report from Washington appearing in a South African news­
paper suggested that the real driving force behind the hearings was 
not O'Hara but Arthur J. Goldberg, then the American Ambassador to 
the United Nations. According to the report, Goldberg cornered O'Hara
99Elizabeth S. Landis, "South West Africa; Hatching a Deci­
sion," Africa Today, XIII (March, 1966), 3 (emphasis in original).
See also, Patrick Duncan, "South West Africa: Timetable for Freedom,"
Nation, March l6, 196U, pp. 265-67.
100United States-South African Relations, 1. O'Hara had lived 
long enough to come full circle on his views on the Afrikaners. As he 
told a South African reporter in Washington, Ken Owen, he once tried 
to join a unit to fight on the side of the Boers in the Anglo-Boer 
War, Natal Daily News, April 19, 1966.
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in a hotel suite in New York and suggested that O'Hara hold the hearings, 
hoping that such Congressional action could influence American policy 
to the point where President Johnson would drop opposition to sanc­
tions. Thus an American policy maker was attempting to influence
10Ppublic opinion so as to gain support for a foreign policy position.
i noGoldberg later made quite explicit his support for sanctions.
Activist groups were also probably in part responsible for 
the decision to hold the hearings. Both Goldberg and O'Hara had come 
under pressure from such organizations. For example, on Christmas 
Day, 1965, members of the NAACP and the Du Bois Club picketed the 
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York where Goldberg made his residence, 
protesting the American position on South A f r i c a , A n d  the ubiqui­
tous American Committee on Africa had some Influence. After the 
national conference which the ACOA had more or less hosted in 19&5, 
delegates from the conference had called on O'Hara to urge policy
101Natal Daily News, March 10, 1966. The author had occasion 
to ask Goldberg about the truth of this report, and Goldberg admitted 
that he had been responsible for O'Hara's calling the hearings. 
Goldberg said his reason for this was that he did not feel that the 
American people knew enough on the subject, a subject which was very 
important at the United Nations. Personal interview with Arthur 
Goldberg, Durham, North Carolina, November 29, 1973.
102Bernard Cohen has found after extensive interviews that an 
overwhelming proportion of foreign policy officials accept the 
desirability or necessity of shaping the public opinion environment 
along supportive lines. Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on 
Foreign Policy (Boston, 1973), l8l.
■^^See Arthur J. Goldberg, "A Case for Disengagement," in 
George M. Daniels, ed., Southern Africa; A Time for Change (New York,
1969), 22.
■^^New York Times. December 26, 1965, P- 37.
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changes. At the 1966 hearings George M. Houser, Executive Director 
of the ACOA, testified: "I guess it -wouldn't he out of place to say
that in a discussion some of us had with Ambassador Goldberg at the 
United Nations shortly after he had taken office last fall, he 
seemed to favor a very strong policy and agreed with many of the 
things which we presented to him . . . ."1^6
The hearings were stacked rather heavily against South Africa.
The Subcommittee heard the testimony of same thirty-six witnesses who 
appeared as private citizens, as representatives of organizations, or 
as spokesmen for the government; it also received written statements 
from many other groups and individuals.
Nine witnesses were government spokesmen or former officials 
who explained the position of the American government on South Africa.
Some of their testimony will be discussed further in a later chapter, 
and it will be sufficient at this point to observe that the general 
position they took was that South Africa, although its racial policies 
were abhorrent, offered certain benefits to the United States and that 
circumstances did not, as of the date of the hearings, warrant con­
sidering South Africa so great a threat to peace as to Justify 
Security Council sanctions
105Lowder, "U. S. Conference on South Africa," 510.
~*~̂ United States-South African Relations, 203. The influence 
of the ACOA appeared in the hearings in other ways. It was obvious 
from the statements of some of the Congressmen that the ACOA had pre­
pared background material for their use; e.g., see ibid., p. 31. And 
several of the witnesses had been participants in the 19^5 national 
conference on sanctions.
107See, for example, the testimony of Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, ibid., 2-12.
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Of the other twenty-seven witnesses, twenty-one were private 
individuals, or representatives of private organizations, who were 
hostile to South Africa and favored a stronger American policy against 
South Africa. The spectrum of opinion in this group ranged from 
advocates of moderate sanctions to those advocating very harsh meas­
ures .
Waldemar Nielsen, the President of the African-American 
Institute, was a good example of an advocate of relatively mild 
sanctions. He was unambiguous in his criticism of South Africa, 
stating that "the racial policies of the South African Government in 
the mid-1960's confront all decent and democratic individuals In the 
world with the same essential issue as nazism posed in the 1930's.
He made it clear that South Africa presented a dangerous threat to 
world peace. And he believed that it was in the national interest 
that the United States show the world its strong condemnation of 
apartheid:
Nothing {he saidj could so foul the principles and prestige 
of the United States in the eyes of the world as collabora­
tion with— or even an ambivalent attitude toward— the 
political and social philosophy symbolized and flaunted by the 
Government of South Africa.1*9
Despite his strong feelings, Nielsen advocated only limited 
measures against South Africa. He called for ceasing to encourage 
investment in South Africa, warning business of the dangers of in­
vestment there, controlling the flow of South African "propaganda" 
to the United States, increasing contacts with the non-white majority
108united States-South African Helations, 72-73.
1Q9lhid.. 77.
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in South Africa, and giving further assistance to refugees from South
Africa. As he put it, he believed that until the whole problem of
southern Africa came to a head, "we must allow this stench in the
110nostrils of decent humanity to continue to exist."
Others were not so generous as Nielsen. Irving Brown,
Director of the New York office of the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and Executive Director of an AFL-CIO project 
called the African-American Labor Center, called for much stronger 
measures through the United Nations. He indicated his belief that 
South Africa constituted a present threat to world peace and intro­
duced into the record ICFTU and AFL-CIO statements that all actions 
short of war should be used to change or eliminate the white regime 
in South Africa. Congressman Boss Adair of Indiana pursued this 
latter point, asking Brown:
How far should the United States go? Mr. Brown, you said in 
your statement . . . '.'employ every action short of war." That 
is pretty clear. You are not, then, advocating the use of 
armed force, is that correct?
Mr. Brown: No, I think that you will find in my statement
that I quoted to the United Nations that any effective boycotts 
would require certain military means at the disposal of the 
United Nations to enforce such a boycott.
Mr. Adair: Well, then you would favor the use of armed
force.
llOlbid., 78-80. Nielsen drew back from stronger measures 
because he feared that war would result. As he had stated in a 
book published a year earlier, "any other course than rejection [of 
mandatory sanctions] would be a violation of [the United States's] 
own responsibilities as a world leader and contrary to the interest 
of its own citizens and of all mankind." Waldemar A. Nielsen, 
African Battleline: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa (New
York, 1965), 86.
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Mr. Brown: I would favor, if this boycott is adopted by
the United Nations, that in order to implement it, that they 
have sufficient force to make it effective.m
Similar positions were taken by several other witnesses.
Chairman O'Hara came close to this himself. At one point he told a
witness:
There is an American spirit. We are fighting for something in 
Vietnam. We are fighting for exactly the same thing in South 
Africa, and we must be consistent.-*--̂
Such observations suggest that perhaps the Vietnam war was
not an aberration, but instead an outgrowth of a general view of
world affairs that was prevalent among American leaders. The ''lesson”
of World War II was that events limiting freedom anywhere in the world
had an immediate impact on and directly involved the interests of
the American people. This point was repeatedly made by Congressman
Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota. He told one witness that he kept
thinking back to the 1930s and Germany and had concluded that "never
again can we say that what happens inside another nation can remain
113beyond our concern no matter what." To another witness who said 
apartheid was an internal matter, Fraser commented, "I find it hard 
to believe that on this planet we can ignore what happens to our 
fellow human beings.
There was another "lesson" too that played a part in the 
thoughts of Fraser and others on sanctions against South Africa, This





was the "lesson" of the history of race relations and the civil rights 
movement in the United States. Fraser noted that blacks in the .Ameri­
can South had achieved rights only through war and federal legisla­
tion. "The realities," he said, "are that the North imposed its 
will through Federal legislation upon the S o u t h . O t h e r  Americans 
too were convinced that persuasion was not a useful method of dealing 
with racism. Edward Crowther, for example, was a clergyman who had 
engaged in civil rights activities in the United States and had then 
gone to South Africa as the Anglican Bishop of Kimberly and Kuruman.
In the Christian Century he wrote that the church’s "participation in 
the civil rights movement in the U. S. . . . has a great deal to teach 
us in South Africa about direct confrontation of wrong, about standing 
up and being counted."11  ̂ In the same publication, several other 
activists argued in favor of sanctions, saying:
Martin Luther King, Jr., would not have obtained integrated 
public facilities in the south if he had simply written letters 
to the mayors of all U. S. cities asking them to work toward 
integrated seating in their municipal bus systems; he had to 
begin in Montgomery, Alabama. The church has accepted the 
validity of this kind of thinking in most areas; on what 
basis does it pull back when the problem of its investments 
[in South AfricaJ arises?!!?
Among the twenty-one witnesses clearly hostile to South Africa 
were four former South Africans who strongly opposed the Nationalist
115Ibid., 327.
*i *| ZTEdward Crowther, "The Church's Task in South Africa," 
Christian Century. July 27, 1966, p. 93^.
117’Letter of David Hornbeck, Charles W. Powers, and John C. 
Paines to the editor, Christian Century, December 7, 1966, p. 1506.
n  * i Qgovernment. They favored the strong actions against Saruth Africa. 
There were also six witnesses not associated with the federal govern­
ment who gave what could be considered testimony favorable to South 
Africa at the 1966 hearings. This is not to suggest that they 
necessarily favored apartheid, but instead that they opposed a harsh 
policy on South Africa. The testimony of several of these will be 
taken up in later chapters. It is only pertinent to note here that 
several of the Congressmen were openly hostile to them for their 
statements on South Africa. Congressmen O'Hara, Benjamin Rosenthal of 
New York, and John C. Culver of Iowa attempted to put several of these 
witnesses in a bad light by asking rather demeaning questions about 
who had paid for their travel expenses to visit South Africa, or
whether they had been reimbursed for their testimony in the South
119West African case.
Indicative of the attitude of several of the Congressmen 
towards these witnesses were several remarks made to General S. L. A. 
Marshall, a noted writer on military affairs. After Marshall stated 
he did not believe that the United States would necessarily be com­
mitted to observe or implement a decision on the South West Africa 
case if it should be contrary to American interests, Congressman 
Rosenthal commented: "If your position is that individuals or nations
should not be bound by court decisions, you are perfectly entitled to
n t AThese were Leslie Rubin, a professor at Howard University 
and former Senator in the South African Parliament; Kenneth Carstens, 
a Methodist clergyman; Gladstone Ntlabati, a student at the Harvard 
Divinity School; and Mary Benson, an author.
"^^United States-South African Relations, 182, 283, 286,
321-22.
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that position."120 Later, Marshall was quizzed by Congressman Fraser
on apartheid, and Marshall indicated to him his disapproval of
apartheid. Nonetheless, Fraser showed his distaste for Marshall in
an exchange that followed a few minutes later:
Mr. Fraser: I would think that one's moral sensibilities
would be offended greatly by the logic of apartheid as it 
has unfolded in Africa.
General Marshall: Sir, you already asked me that question.
You asked me if I am sympathetic--
Mr. Fraser [cutting Marshall shortJ: I perhaps feel more 
strongly about it than you do,121
Anticipation of such treatment at the hands of hostile
Congressmen is undoubtedly a major reason why more witnesses favorable
to South Africa did not appear at the hearings. The Subcommittee did
indicate a desire to hear from American business leaders, but only one
(Clarence B. Randall, President of Inland Steel Company) was interested,
and he was too ill to attend.
Nothing came out of the hearings of the Subcommittee. The
Subcommittee made no policy recommendations, and no visible policy
changes were made as a result of the hearings. They stirred no great
122interest in South African policy in Congress. The testimony of the
120Ibid., 323.
-L21Ibid., 328.
122For an excellent analysis of sentiment in Congress on South 
Africa and other African issues, see Gary Gappert, An Africanists1 
Guide to the 91st Congress (Washington, 1969) (mimeograph available 
from the American Committee on Africa; copy in possession of the 
author). For an earlier analysis, see Stanley Meisler, "The II. S. 
Congress and Africa," Africa Report. IX (August, 196*1), 3-7. Both con­
firm that while some Congressmen were active on African issues,
Congress did not play a significant role in policy making.
witnesses did not mobilize American public opinion against South
123Africa. The hearings were simply inconclusive. This was not
primarily the fault of the conduct of the hearings; rather, it was
due to events extrinsic to the hearings.
Even as the Subcommittee on Africa was hearing testimony the
drama of the South West Africa case was reaching a denouement -^e
Hague, The long-awaited decision of the International Court of
Justice was handed down on July 18, 1966. By an eight to seven
decision (with the President of the Court having to break a tie by
casting a second vote) the Court held that the complaining parties—
Liberia and Ethiopia— lacked standing; that is, they lacked legal
capacity to bring the suit before the Court.
The Court’s decision was unexpected, and It Infuriated a
number of South Africa's critics. The Subcommittee on Africa had
Ernest Gross, the American lawyer who had represented Ethiopia and
Liberia, appear befo're it to discuss the decision. Representative
Rosenthal declared that in his Judgment world order suffered substan-
TOlltially from the decision. At the United Nations, the Afro-Aslan 
group of states decided to proceed to place South West Africa under
123^The Subcommittee on Africa held further hearings on 
Southern African issues after Charles C. Diggs, a black Congressman 
from Michigan, became its Chairman. In 1969 there were hearings on 
the granting of a permit for the planes of the South African Airways 
to land in New York, and on the continuation of a quota for South 
African sugar. In 1971 and 1973 there were extensive hearings on 
American business involvement In South Africa. None of these pro­
duced significant policy changes.
12k sUnited State3-South African Relations, 526. See also
"South Africa's Victory," Nation. August 8. 1966, p, 107; "World
Court's Non Decision," New Republic, August 13, 1966, p. 7; Ernest A,
Gross, "The South West Africa Case: What Happened?" Foreign Affairs,
XLY (.October, 1966}, 36-1+8.
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United Nations authority despite the decision.
Whatever the merits of the decision of the International 
Court, it altered the complexion of the policy questions which faced 
the United States. The decision removed the prospect of clear legal 
justification for American intervention in South Africa, and it 
strengthened the hand of those who felt sanctions inappropriate. When 
the United Nations attempted to "override" the decision through its 
resolution, it made the African bloc appear to be the side to the 
controversy which was unwilling to adhere to the rule of law. The 
International Court's decision was thus a significant factor in c
reducing or eliminating the prospects for success of the movement for 
American participation in United Nations sanctions against South 
Africa. There were other factors contributing to this which will be 
discussed in the final chapters of this study.
Before turning to these other factors, it will be necessary to 
consider briefly what became of the movement for sanctions after it 
became apparent that the United States would not initiate a stronger 
policy against South Africa. The movement did not die with the 
International Court's decision and the termination of the 1966 Congres­
sional hearings. It simply took a new tack. Paradoxically, while the 
moyement lost the possibility of bringing about broad change within 
South Africa, it gained somewhat in effectiveness in limited areas 
and grew in the volume of materials its spokesmen put out on matters 
pertaining to South Africa.
The anti-South African movement now followed a course of
I25united Nations, General Assembly Resolution 21^5 (XXI}
U966).
action implicit in its earlier criticism of American business in­
volvement in South Africa, Instead of devoting further substantial 
efforts to getting the United States government to use American 
business as a diplomatic tool (through sanctions) against South 
Africa, the movement now turned directly against business itself. 
Although bringing about change within South Africa remained a stated 
goal of the movement, the emphasis of the movement shifted to the 
apparent goal of cleansing the United States of a collective guilt 
from earning profits from apartheid and from giving support to South 
Africa through business.involvement.
The dissatisfaction with government policy and the extent to 
which business was blamed for policy was seen in the reaction of the 
liberal journals of opinion to a speech attacking apartheid by 
President Lyndon B. Johnson in May 1966. Speaking at a White House 
reception for African leaders on May 26, President Johnson had made a 
"model" denunciation of apartheid and r a c i s m . T h e  Hew Republic 
quoted a portion of it on American support for majority rule and 
opposition to South Africa's "narrow and outmoded policy" and com­
mented that this was America talking out of the left side of 
its mouth. Out of its right side, American business was saying
This is not to say that activists ceased to urge policy 
changes by the federal government. Some continued to call for the 
same policy changes advocated earlier; e.g., John Marcum, "Southern 
Africa and United States Policy: A Consideration of Alternatives,"
Africa Today, XIV (October, 1967), 5-13; Lincoln Bloomfield, The 
UN and World Order, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No.
197 (New York, 19&9), 56. Rather, the focal point of activity 
shifted in the manner described below.
127l$mdon B. Johnson, "The United States and Africa: A Unity
of Purpose," Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1966, p. 915.
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something else, said the Hey Republic, addingj "The sheer scale of
existing business investment itself offers assurance that the U. S.
government will not act 'rashly* by putting too much pressure on South
128Africa to alter her 'narrow and outmoded policy,'" Commonweal noted
President Johnson's words against apartheid and commented:
If they had been accompanied by equivalent action, say by the 
economic disengagement of the U. S. from South Africa, we might 
celebrate. . . . Il]nstead of celebrating, the President's 
speech is an occasion to reflect on how little reason Africans 
have to believe our stated good intentions.-*-29
The Nation similarly noted that American investments spoke louder than
n oAmerican words denouncing apartheid. J
Because of sentiments such as these, the main thrust of the
anti-South Africa campaign since about 1966 has been against 
American business operations in South Africa. The movement has been 
directed primarily at forcing reduction of business involvement re­
gardless of governmental policy. The details of this movement for 
"disengagement," as it has been commonly called, are somewhat beyond 
the scope of this study and are of too recent a date to be readily 
accessible. Nevertheless, the activity itself is germane to this 
study in that it has been an outgrowth of the harsh image of South 
Africa and a sense of guilt among some Americans over alleged complicity
-*-28*tg0uth Africa," New Republic, August 13, 1966, pp. 7-8.
■'■^"African Investments," Commonweal, June 10, 1966, p. 327.
It should be noted that the American Committee on Africa had published 
an updated "Special Report on American Involvement in the South 
African Economy," as a special issue of Africa Today, XIII (January,
1966), and that the Commonweal editorial, and probably the New 
Republic editorial, relied on it.
■^^"South Africa's Victory," Nation, August S, 1966, p. 107.
161*
in apartheid. One of the leading proponents of disengagement,
Henry P. Van Dusen, President Emeritus of Union Theological Seminary,
enunciated a basic premise of the policy when he stated:
Every American investor or employee in American firms doing 
business in South Africa, every American depositor or employee 
of virtually every major American bank involved with South 
Africa, every American educational, philanthropic or religious 
body holding similar investments or deposits is, however 
unwittingly and unwillingly, a profit-taking partner of 
apartheid. Let Americans of conscience declare to those 
who administer their money: "This sordid involvement must
cease."131
The ethical demonstration of such action, he said, would be epochal.
The activity against American business aimed at disengagement 
is also pertinent to this study because it has further stimulated 
efforts to produce more favorable images of South Africa, or at least 
of American business activity in South Africa. Thus it would be 
worthwhile to examine scane examples of the campaign against American 
businesses operating in South Africa that have developed in recent 
years.
The types of activities engaged in by anti-South Africa groups 
have been quite varied. They have ranged from simple demonstrations 
staged to embarrass individual businessmen— such as mining entre­
preneur Charles W. Engelhard— to rather sophisticated use of the proxy
system under the securities laws for shareholder participation in
132corporate decision making. The employment of these activities can 
best be suggested by tracing the campaign against a loan to South
-'-^Letter of Henry P. Van Dusen to the editor, Life, December 
2, 1966, p. 29. See also Van Dusen1s statement on western "guilt" in 
"Third Thoughts on Africa," Christian Century. July 1, 196**, pp. 855-57-
On such a demonstration against Engelhard, see "Hews and 
Views," Commonweal. May 2k, 1968, p. 282.
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Africa "by a consortium of American banks.
In 1951, a revolving credit agreement for about $30,000,000 
(later increased to $1+0,000,000) was set up for South Africa in which 
a consortium of American banks participated. It did not begin to 
draw serious criticism until the mid-1960s after attention was drawn 
to it because of its renewal during the critical period after
1 "3-3Sharpeville. Even then, it was not the more established opponents
who began the attack on the credit agreement. Instead, it was a
newer generation of activists who transformed the growing concern of
the opponents of South Africa over business involvement in South Africa
into specific initiatives against such business involvement.
Foremost among the student activist groups of the 1960s was
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). It is perhaps indicative
of the prominence of South Africa as a target for liberal groups in
the mid-1960s that the first time that the SDS's national council
singled out a program of action for chapters throughout the country it
chose to demonstrate against American investment in South Africa. At
a meeting of the national council in New York in December 196U, the
SDS endorsed a program of demonstrations against the Chase Manhattan
Bank and other banks which had participated in the loan to South 
13l+Africa. Demonstrations against the banks took place in at least
■*"33it should be noted that the Council on African Affairs had 
strong criticism for the loan. Alphaeus Hunton, "Postscript," Resis­
tance Against Fascist Enslavement in South Africa, 60-62. Also, the 
Nation had registered its disapproval of the loan. Editorial, Nation, 
February 3, 1951, p. 98. For other background material on the loan, 
which was really one of several loans made at the time, see S. D. 
Greenberg, "United States Policy Toward the Republic of South Africa,
19^5-1964," 108-llU.
■^Silan Adelson, SDS: A Profile (New York, 1972), 212.
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six cities in. March 1965- In New York, some four to six hundred 
members of the SDS and other organizations took part in a five-hour 
demonstration at the Chase Manhattan building, Five of the demon­
strators were allowed to meet with a member of the bank’s board of 
directors to express their protest. Forty-nine of the demonstrators 
who staged a sit-in at the back doors of the building were arrested,-*-35
Student militancy against the loans to South Africa also re­
sulted in the formation, at the Union Theological Seminary, of the 
Southern Africa Committee of the National Student Christian Federation 
(which later became the University Christian Movement). These students 
began calling on Protestant church bodies to stop depositing, and to 
withdraw, their funds in banks which took part in the South African 
loan or had operations in South Africa. For example, in April 1966 
a number of Union Theological Seminary students jointly condemned the 
Methodist Church's Board of Missions for depositing its funds in the 
First National City Bank of New York. The Board declined at this 
time, but did call for American businesses operating in South Africa 
to work against apartheid, and for the American government to review 
its relations with South A f r i c a . I n  the same month, three hundred 
students and others took part in a march down Broadway to a branch of 
the First National City Bank where seventy of the group withdrew their
■^^New York Times, March 20, 1965» P- National
Student Association also went on record in opposition to the loan; 
see American Committee on Africa, A Summary Report on the Bank 
Campaign (New York, n.d.), 2.(pamphlet in possession of the author).
l^'What Would John Wesley Do About It7" Christian Century, 
October 19, 1966, p* 126k.
accounts.^37
The student activities were united with the work of the 
American Committee on Africa in the summer of 1966 when members of 
the National Student Christian Federation and the ACOA jointly formed 
the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid. The ACOA was thus 
drawn somewhat to the left by more radical student groups. Direct 
activity against business was, however, a logical outgrowth of its 
criticisms of business policy in South Africa. And, as it became 
obvious that the 1966 Congressional Subcommittee hearings would have 
little effect on policy, the ACOA had no other direction in which it 
could turn, except perhaps to close up shop. It was too long estab­
lished an institution for that. But in moving further to the left it 
incurred the risk of losing its more moderate support, just as the 
Council on African Affairs lost its audience when it grew increasingly 
radical. It may be doubted though whether the formation of the 
Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid (CCAA) was perceived as a 
radical step.
Named as Chairman of the Committee of Conscience was A.
Philip Randolph, a veteran black civil rights leader and a Co-Chairman 
of the ACOA. Plans were made to generate public pressure to bring 
about the withdrawal of institutional and individual funds from banks 
participating in the credit agreement. The Committee of Conscience 
and other organizations which joined in the campaign printed pamphlets, 
wrote letters to elected officials, called on personnel at the banks, 
staged demonstrations against the banks, made use of bank shareholder
"^^American Committee on Africa, Summary Report on the Bank 
Campaign, 2.
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meetings to protest the involvement of the hanks, called on universi­
ties to divest themselves of stock in the banks, circulated petitions, 
and called for boycotts of the banks by individuals.^8® The campaign 
of the CCAA attracted attention and support in the liberal periodicals 
which had long been critical of South Africa. In lending its support 
to the campaign, the Christian Century stated:
The long range purpose of the C. C. A. A. campaign against the 
New York City banks is to compel the United States to alter 
its South Africa policy radically and to stop allowing U. S. 
dollars to finance abroad the racism it seeks to eliminate at 
home. This is a cause worthy of the sympathy and support of 
conscientious men. -̂39
Within a short time, the Committee of Conscience began to 
achieve a measure of success. By December 1966 Chairman Randolph was 
able to announce that almost $23,000,000 in funds had been withdrawn 
by groups and individuals from the two principal targets of the cam­
paign, Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank."*"̂  In September 
of the following year the Methodist Church's Board of Missions, in a 
reversal of its earlier position, voted in favor of transfer to 
another bank a $10,000,000 investment portfolio that was held by the 
First National City Bank. Mrs. Porter Brown, the Board's General 
Secretary, indicated that the purpose of the action was moral; it was 
not expected to bring about change:
138Ibid., 2-6.
■*-39"Financing Racism," Christian Century, December 7, 1966, 
pp. 1^95-96. See also, "Bank Loans to South Africa," America,
February 25, 1967, p. 27^; "Banks and South Africa," New Republic. 
December 17, 1966, pp. 6-7; Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., "The United 
States and South Africa," Christianity and Crisis, November 28, 1966,
pp. 265-69.
American Committee on Africa, Summary Report on the Bank 
Campaign, 3.
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Even the most enthusiastic supporters of the hoard's decision 
recognize that the mere transfer of a portfolio amounting to 
a little more than $10 million would probably not hring radical 
changes in the policies of either the hank or the government 
involved. On the other hand, it is a moral ohligation of the 
churches to throw whatever light they can upon the dark wounds 
of suffering in the world.
Other churches withdrew funds or hegan inquiries into whether they
and
11*3
lh2should do so. After radical student activities, Cornell 
Princeton Universities sold their stock in the target hanks.'
The ultimate success of the hank campaign came in November 1969 
when a South African official announced in a terse statement that the 
credit agreement would not he extended. The expenses incurred in the 
loan, he said, were no longer warranted because of South Africa's
lliL.strong gold and foreign exchange position. He might well have said 
that the benefits of the loan no longer outweighed the embarrassment 
and inconvenience which the loan caused both the South African govern­
ment and the hank consortium. After the South African announcement, 
the American Committee on Africa suggested that the hanks themselves 
may have been responsible for initiating the termination of the loan. 
But even if the South African government took the initiative it seems 
very possible that it was doing so to save the American banks from
ll*l"Methodist Missions Use Economic Leverage," Christian 
Century, March 6, 1968, pp. 308-309.
ll+2Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, The Church Makes a 
Decision on South Africa/Banks (New York, 1969) (special report in 
possession of the author). This organization, founded in 1956, is one 
of the oldest of the activist religious groups on South Africa.




further disturbance that might jeopardize more important areas of
business activity.
The bank campaign as such ended with the termination of the
consortium credit agreement. However, activity did continue against
the principal Hew York banks which operated in South Africa. In
addition, the bank campaign spawned activities against other areas
of business involvement in South Africa; the techniques employed
against the banks were utilized against other businesses; and groups
formed in opposition to the bank loan continued to operate afterwards,
focusing on other targets for protest. For example, when students
challenged university officials because of university holdings of
stock in the banks, they went on to challenge them for holding shares
in other corporations.which invested or operated in South Africa. And
the technique of voicing opposition to the credit agreement in bank
shareholders' meetings came to be employed against other corporations
with activities in South Africa.
After the bank campaign several of the anti-South African
organizations turned their attention to the automotive industry.
Timothy H. Smith, writing as an offical of both the Southern Africa
Committee (University Christian Movement) and of the Council for
Chrisitan Social Action (United Church of Christ), published a lengthy
ikqpamphlet entitled The American Corporation in South Africa. Very 
lU5Timothy H. Smith, The American Corporation in South Africa: 
An Analysis (New York, 1970) (pamphlet in possession of the author).
In an interview with the author, Smith indicated that the purpose of 
sanctions was to bring about a change to a more just society in South 
Africa (personal interview with Tim Smith, New York City, June 10, 
1972). Two other officials of the Southern Africa Committee indicated 
to the author that they looked to sanctions more as a means of 
opposing the activities of American business abroad; South Africa was
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critical of the role of American business in the South African 
economy, the study contained a considerable amount of material on the 
automotive industry. Some of Smith's research was utilized by 
another organization, the Council on Economic Priorities, when Smith 
served as a consultant in the preparation of a special report on 
"Chrysler, Ford and General Motors in South Africa,"'*'^ The American 
Committee on Africa then produced a smaller pamphlet on General Motors 
and South Africa, apparently based on the earlier two studies.
With this background information compiled, religious organiza­
tions now turned to direct action against General Motors. In 1971, the 
Social Criteria Committee on Investments of the Episcopal Church sub­
mitted a resolution at the annual shareholders meeting of General 
Motors Corporation which requested the Board of Directors to adopt
resolutions to amend the corporate charter to forbid operations in 
lU8South Africa. Ostensibly, the reason for proposing such a resolu­
tion was fear for the church's investments if apartheid should lead to 
turmoil. The Committee had found that some thirty-one companies in
focused upon simply because it was a particularly egregious example 
of such activities (personal interview with Reed Kramer and Tami 
Hultman, Durham, North Carolina, December 20, 1972).
■j JifCCouncil on Economic Priorities, "Chrysler, Ford, and 
General Motors in South Africa," Economic Priorities Report, I 
(October-November, 1970).
11,7'American Committee on Africa, General Motors and South 
Africa (New York, 1971) (pamphlet in possession of the author).
lk8Edgar Lockwood, "The Episcopal Church and General Motors: 
David and Goliath— 1971," Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, n.v. 
(April, 1971), 3. See also, "U. S. Business in South Africa,"
Newsweek, March 29, 1971, pp. 80, 83; and "The American Corporation 
Under Fire," Newsweek, May 2k, 1971, pp. 7^-83.
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which it had investments carried on business in South Africa. But it 
decided to single out General Motors, probably because it had the 
highest degree of visibility. Although unsuccessful, the action by 
the Committee did raise the question of corporate activity in South 
Africa to a higher level of public debate.
Later in 1971, members of the Episcopal Committee on Social 
Criteria for Investments (subsequently renamed) joined with repre­
sentatives of groups from four other Protestant denominations to form 
what became known as the Church Project on United States Investments 
in Southern Africa. A group of these churchmen made a visit to South 
Africa to investigate activities of a number of American corporations 
operating there. After the visit, the Project undertook to solicit 
proxies from the shareholders of General Motors, Goodyear, and Gulf 
Oil in support of resolutions requesting the boards of directors of 
these corporations to provide reports to their shareholders on details
1^9of the corporations' activities in southern Africa. The Church 
Project was no more successful than the Social Criteria Committee had 
been the previous year.
Still other corporations have come under attack for various 
aspects of their operations in southern Africa. The Polaroid Corpora­
tion has been challenged by several organizations, including one
^^Church Project on United States Investments in Southern 
Africa, "Proxy Statement" (March, 1972) (copy of proxy statement for 
General Motors, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, and Gulf Oil, with 
appendixes, in possession of author). For a copy of the report of 
the Churchmen after their visit to South Africa, see the Congressional 
Record, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., E 2950-55 (March 23, 1972). See also, 
New York Times, January 17, 1973, p. k.
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formed from among its own workers, the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers
Movement.1^  The American Committee on Africa has criticized General
Electric and International Business Machines for their operations in 
151southern Africa. Proxy resolutions with reference to southern Africa 
have been filed with the Newmont Mining Corporation and American Metal 
Climax by church groups.
Activists continue to bring pressure on American corporations 
at this time. It would be premature to attempt an assessment of their 
success or lack of success. They have forced the corporations 
operating in South Africa to respond and perhaps to examine more 
closely their policies in South Africa. They have not, however, re­
sulted in the disengagement freon South Africa that their proponents 
have advocated. The activist groups have been troublesome irritants 
to the corporations over which they have asserted their moral superiori­
ty. It is doubtful that anything positive has came from their attempts 
to impose their consciences upon the people associated with these 
corporations and upon all the people of South Africa. And if they 
were successful? One can ohly speculate, and the activist groups, after 
all, need not be too concerned, for they would not have to live with 
the consequences of their actions.
^Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement, Polaroid and South 
Africa (n.p. [Cambridge, Massachusetts], 1970) {this pamphlet and other 
materials were kindly supplied to the author by Ms. Caroline Hunter of 
the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement); George M. Houser, "The 
Polaroid Approach to South Africa," Christian Century, February 2U, 1971* 
2^9-52; "South Africa: Polaroid Stays Put," Hews week, January 10, 1972,
pp. 50, 53.
151American Committee on Africa, Power to the Portuguese Empire 
from General Electric (New York, 1971); American Committee on Africa, 
I.B.M. in South Africa (New York, 1971) (these are ACOA "fact sheets" in 
possession of the author).
CHAPTER V
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SOUTH AFRICA'S IMAGE: 
PIERCING THE PAPER CURTAIN
The movement for sanctions against South Africa was not with­
out opposition in the United States. There were Americans who were 
favorably inclined towards South Africa and who opposed criticism of 
and measures against South Africa. The remarkable thing is not that 
there were such individuals and groups, but that they so seldom gave 
expression to their views during the first decade of Nationalist rule 
in South Africa. In the late 1950s and the 1960s, however, some Ameri­
cans came to see the situation in South Africa and American policy 
towards South Africa as involving issues touching upon or threatening 
their own interests. Also, favorable information on South Africa 
became more widely available to those Americans who might be willing to 
reject or oppose the hostile image of South Africa.̂ "
1It was not, of course, necessary to have favorable information
on South Africa to have a favorable image of the South African govern­
ment and the policy of apartheid. Indeed, some of the sympathy that did 
appear in the United States for South Africa in the 1960s grew out of a 
reaction to the fact that "liberal" publications had been criticizing
South Africa so severely. See, for example, the letter of the New York
Times reader, A. F. P. Mbyler of West Redding, Connecticut, who found 
his "sympathies increasingly with the Afrikaners, which is probably one 
result of the shrill and intensive propaganda against the regime from 
liberal sources throughout the world." New York Times Magazine, May 1, 
i960, p. 6. Likewise, an author of an article favorable to South 
Africa in American Mercury said that his work had been "inspired by 
the mendacious newspaper coverage of the recent riots, which gave an 
intentionally distorted picture of those heroic people whose early
17 k
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The activities of several South African and American agencies 
and organizations were a significant factor in the creation and pro­
motion of more favorable images of South Africa among Americans in the 
1960s and opposition to a hostile American policy towards South Africa.
The background and work of the more important of these groups will be 
discussed before going over the specific views of Americans who were 
favorable to South Africa.
In the period since World War II the governments of many of the 
nations of the world have grown increasingly concerned with the way 
they are viewed by people abroad. The growth of the mass media has 
had a profound effect on the conduct of politics and diplomacy, and, in 
response to this, government agencies have been created to carry on 
public relations work abroad for their countries, either specifically 
in the hope of exercising political influence through the creation of
2favorable public opinion or to promote tourism, trade, and investment.
The South African government has recognized for some time the impor­
tance of foreign opinion and has carried on an active campaign for a 
number of years to influence American views of South Africa.
The South African Information Service which is in operation 
today began as an Information Bureau instituted in 1937 in the admin­
istration of Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog. It had only three informa­
tion branches abroad during World War II, one of which was a New York 
office opened in 19^2. The Bureau was succeeded by the State
history reads so much like our own." Frank Volkman, "Boer and Bantu in 
South Africa," American Mercury, JCCI (November, i960), 2.
pJohn Lee, "Preface," in John Lee, ed., The Diplomatic Per- 
suaders: New Role of the Mass Media in International Relations (New
York, 1968), x.
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Information Office created by the government of Jan Smuts in 19^7.
This Office was reorganized when the Nationalists came into power in 
19^8, and its operations were placed under the authority of the Depart­
ment of Interior. The Nationalist government stepped up the activity
of the Information Office abroad and increased the money allocated to
3the foreign operations. An office of the Information Service was 
opened in Washington, D.C. in 1951 to complement the work of the New 
York office created earlier.
In the first years of the operation of the Information Office 
by the Nationalist government the primary technique of attempting to 
influence opinion was through the distribution of various publications, 
including a weekly Digest of South African Affairs, "Fact Papers,” and 
other pamphlets and sheets aptly known as "throw-aways" among public 
relations people. An early example of the sort of work carried on by 
the Information Service was its distribution to news media and 
interested persons in the United States of a letter by Prime Minister 
Mai an to an American clergyman.
In 1952 Reverend J. H. Piersma of Grand Rapids, Michigan wrote 
to Malan asking for a frank description of apartheid which he could use 
in discussing the policy and the problems of South Africa with his 
fellow Americans. The response was a rather defensive plea by Malan
kfor an understanding of South Africa's dilemma. Malan's letter
3Edwin S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African 
Foreign Policy (Pasadena, California, 1965), 2h-25i Vernon McKay,
'"South African Propaganda: Methods and Media," Africa Report, XI
(February, 1966), ^3-^; John Laurence, The Seeds of Disaster (New 
York, 1968), lU2-l»3.
kThis letter is discussed and quoted in L. E. Neame, The 
History of Apartheid: The Story of the Colour War in South Africa
(London, 1962), 80-82.
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stressed the vast differences "between the ways of life of the white
and black populations, and the small numbers of the whites in the
country. It made little sense, the letter said, to criticize apartheid
in the abstract without regard to the extraordinary conditions in
South Africa, and that it would be just as -immoral to consider only the
rights of the blacks as it would be to have regard only for the rights
of the whites. Attempting to counter the harsh image of the white
population, Malan*s letter stated:
I must ask you to give White South Africans credit for not 
being a nation of scheming reactionaries imbued with base and 
inhuman motives, nor a nation of fools blind to the gravity 
of their vital problem. They are normal human beings. They 
are a Bmall nation grappling with one of the most difficult 
problems in the world.?
Describing apartheid as a tremendous experiment, Malan pointed out that
his government was doing a great deal to improve the living standards
and education of the non-white population.
Another technique employed by the South African Information 
Service to influence American images of South Africa was to write 
letters to the editors of publications in response to articles they 
published tdiich were hostile to or misrepresentative of South Africa.
An illustrative example of this was the letter by Conrad Norton, the 
assistant director of the New York office of the Information Service, 
to Time, in 195^. Time had published a report about the conviction in 
South Africa of two young white farmers for flogging an African to 
death.^ The magazine's writer quoted a "Boer farmer" who had said 
after the trial that it was a deep humiliation to see white men sent
5Ibid., 8l
6"The Flogging of a Kaffir," Time, June 7, 1951*, pp. 30, 33.
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to prison for killing a thieving Kaffir. Norton's letter to the
editor said: ’’Had your correspondent used a fraction of the diligence
he showed in tracking down and recording an anonymous 1 Boer farmer1s1
comments on the case, he could not have failed to mention in passing
the countless numbers of South Africans— both 'Boer farmers' and
others— in whom the crime aroused the same shocked views as those held
7by the trial judge."
In spite of the fact that the Nationalist government attached
considerable importance to foreign opinion, its early efforts (such as
those described above) at international public relations work were
ineffective. The repercussions from Sharpeville and the independence
of other African countries spurred the South African government to
devote still more attention to improving South Africa's image abroad.
In 196l Prime Minister Verwoerd established a State Department of
Information and Wentzel C. du Plessis, at one time the Ambassador to
8the United States, as its first Secretary. The standard activities 
of the Information Service— the printing and distribution of informa­
tion on South Africa— were increased, and new approaches were imple­
mented that had a somewhat different focus.
Over the years, the South African Information Service had 
basically two tasks to accomplish. The first of these was to counter
7Conrad Norton to the editor of Time, ibid., June 21, 195U, 
p. 8. For several more typical examples of such letters by Information 
Service officials see the letter of W. J, Le Roux to the editor,
Atlantic. CCX (July, 1962), 33; and, more recently, the letter of 
L. E. S. de Villiers to the editor, New York Times, August 3, 1971, 
p. 29.
Q
Wentzel C. du Plessis, "South Africa's Image Abroad," in 
G. Cronje, ed., South Africa in the World (Cape Town and Johannesburg,
1970), 72.
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an existing bad image. The effort to reject the tenets of the harsh
image is apparent in much of the material put out by the Information
9Service. As described by the information counselor of the South 
African Embassy in Washington, W. G. Meyer, the media in the United 
States often portrayed South Africa in a most unfavorable light: "At
every possible occasion South Africa has been presented to the world 
as a despicable monster, governed as a police state by racists prac­
tising a policy of oppression contrary to all accepted moral standards 
and religious concepts; no less than a threat to world peace. The 
Information Service sought to convince people that such views were 
incorrect.
It was not enough, however, just to try to counter the poor 
image of South Africa. A second task was to create a positive image to 
replace the negative one. The government had to try to show that South 
Africa has positive value t o those whose goodwill it sought to retain 
or win, as well as attempting to demonstrate that its racial policies 
were mlspa’ceived. In the 1960s the Information Service focused more
^For example, a pamphlet published in 1961 and distributed in 
the United States, began its discussion of "Race Policy" by saying:
The policy of Apartheid— of separate development— and its 
implications as far as White-Black relations are concerned 
are not always fully understood.
Firstly, it is sometimes erroneously contended that the 
Whites robbed the Bantu of a fatherland, that apartheid is 
the system under which the White population exerts a cruel 
domination over the Bantu, and that it implies the eventual 
herding together of all surplus Bantu workers into barren 
reserves, where they will be kept in perpetual subservience 
to the whims of the Whites. Nothing is further from the truth.
South African Quiz (Pretoria, 1961), 25.
■̂®W. G. Meyer, "The Challenge of South Africa," in Lee, ed. , The 
Diplomatic Persuaders, 100.
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on this second task, and was able to undertake somewhat more effectively 
both tasks as it made use of new approaches to influencing opinion.
Some of the principles guiding the South African Information 
Service were brought out by Derick de Villiers, a United Party member 
of Parliament, in an article published in the South African periodical 
Mew Nation.^ Describing the overseas information service as the 
"cowcatcher of diplomacy" which’bweep[sj obstacles from the line of 
advance," he said that the service had to restrict its activities to 
the accomplishment of a few carefully selected aims. These objectives 
had to be chosen with a view to "the country's main strengths— for 
example, economic rather than political in the case of South Africa—  
and the impact these are likely to make on a particular foreign 
audience."12 The correct medium, he observed, had to be chosen to 
make the message effective, and personnel had to be selected with an 
eye to their "ability to reconcile the political, economic and cul­
tural interests of their own country with those of the country in
13which they will work." De Villiers recognized that the limited 
financial resources and manpower available to South Africa meant that 
the overseas information officer had to reach the many through the few. 
Finally he said that services offered by the information agency had to 
be reliable, fair, objective, and continuously offered. These stand­
ards enunciated by de Villiers are sound from the standpoint of public 
relations work, and they describe correctly the basic working
^Derick de Villiers, "The Cowcatcher of Diplomacy: South




principles in recent years of the South African Information Seryice 
in the United States.
In the 1960s the Nev Yo:rit office of the Information Service 
continued to make available published information on South Africa 
though increasing the amount it produced from what it had previously 
distributed. Three regular publications were prepared and sent out 
by the New York office: a weekly news release which summarized news
from South Africa, a Business Report which stressed material end data 
of interest to American investors or potential investors in South 
Africa, and a monthly called Scope which varied in content end format. 
Another three publications were sent to Americans from South Africa: 
the South African Digest, a weekly containing news and statements of 
government officials; Bantu, a monthly with information on black South 
Africans; and Panorama, a slick paper monthly with attractive pictures 
on South African life. These last three publications were not pro­
duced specifically as propaganda for the American market but were 
circulated among readers in South Africa as well as abroad. Department 
of Justice data on the circulation of these six periodicals in the 
United States, according to Vernon McKay, showed that they were 
reaching only a very small audience. In December 1965 circulation 
ranged from a high of 1^,000 for Scope to a low of 1,200 for Panorama.
In addition to the periodicals, hundreds of pamphlets were produced
lUfor public consumption.
The content of the publications of the South African Informa­
tion Service varied from the colorful to the highly political. In
^McKay, "South African Propaganda," k6.
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general, nearly all tried to project the image of a stable country 
facing immense problems which the government has attempted to alleviate 
through an enlightened policy of the separate development of the races. 
They frequently sought to persuade the reader of South Africa's 
strategic importance to the West as an anti-Communist ally, and 
emphasized that South Africa was an area of prosperous industrial 
development. One such pamphlet, for example, made the point that 
apartheid was both necessary and moral, quoting Dr. Verwoerd as 
stating:
Cannot you understand us fighting to the death for our existence? 
And yet we do not only seek and fight for a solution which will 
mean our survival, but seek one which will grant survival and 
full development, politically and economically to each of the 
other racial groups as well, and we are even prepared to pay 
a high price out of our earnings for their future.^5
Another pamphlet produced about 196^ was entitled South African 
Prospects and Progress: Economic Survey of an Industrial Giant in
Africa. The image of South Africa that it sought to convey was 
expressed succinctly on its first inner page, as well as in the pam­
phlet ' s title:
On the southern tip of Africa, in one of the greatest mineral 
treasure houses of the world, a new industrial giant is arising. 
Already this land of golden opportunity, the Republic of South 
Africa, has far outstripped all other countries in Africa in 
output and living standards; and is poised for new spectacular 
economic advances.
•^Progress Through Separate Development: South Africa in
Peaceful Transition (Mew York, n.d.), 15 (pamphlet in possessionof 
the author). A "fact sheet" produced at about the same time, probably 
196U, in the possession of the author, stated "South Africa is firmly 
committed to the cause of the Free World and has outlawed the 
Communist Party. The Republic fought on the side of the Allies in two 
world wars and against the Communists in Korea."
^ South African Prospects and Progress: Economic Survey of an
Industrial Giant in Africa (2nd U.S. ed. « Hew York., n.d.)T 2.
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These examples were typical of much of the material which was
17published by the South African Information Service. Many governments 
with diplomatic representation in the United States publish the same 
sort of pamphlets and periodicals. It is doubtful that this kind of 
activity influences many. The publications reach relatively few people, 
and they are usually regarded by the people who receive them as propa­
ganda. Nevertheless, many information agencies continue to churn out 
such material because it does reach some people, and it is tangible 
evidence that the agency has been at work.
Recognizing the limited effectiveness of the information 
agency's activities in the 1950s, Piet Miering, the director of the 
Information Service at the time, sought the advice of American public 
relations firms. After contacting four firms in 1955 s Meiring con­
cluded that they could not effectively represent South Africa's inter-
lBests in the United States, Five years later, however, he signed a
contract with a New York public relations firm, the Hamilton Wright 
19Organization. The Wright Organization was begun in 1908 as a public 
relations agency; over the years it came to specialize in representing 
foreign governments, including Mexico, Nationalist China, Morocco,
17For more on the publications put out by the South African 
Information Service, and a paint by point refutation of the facts 
they contain and arguments they make, see John Laurence, Seeds of 
Disaster, 80-l68. Laurence, a British subject, worked for ten years 
in an advertising agency in South Africa which had been engaged by 
the South African government to develop such material for distribution 
abroad.
18McKay, "South African Propaganda," M.
19■̂ U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives in the United States, 
Hearings, 88th CongT, Ts¥ Sess., 1963, 707-709 (hereafter Activities 
of Nondiplomatic Representatives).
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Italy, and the Ivory Coast. The South African government agreed to 
pay the Organization $250,000 to represent it in the United States.
The approach used hy the Hamilton Wright Organization differed 
somewhat from the standard published fare that the Information Service 
had been producing. The philosophy of the Organization, as Hamilton
Wright, Sr. explained to Meiring, was to make use of "positive non-
21political propaganda to create an effect essentially political."
The public relations firm worked through newspapers, magazines, news­
reels, television, shortfilms, and other media. It concentrated on 
what it felt were the positive elements of South Africa: the progress
of the country, the economy and the extent of foreign investment, the 
natural resources, the culture and folklore, the tourist attractions, 
and South Africa's social accomplishments.
Films cn South Africa were produced by the Hamilton Wright 
Organization, including "A Touch of Gold" on gold mining, "South 
African Frontier," and "South Africa Today." These were turned over 
to Twentieth Century Fox, Metro-Goldvyn-Mayer, Universal-International, 
and firms in Spain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium, and
elsewhere for distribution to theaters. Some of the films were
2?distributed also to television stations. The Organization sent 
still-photos of South Africa and articles to several thousand newspapers
20Piet Meiring to J. William Fulbright, August 1, 1963, in ibid.,
1508-1509.
21Hamilton Wright, Sr. to Piet Meiring, November 22, 196l, in 
ibid., 708-709.
ppFor example, "South African Frontier" was distributed for the 
Hamilton Wright Organization by Radiant Films and shown at stations in 
Birmingham, Alabama, Houston, Texas, Great Falls, Montana, and Tampa, 
Florida. Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives, 759*
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23with, said the head of the firm, an eighty per cent acceptance rate.
Still another activity of the Organization was to make contacts with 
American news editors with a view to arranging trips to South Africa
2kfor them through the South African Information Service.
The contract between the South African government and the 
Hamilton Wright Organization was not extended when it came up for 
renewal in 1963. The reasons for this are not clear. Hamilton Wright,
Sr. told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that South Africa had 
wanted him to use "hard-core" political propaganda, and he was un­
willing to do this. The South African government had already had him
release one such film on the Transkei against his better judgment, and
25it had been unsuccessful. But it is likely that the South Africans 
did not feel that Wright was delivering as much as he claimed to be.
No doubt the Hamilton Wright Organization was embarrassed when the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee printed a letter from Hamilton 
Wright, Sr. to an agent for Warner Brothers Pictures Distributing 
Corporation requesting that the agent send him a "rave" letter com­
mending him for "A Touch of Go]d" so that Wright could use it to
2 6demonstrate his effectiveness to the South African government.
^Wright to Meiring, November 22, 1961, in ibid., 708. In 
testimony, Wright, Sr., said that National Geographic magazine printed 
a number of photos contributed by the Organization. This was undoubted­
ly in reference to photographs in Kip Ross, "South Africa Close-up,"
National Geographic, CXXII (November, 1962), 6Ul-8l.
^Hamilton Wright, Jr. to Willem Le Roux, April 12, 1962, in 
Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives, 1^6. The author has been 
unable to ascertain whether any such trips were made at this time.
25Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives, 717-18.
^Hamilton Wright, Sr. to Charles Bailey, September 12, 1962, 
in ibid., 1U92.
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The South African government tried another public relations 
firm in 1965 when it entered into an agreement with a Washington con­
sultant, T. A, Mclnery. This arrangement was terminated upon the death 
of Mclnery before the agreed-upon work was completed.
Even as the South African Information Service was attempting to 
work through American public relations firms, it was broadening the 
range of activities that it carried on. It began producing films of 
award-winning quality for television and for motion-picture theaters.
In 1965 short wave facilities were opened to broadcast the "Voice of 
South Africa" around the world. ^  Officials of the government at all 
four of the South African posts in the United States (New York, 
Washington, New Orleans, and San Francisco) participated in television 
and radio interviews and delivered public lectures. The Information 
Service also used new approaches to reaching an American audience 
through newspapers.
In the spring of 1965 the Information Service purchased three 
full-page advertisements in the New York Times, the Washington Post,
the Houston Chronicle, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Chicago
29Tribune. The first showed one hundred thousand people in one of 
South Africa's football fields. This represented the number of 
Europeans who had immigrated to South Africa because "there is stability,
2^McKay, "South African Propaganda," 1*5; Washington Post,
April 25, 1965, A 31. Mclnery was a former director of public 
infoimation for the Justice Department,
2®New York Times, July 19, 1965, p. 30; October 28, 1965,
p. 12.
g^Natal Dally News, March 25, 1965 (all citations to this news­
paper are from the paper's clippings files in Durban, South Africa).
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peace and progress in this Republic, one of the fastest growing
QQeconomies in the world.' It said that capitalism was taken for 
granted in South Africa, and that South Africa, as a strongly anti­
communist country, had supported the United States in the Berlin air 
lift and in the Korean conflict. The other two advertisements in the 
series emphasized South Africa's economic progress and the political 
development of the Transkei. The chief information officer of the 
Information Service in New York, J. 0. Adendorff, said that the ads had
drawn a strong response and that most letters commenting on them hed
31been very favorable. It was estimated that these advertisements 
probably reached more than seven million people in the areas served by 
the newspapers.
Even though the South African government was able to reach more 
people through newspaper advertising of this sort, it still was a form 
of propaganda and was likely to be received as such by most of the 
people who read it. To be effective, favorable information on South 
Africa had to be in the form of news or opinion by Americans not an- 
ployed by the South African government. A means of achieving this was 
found which in part depended, fccr its success, upon the harsh image 
that was predominant in the American media.
One of the repeated themes that can be found in the published 
writings and statements of Americans who have visited South Africa is 
that the country and the government are not nearly so bad as they had 
been led to believe by the reports on South Africa that they had read
^®New York Times, March 21, 1965, E 12.
31Natal Pally News, March 25, 1965- Washington Post, April 25,
1965, A 31,
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before going to South Africa. For example, a visiting American 
businessman, the president and general manager of a San Francisco 
savings and loan institution, was interviewed in Durban in 195^. He 
told the reporter: "Somehow the picture obtained overseas is one of
great unsettlement, which a personal visit serves largely to dispel.
One of the main reasons why groups opposed to the South African govern­
ment have tried to discourage American tourism has been because, as 
one critic put it, tourists to South Africa "often leave the country 
with a very 'white* picture of her racial situation."^ Or as the 
writer E. J. Kahn, Jr., expressed it with regard to his own reaction 
to apartheid: "after a few weeks there, whatever one's views about
aparthei d, one gets used to it. It simply becomes part of the
ohenvironment . . . .
The South African government, and seva*al other groups,
32Quoted in Sunday Tribune (Durban, South Africa), April 13,
195^ (Natal Daily News clippings file).
33Tim Smith, "Suggested Actions," in George M. Daniels, ed., 
Southern Africa: A Time for Change (New York, 1969), 93. A similar
position was taken by Joseph C. Kennedy in a paper presented at the 
national conference on "South African Crisis and American Action"
(March 21-23, 1965) in Washington, D.C., entitled "American Private 
Involvement in South Africa," 36 (paper among the materials on the 
conference lent to the author by the American Committee on Africa).
His research showed that Americans constituted the second largest group 
of tourists to South Africa throughout the period I960 to 196^, and 
that many of them reacted favorably to the country. Ibid. , 2-3. 
Kennedy's study discusses the activities of the South African Tourist 
Corporation (SATOUR) in the United States. These activities have not 
been discussed in detail here because they have been glided by the 
same considerationsoperative with regard to the South African Informa­
tion Service. The two have worked together and used some of the same 
approaches.
31*E. J. Kahn, Jr., The Separated People: A Look at Contemporary
South Africa (New York, 196*3), 2b.
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apparently observed this phenomenon and undertook a public relations 
program based on it. The Information Service began bringing journalists 
and other opinion leaders to South Africa to see the country for them­
selves. The hope was that such visitors would be favorably impressed, 
or at least conclude that the country was not so bad as they had been 
led to believe, and would return to the United States to write and 
speak favorably of South Africa. Although the Hamilton Wright Organiza­
tion did make some contacts for the Information Service for such a 
program, the author has been unable to find any examples of people who 
made the expense-paid tours of South Africa prior to 1965, and officials 
of both the South African and the American governments were unwilling 
to provide him with information on the program.
People chosen to make the tours were usually newspapermen with
35occasional business, religious or military leaders taking paft.  ̂ Many 
were conservatives whose views could be expected to be more favorable 
to South Africa even before they visited South Africa. However, South 
African officials recognized that some critics had to be brought to
South Africa as well as friends so as to lend credibility to the
36program.
Normally the visitors and their wives were flown to South 
Africa for a fifteen to twenty-five day tour which included sojourns 
in the major urban centers, stop-overs in the Transkei, and lectures by 
various government officials at the sites of government programs. The
3^See Francis Pollock, "America's Press on Safari," Nation, 
November 7, 1966, pp. 1+79-81. Pollock, who spent three years in Africa 
working for the American government, lists a number of the people who 
participated in the program in 1965 and 1966,
^Du Plessis, "South Africa's Image Abroad," 75.
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visitors were generally allowed to see whatever they wished to and to
talk to anyone they wanted to. Often they left the country favorably
impressed. For example, the education editor of the Philadelphia
Bulletin, Peter H. Binzen, made the tour in 1966 and was impressed by
the self-government program for the Transkei. He told a reporter that
his group of fourteen had met white civil servants who were obviously
dedicated and sincere in their approach to the problems of the
Transkei. Binzen had thought that there would be more overt repression
than he had seen, and he said: "I didn't expect the prosperity on the
37scale which all races seem to enjoy."
American visitors on the Information Service tours would fre­
quently publish their views in their newspapers. Binzen's reports 
appeared on the front pages of the Philadelphia Sunday Bullet in and 
Evening Bulletin, February 20-25, 1966. Binzen concluded inter alia 
that separate development deserved close study, that the solution to 
South Africa lay somewhere between complete separation and proportional 
representation, and that South Africa "with its enormous mineral wealth
and key location at the foot of Africa, is of great importance to the
38West in the Cold War." On one trip to South Africa of this nature,
George N. Crocker of the San Francisco Examiner wrote that he had.
found that the economic boom in South Africa was so great that Africans
from neighboring countries were clamoring to get in. He continued:
More importantly, the South Africans are anti-Communist 
and loyally pro-West. They are the most reliable opposition 
to Communism on the African continent and to the outflanking
•̂ Natal Daily News, February 7, 1966.
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, February 25, 1966, pp. 1, 36.
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of Europe, which is known to he a major objective of the 
Russian and Chinese apparati of the World Communist 
conspiracy.39
Although the Information Service tours occasionally resulted
in unfavorable publicity for South Africa, they generally worked 
1*0effectively. The program had immediate returns in that visitors
would write favorably in their publications, giving the Information
Service a wider audience than it could have through advertising, and
the "message" was more credible than if it had been prepared by the
Information Service. The Information Service would sometimes reprint
the views of the visitors and distribute them to people on its mailing
list or to people who wrote to the Information Service for material on 
1*1South Africa. But the program also resulted in the creation of a
body of American Journalists with generally favorable views of South
Africa and a sense of personal involvement with the country who were
likely to speak up for South Africa when issues arose in the future.
Thus when a film "South African Essay" produced by Henry Morgenthau III
was shown on television in 1966, Thomas R. Weiring of the Charleston
Hews and Courier criticized it in his columns; Waring had made the
1*2Information Service tour in 1965.
39Quoted in Pollack, "America's Press in Safari," 1*79-
1*0For an example of an unfavorable response to the trip, see 
Richard Atcheson, "South Africa: It Could Have Been Arcadia," Holiday.
XLVI (November, 1969), 32-33, 7**, 76-77, 61-83.
1*1E.g., the articles of Ross Mackenzie, sin associate editor of 
the Richmond News Leader, which appeared in his paper after a sponsored 
tour in Apri1-May 1969 were reprinted in an attractive format with pic­
tures and distributed by the Information Service under the title "A 
Report on Southern Africa" (pamphlet in possession of the author).
1*2Letter of Henry Morgenthau, III to the editor of Nation, 
December 19, 1966, pp. 658, 686.
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Because the author has been unable to obtain data about the 
numbers of American brought to South Africa by the South African 
Information Service, it is not possible to assess fully the success of 
this program. After reading South African nevspaper accounts of In­
formation Service tours and inquiries to various American newspapers, 
it appears that hundreds of such visitors have participated in the 
tours and that the program has been fairly effective in mobilizing a 
segment of conservative opinion in the United States in favor of South 
Africa.
The idea of bringing American visitors to South Africa to gain 
a better understanding of its problems from personal observation did 
not originate with the South African Information Service. Instead, the 
use of such a method was begun by the United States-South Africa Leader 
Exchange Program (US-SALEP), an organization which first brought 
American leaders to South Africa in 1958.
The man responsible for the creation of the United States- 
South Africa Leader Exchange Program was Dr. Frank s. Loescher who 
became the Program's first director. An authority on inter-group 
relations, Loescher had served as a consultant to the Fund for the 
Republic and as the director of Philadelphia's Commission on Human 
Relations. He was the author of The Protestant Church and the Negro 
and of articles on race relations in the United States and South 
Africa.
Dr. Loescher's first visit to Africa was in 1953 when he 
served as a consultant for a program of the South African Institute 
of Race Relations. After this experience he began to consider ways 
in which American voluntary organizations could provide constructive
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help for South Africa's problems. One way, he believed, of accom­
plishing this vas through the exchange of influential persons from the
1(0two countries. J Friends of his in South Africa encouraged the idea,
and he enlisted the aid of the American Friends Service Committee in
the United States. A conference sponsored by the Service Committee
was held at Haverford College in May 1955 to inquire further into the
possibilities of an exchange program and to explore the resources that
might be called upon for such a program. Eighteen representatives of
eleven religious, philanthropic, educational, and cultural exchange
organizations attended the conference. They appointed an Interim
Committee to carry on with the idea; it called a second conference two
years later. In January 1958 Ur. Loescher was named director of the
1+ 1+newly created US-SALEP and exchanges were begun a few months later.
The Program had criticism from liberals in the United States
1+5and from conservatives in South Africa. This was due to the very 
nature of the Program. On the one hand, it tried to serve the purpose 
of making South African leaders more liberal. It tried to make them 
aware of currents of thought in the United States on race relations and 
to break down intellectual isolation in South Africa. But from the 
standpoint of many of the South African supporters of the Program, it 
also had the function of showing to American participants that South 
Africa's problems were highly complex, far more difficult than the
JNatal Daily News, December 17, 1959- 
1+1+Carol Ann Weisenfeld, The First Decade (n.p., 1968), 2.
This publication was provided to the author by Dr. Loescher.
^See William 0. Brown, "Some Relevant Aspects of South African 
Society," in Leiss, ed., Apartheid and United Nations Collective Meas­
ures (New York, 1965), 1+1; and Edwin S. Munger, Notes on the Formation 
of South African Foreign Policy. 77.
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problems of race relations in the United States, The International 
Management Committee of US-SALEP, made up of an American and a South 
African Executive Committee, reflected the diversity of purposes that 
the organization has tried to serve; it consisted of individuals of 
very different backgrounds and political persuasion, ranging from 
black Americans to strong supporters of the Nationalist Party in South 
Africa.^ All, however, undoubtedly shared the assumption that commu­
nication with South Africa was preferable to its isolation.
Between 1958 and 1968 there were 228 individuals or families
who participated in the exchange programs, most of which were for
periods of three months. Of these, 160 were from South Africa and
sixty-eight were from the United States. Six types of exchanges were
sponsored by US-SALEP. University faculty exchanges had the highest
priority; a third of the exchanges in the first decade of the work of
the organization were associated with universities. A second type of
exchange was functional, that is, dealing with specialized projects
such as conferring on the role of small business in economic and
community development. Science exchanges were arranged in cooperation
with the National Science Foundation. Another activity of US-SALEP was
to sponsor South African newspapermen as Associate Nieman Fellows at
Harvard University. A fifth type of prog? am was to support two-way
exchanges of clergymen, a South African minister serving an American's
congregation and vice-versa. Finally, there were Independent Exchanges,
visits to each other's country by American and South African leaders
h.7from various fields. J
^^Weisenfeld, The First Decade, 5-7•
^Ibid.. 3-U.
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American visitors to South Africa under the US-SALEP exchanges
were often surprised to find that South Africa was not so had as they
had expected from their reading on the country in the United States.
To cite an example, one such exchangeevas the Reverend William H.
Felmeth, a Presbyterian minister from New Jersey. He took his wife
and daughter to South Africa in June 1967 when he exchanged pulpits
with Dr. J. Dalziel at St. Columba's Church in Johannesburg. He told
a reporter in South Africa that he had found from his visit that the
situation was at variance with the harsh impressions gained abroad.
He said that he was returning home after his ten week visit to "marvel
at how much was being done, frequently with concern and compassion,
1*8to implement the policy of separate development." Participants in 
the Program gave expression to similar views in important publications 
and places. Although the Program did not issue a regular publication 
and did not adopt any particular "line" on South Africa, it is possible 
to speak of a US-SALEP image of South Africa in bringing out some of 
the main points in the published views of several Americans who par­
ticipated in the exchanges.
The most prominent feature of the US-SALEP image of South 
Africa was the view that white South Africans were not depraved and 
that there was hope for constructive change in South Africa through the 
more enlightened members of the white community. The people associated 
with the program often expressed the belief that racial prejudice is 
based on social and economic differences between racial groups rather 
than irrational reactions to differences in skin color or psychological
^ Natal Daily News, October 5S 1967, "Verkrampte v. Verligte," 
Christian Century. November 15, 1967, pp. 1^72, ll*7̂ -75-
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abnormalities. William 0. Brown, director of the African Studies
Program at Boston University and later a member of the US-SALEP
International Management Committee, wrote in 1955:
Even in South Africa, where great importance is attached to 
race per se, the significant factors in race relations are not 
the physical differences, existing or imputed, but the basic 
divergencies in history and culture as between the so-called 
racial components in the South African complex. The emphasis 
on race as a physical reality conceals the Europeans' fears 
that Africans, Asians, and Coloreds as social groupings may 
share with them a common society and compete for place and 
status in a common world. °
This approach was most prominently and often expressed by 
Edwin S. Munger, a professor of political geography at the California 
Institute of Technology who published widely on South Africa. In 
contrast to John Gunther who viewed the South African Bureau of Racial 
Affairs (SABRA) as being at the extreme right wing of the Rationalist 
Party, Munger found that "SABRA believes that all men are equal in the 
sight of God and potentially equal in practice, and that no Christian 
solution in South Africa can be based upon an assertion of inherent 
superiority of Afrikaner over African.Indeed, he said that many 
of the speeches he heard at a SABRA meeting were liberal. It was 
Munger's belief that the world press had overstated the importance of 
the race issue in elections in South Africa, that the Nazi label on the 
Nationalist Party was an "anachronistic epithet," and that South Africa
^ W i l l i a m  o. Brown, "Commentary [on a paper presented by 
Edwin S. MungerJ" in C. Grove Haines, ed., Africa Today (New York, 
1955), 198.
■^Edwin S. Munger, African Field Reports, 1952-1961 (Cape 
Town, 1961), 510.
was lay no means a police state under the Nationalists.^
One of Hunger's most important statements of the theme of
hopeful developments within the white groups was his 1969 article in
52Foreign Affairs: "South Africa: Are There Silver Linings?" There
he discussed the development of a split within the Nationalist Party 
between the verligtes (enlightened ones) and the verkramptes (narrow 
or cramped ones). The fact that the Nationalist Party was moving to 
a verligte position on key issues (immigration, mixed sports, open 
discussion of issues, enlightened Separate Homelands instead of 
baasskap) was bringing about change in South Africa. Economic forces 
were serving as a liberalizing influence, living standards were rising 
among the Africans, and the "victory" of South Africa at the World 
Court gave the whites a sense of relief which permitted a freer dis­
cussion of future policies and permitted the government to embark on a 
new foreign policy friendlier to the African countries to the north.
A hundred Free State Afrikaner farmers, he noted, had recently taken 
their tractors to aid the plowing in the African state of Lesotho, and 
he quoted Professor N. J. Olivier (who served on the International 
Management Committee of US-SALEP with Munger) from a speech at 
Stellenbosch where he said: "We are not monsters and I believe it
will be realized that discrimination based on colour is untenable.
•^Ibid., 5^2i Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African 
Foreign Policy, 51; Munger, Afrikaner and African Nationalism (London,
1967)7 6k.
52Edwin S. Munger, "South Africa: Are There Silver Linings?"
Foreign Affairs. XLVII (January, 1969). 375-86. See also the views 
of Richard B. Ford, a historian at Carnegie Institute of Technology 
who was a US-SALEP exchangee in 1967. in his "The Urban Trek: 
Comparison of Mobility," in Heribert Adam, ed. , South Africa: 
Sociological Perspectives (New York, 1971). 2^9-67.
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It will take time, but we haye seen -many changes in South Africa,
53and I believe that this one will came.'
In a later issue of Foreign Affairs George F. Kennan, the 
historian and diplomat whose views on race and foreign affairs in 
different context have already been noted, expressed Judgments similar 
to those of Munger. Kennan said after a US-SALEP visit that he was 
inclined to agree with those who felt that "the results of the recent 
election, repudiating the right wing of the Nationalist Party and 
strengthening somewhat the position of its more moderate opponents, 
is the beginning of a trend in the direction of greater liberality and 
maturity of official policy— a trend bound to became strengthened as 
more young people come into the picture as voters."
The fact that the whites of South Africa were not evil people
did not mean that the policy of apartheid was a desirable one. On the
contrary, people associated with US-SALEP often concluded that apartheid 
was very harsh, inexcusably so, and that ultimately the aim of complete 
separation could not be achieved. Kennan, for example, stated that the 
evils of apartheid were "real, ubiquitous, shocking and depressing.
, . . No merits cf theory could Justify, and no deficiencies of 
execution excuse, the inequities and inhumanities which the present 
system obviously produces. Munger similarly found that the hard, 
legal facts of life for the Africans did not present either a new or
^^Munger, "South Africa: Are There Silver Linings," 386.
^George F. Kennan, "Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa," 
Foreign Affairs, XLIX (January, 1971), 22k. See also Kennan's earlier
and shorter statement of his views on South Africa in his Democracy
and the Student Left (Boston, 1968), 181-82.
55Kennan, "Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa," 219.
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a creditable picture. He felt that the program of separate homelands
had not made much headway and indicated that only about one-half of the
total African population might eventually live within the enlarged
Bantustans. nonetheless, Kennan, Munger, and others connected with US-
SALEP said -that 1he whites of South Africa faced grave problems; and
they had a right to maintain their own historical and cultural 
57identities.
Finally, American action against apartheid, in the US-SALEP 
view, would be not only inappropriate but foolhardy and counter­
productive. This position has been put forth by various US-SALEP 
people since the organization was founded, but it was given its most 
forthright expression by George F. Kennan who stated:
No changes in official South African policy will ever be 
successful unless they spring in the main from the workings 
of the country's own public opinion and political process.
It is inadvisable and unproductive for outsiders to relieve 
the South African authorities of even the smallest degree of 
their own responsibility by forcing their hand and trying to 
tell them what to do. Let the friends of the various South 
African peoples hold the white rulers of the country to the 
recognition that to the outside the present pattern of South 
African apartheid is abhorrent in aspect and unconvincing in 
rationale; but beyond that let it be the task of those rulers, 
who know their own situation better than any outsider can, to 
find the conceivable alternatives.5°
The director of the Program, Frank Loescher, had also stated on
"^Munger, "South Africa: Are There Silver Linings?" 379.
>JSee, for example, the letter to the editor of the New York Times 
Magazine from US-SA.LEP exchangees Lorus and Margery Milne. While on 
their visit they "saw a very different South Africa from the one we had 
visualized. . . . The Afrikaners need help in solving their problem.
But the answer has to be one that leaves them there, in control of 
their possessions." New York Times Magazine, April 2h, i960, p. 8.
See also the views of US-SALEP visitor Hodding Carter discussed below,
p. 2U9.
rO7 Kennan, "Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa," 226.
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occasion the wisdom of refraining from efforts to impose the American
59way of life on otiier pecples . And it was Dr. Loescher who, at the
time of Sharpeville, revealed one of the links between views on civil
rights questions in the United States and views on the proper course
of policy on South Africa. He wrote a letter to the New York Times
about the whites in South Africa he had seen in a visit just after the
Sharpeville incident, stating that there were thoughtful groups which
face the same problem in South Africa that their counterparts 
in our Deep South are trying to deal with— how to bring along 
the indifferent, the fearful and the hostile whites. . . .
In our rightful concern for human dignity for people of every 
race, creed or national origin in South Africa we should keep 
in mind our own Deep South and test a proposed course of action 
by first asking whether it would help the movement for justice 
in the Deep South. Does ostracising moderate leaders in the 
South, South Africa or an other area of tension help or hurt 
what they are trying to accomplish?60
Loescher, and others of US-SALEP like him, concluded that force was
not a proper tool for implementing race policy in the United States
or in South Africa.
It should not be doubted that the United States— South Africa 
Leader Exchange Program played a role in influencing some American 
thinking on South Africa both through the exchanges it sponsored and 
through the published and other expressions of the exchangees. But 
it should be observed that the views put forth by such people were 
largely restricted to scholarly analyses of the forces at work within 
the white community and arguments against Anerican activity against 
the South African government. The exchangees seldom spoke of the
^Frank S. Loescher, "Perspective,,r in Weisenfeld, The First 
Decade, 23.
^°Letter of Frank S. Loescher to the editor, New York Times. 
May 26, i960, p. 16.
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self-interest of the United StateB in its relations with South Africa. 
Instead they sought in general to promote a greater understanding of, 
and sympathy for, the problems of white South Africans.
If the South African Information Service attempted to influence
journalists and mass opinion and the United States-South Africa Leader
Exchange Program brought academics to South Africa for a better view
of the country, there remained a gap in American opinion that might be
influenced in favor of South Africa. This was a gap in American
business, military and what might be termed "establishment" (for lack
of a better word) opinion. The gap was filled by the creation of the
South Africa Foundation. The purpose of this organization has been
not so much to change the image abroad of South Africa's racial policies
as it has been to convince people that South Africa offers both
62economic and strategic advantages to the West. The aggressiveness 
of the Foundation and the tenor of its approach are suggested by its 
symbol and motto: MM, which stands for Man-to-Man. It is probably one
of the most sophisticated and well-financed operations of its kind in 
the world.
The South Africa Foundation was launched at a December 1959 
meeting in Johannesburg attended by twenty-five leaders of finance,
There were several other programs that took Americans to 
South Africa that are not discussed here because of the small number 
of people involved or because it has not been possible to perceive 
any significant statements on South Africa growing from them. These 
include visits sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation (which has a 
world-wide travel grants program), the United States State Department 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Program, the Smith-Mundt program, the 
People to People program started by President Elsenhower in 1956, and 
the American Field Service (which sponsors student exchanges).
62See Colin and Margaret Legum, South Africa: Crisis for the
West (New York, 1964), 112-16, 244-46.
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commerce, industry and culture in South Africa, Presiding at the 
meeting was Sir Francis de Guingand, Chief of Staff to Field Marshal 
Viscount Montgomery during World War II. De Guingand explained to 
those present that South Africa was being undermined abroad by an 
organized campaign of misrepresentation, that it was time that all 
public-spirited South Africans, together with those who had a stake in 
South Africa, to mobilize their forces to present the real South 
Africa to the world.
One of those with a stake in South Africa present at the 
meeting was Charles W. Engelhard, an American industrialist who had 
extensive holdings in South Africa. He was elected as one of the 
four vice-chairmen chosen by the group. American business was thus 
involved In the South Africa Foundation from its inception. Two days 
after the initial meeting of the Foundation, Engelhard left South 
Africa to return to his home in New Jersey, stating that once there 
he would work to "put the South African record right." He would work 
through private contacts, he told a reporter, and added, "I also have 
connections in Washington, among Congressmen and Senators and I will 
talk to them."^
63 Natal Daily News, December 15, 1959* 
6kIbid. Engelhard did have good connections. He was an 
influential member of the Democratic Party and represented Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson on a number of special missions abroad, including 
heading the American delegation to Zambia’s independence ceremonies.
In addition to his support of the South Africa Foundation, the Charles 
Engelhard Foundation was a contributor to the United States-South 
Africa Leader Exchange Program. For several critical articles on his 
business ties in South Africa and his possible Influence on policy 
making, see Paul Jacobs, "Charles Engelhard: Our Man in Africa,"
Ramparts, IV (November, 1966), 23-39 and "Our Man— Still in Africa," 
Africa Today, XVII (September-October, 1970), 26-29.
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The first year of the Foundation's operation was limited to 
consolidating its organization and laying the groundwork for future 
campaigns. Initially, its organizers intended that the Foundation 
would serve as a trust fund to finance publicity and public relations 
operations on behalf of South Africa.^ It attempted to influence 
mass opinion by placing promotional information in magazines and news­
papers and by making material available to television.^ An example of 
this type of activity in the United States was the publication of a 
twenty-four page brochure entitled "This is South Africa" which was 
distributed as a supplement to the New York Times of June U, 1961.
As time passed and the Foundation gained experience it found that it 
was becoming an operational public relations firm itself. It also 
began to limit its activities to attempting to influence the higher 
echelons of government, private enterprise, and the communications 
industry. As one of its annual reports described the Foundation, it 
became a "unique organization which combines the functions of publicity, 
public relations and unofficial diplomacy."^® Although it continued 
to produce a magazine, brochures, newsletters and the like, it limited 
its efforts to influence mass opinion and instead concentrated on
6 sSouth Africa Foundation, Annual Report for 1969. 1 (copy in 
possession of author provided by the Foundation's Johannesburg office).
66 ttHarry Klein, Work of the South Africa Foundation Here and
Abroad," Natal Daily News. February 15, 1962. Klein was a member of 
the publicity canmittee of the Foundation.
67The advertisement does not say that it was paid for by the 
South Africa FoundaUon, only that it was by South African and 
American business interests. However, it seems most unlikely that 
it was not the South Africa Foundation which was responsible for it.
^®South Africa Foundationj Annual Report for 1969, 2,
opinion leaders.
The Foundation was slow in getting started in the United States 
in spite of the support of Engelhard and of American industries 
located in South Africa. It opened an office in London in 1961 and 
shortly thereafter one in Germany. A part-time representative was 
appointed in Paris in 1963 and a full-time office opened there in 
1966. It was not until 1968 that a permanent Foundation representa­
tive, John H. Chettle, was appointed for the United States.^
Originally opening an office in New York, Chettle soon moved the 
Foundation's American headquarters to Washington.
There were several reasons why the Foundation was slow in
developing its American operations. The United Kingdom was of higher
priority because of the strong political, and economic ties it had with
South Africa. Germany and France were also of higher priority than
the United States because it seemed that there were better possibilities
of successful links with them. It was much more expensive to undertake
a full-time operation in the United States than in Europe. In addition,
it took longer to build up a network of friends of the Foundation in
the United States because there were fewer initial contacts between
South Africans and Americans, despite a sizeable American investment 
70in South Africa.
Although Britain and Europe were of higher priority than the 
United States, the Foundation did make some efforts beyond the New
^Interview of author with John H. Chettle and Michael Christie, 
Washington, D.C., August 23, 1971.
"^Interview of author with J. de L. Sorour, Deputy Director 
General of the South Africa Foundation, and Scdly Press, Information 
Officer, Johannesburg, South Africa, December 1, 1972.
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York Times advertisement to influence American thinking on South 
Africa wen before Chettle was sent to New York. Within South Africa, 
steps were taken to bring about contact with influential people by 
the formation of "Man-to-Man" committees made up of leaders of the 
various foreign communities located there. One of the twenty commit­
tees represented the United States, and it eventually included repre-
71sentatives of most .American companies operating in South Africa.
At least as early as 1962, the Foundation began bringing Americans to 
South Africa to gain first hand knowledge of the country and began 
assisting other Americans who were visiting South Africa.
Although the South Africa Foundation did provide some informa­
tion on its activities, it was unwilling to release the names of the 
Americans who were brought to South Africa by the Foundation. Neverthe­
less, it has been possible to gain some insight into the workings of 
the Foundation's visitors program from the Foundation's publications, 
from Congressional materials, from newspapers, and from other sources. 
The Foundation regarded the visitors program as the most successful 
of its undertakings, one 'trhich yielded remarkable results and enabled 
the Foundation to make many important and influential friends for 
South Africa abroad.
71Ivor Language, "S. A. Foundation Explains Its Aims," Natal 
Daily News, July 29, 1965. Language was, at the time, Public Relations 
Officer to the Foundation. South Africa Foundation, Annual Report for 
1969, U.
72South Africa Foundation, Annual Report for 1969, 2. The 
first such visitor tfiat the author has been able to learn of was 
Clarence B. Randall, President of Inland Steel. He became a strong 
advocate of greater understanding of South Africa, end his views 
appeeLred in severed prominent publications. He also became a member 
of the International Management Committee of the United States-South 
Africa Leader Exchange Program. His views are discussed in the next 
chapter.
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One such friend was Charles Burton Marshall, a professor at 
Johns Hojkins University and a spokesman on foreign policy and military 
matters in Washington. The way in which he was selected to visit South 
Africa affords a glimpse into the methods employed hy the Foundation in 
locating and cultivating friends for South Africa. At a Congressional 
hearing, Marshall testified that his interest in South Africa began at 
a closed meeting in a private club in Washington which had as its 
focus South Africa and American policy on South Africa. He had been 
asked to comment on the paper delivered by the main speaker for the 
evening, and he found it replete with unsound propositions. Appar­
ently a member of the South African Embassy who was present at the 
meeting passed Marshall's name on to the Foundation; several weeks later 
the Foundation cabled him an invitation to visit South Africa. Marshall 
accepted after setting down several ground rules: he wanted no guided
tour; he should go where he wanted and talk to whom he pleased; and
he shouJd be able to see South West Africa. These were agreed to, and
73he went in June 1965■
While in South Africa, Marshall saw a great deal of the
country and met with many whites and non-whites, including the Prime
Minister and Cabinet ministers. The trip had the desired effect;
Marshall returned to the United States to become a strong advocate
against sanctions and for a lessening of American criticism of South
Africa. He told the House Subcommittee on Africa:
Portentous talk of a bloodbath in the offing is idle. Obvious­
ly the society there faces a great many difficult problems. In
^u.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United 
States-South African Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Africa, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 19667 p. ^3^.
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the large, they are being handled with a fair amount of skill 
and patience combined with ruthless energy. Time is more 
likely to help than to aggravate the problems. Chivvying from 
outside is unlikely to do any good. The portrayal of the 
dominant group in Nazi-like terms is quite inaccurate.^
Marshall called for greater contact with South Africa, rather than
ostracism of the country, and for an end to the policy of "pinpricks":
"If we are not going to move in on this place and capture it, conquer
it, and hold it and attempt to govern it, then let us desist from the
75line we are following— the line of petty annoyances."
One famous visitor with whom the Foundation met was Robert F.
7l|rbid., U36.
75Ibid., U51. Marshall's brother, General S. L. A. Marshall, 
also appeared before the Congressional Subcommittee. General 
Marshall's interest in South Africa was aroused by his brother's 
interest, and he, too, was a Foundation visitor to South Africa. His 
views are discussed in the next chapter. Among others from the United 
States who were brought to South Africa as visitors by the Foundation, 
who were assisted by the Foundation, or who met with Foundation 
personnel in South Africa were the following: Generals James Doolittle,
Mark Clark, Albert Wedemeyer, and Lauris Norstad, Admiral Arthur W. 
Radford, John Davenport (editor of Fortune), Allen Drury (author), 
staff writers for Business Week and the Wall Street Journal, an 
editorial writer for the Cincinnati Enquirer, E. C. BurBk (Professor 
of Business Administration at Harvard and editor of the Harvard 
Business Review), M. A. Samuels (Senior Staff Officer at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University)*
W. E. Griffith (Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology), F. H. Harbison (Professor of Economics and 
International Affairs , Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Interna­
tional Affairs, Princeton), Kevin Phillips (columnist and former 
assistant to Attorney General John Mitchell), N. M. Stultz (Professor 
in the Department of Political Science, Brown University), Harvey 
Gllckman (chairman of the Department of Political Science, Haverford 
College), George F. Kennan (probably while visiting with US-SALEP), 
visiting Congressmen and State Department officials, four executives 
of the Polaroid Corporation (who were investigating whether Polaroid 
should continue operations in South Africa), and a commission from 
Princeton University (who were investigating whether Princeton 
should divest itself of Its portfolio of Btock in companies doing 
business in South Africa). South Africa Foundation. Annual Reports 
for 1969, 1970. 1971; Natal Daily News. October 2, 1967 *, Allen Drury,
A Very Strange Society (New York. 1967). 193, 3̂ 5.
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Kennedy who went to South Africa in 1966 at the invitation of the 
National Union of South African Students. While its treatment of 
Kennedy may not have been typical, it does give a little more insight 
into the way the Foundation has worked. Shortly after Kennedy’s 
arrival, the Foundation sponsored a dinner for the Senator in 
Pretoria and tried to impress upon him the great ethnic and political 
diversity of the country. The Foundation's directors tried to con­
vince him that South Africa was entitled to the support of Western 
countries because it was strongly anti-Communist. He argied with 
the directors, but when he returned to the United States he wrote
letters to thirty American business leaders making clear his opposition
77to financial disengagement from South Africa.
The results that might be achieved by assisting visitors to 
South Africa and impressing upon them the economic and strategic 
significance of South Africa can be suggested by looking into the 
published views of another of the visitors with whom Foundation 
members met in 1969, Ernest W. Lefever. A Senior Staff Member of 12ie 
Foreign Policy Studies Division of the Brookings Institution, Lefever 
published a book on tropical Africa a year after his visit to South 
Africa. It was aititled Spear and Scepter, and in it Lefever observed 
that South Africa was of greater importance to American political, 
strategic, and economic interests than was all of Central Africa.
76William van den Hauvel and Milton Gwirtzman, On His Own:
RFK. 196U-1968 (Garden City, New York, 1970), 153-51*.
77William A, Hance, "The Case For and Against United States 
Disengagement from South Africa," in William A. Hance, ed,, Southern 
Africa and the United States (New York, 1968), 118.
"^Ernest W. Lefever, Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and
Politics in Tropical Africa (Washington, 1970), l£>.
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South Africa was much more advanced than tropical Africa by all
comparative indicia:
Economically South Africa is more important than tropical Africa. 
U.S. private investment in the republic in 1966 was $601 million, 
compared to $1.5 billion for the rest of the continent combined. 
South Africa produced 95 per cent of all the gold mined in 
Africa and approximately 75 per cent of that produced outside 
the communist world. An industrialized state, South Africa has 
a per capita GUP of $530, about three times higher than the 
average for Africa. It generates more than half of Africa's 
electrical power with a per capita consumption equal to that 
of Western Europe. It produces ten times as much steel as all 
other African countries combined.79
It would appear that the Foundation's visitors program was 
quite successful. However, the Foundation was able to accomplish even 
more with a Foundation director in the United States on a full-time 
basis. The Foundation's representative, John Chettle, undertook a 
wide variety of activities to improve South Africa's image in the 
United States and to counteract the work of critics of South Africa.
Chettle's office produced an analysis of the Congressional
resolution to end the South African sugar quota and placed it with an
influential (unnamed) Democrat. He appeared cn radi o and television
in various parts of the country, including the Today show and The
Advocates. Chettle and his assistant attended meetings of the African
Studies Association to rebut critics of South Africa. They pointed
out errors in the television documentary "Black View of South Africa"
shown on CBS in 1970 in a letter of protest to CBS President Frank
Stanton. The letter was then placed in the Congressional Record by
Representative 0, C. Fisher of Texas and sent also to the Federal
80Communications Commission. The Annual Report of the Foundation
79Ibid.
80Interview of author with John H. Chettle and Michael
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for 1969 summarized some of the other activities of the American
office as follows:
Moreover, in the first year of the Foundation's activities 
in the United States, contact was made with more than 150 
businessmen, including the Chairman or President of more than 
30 ccmpanies, more than 30 academics, including the directors 
of 5 schools of international studies and I* schools of African 
Studies; the present and a former Secretary of State; the present 
and a farmer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee; 
members of the Executive including a Cabinet Member, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and several 
of President Nixon's advisers on the National Security Council, 
half-dozen Congressmen, numerous Journalists, including the 
editors or publishers of 12 newspapers or magazines; and 
ambassadors, theologians, community leaders, lawyers, 
foundation representatives and student leaders.
It should be clear from the foregoing that by 1969 the South 
Africa Foundation was operating as a full-time lobbyist for South 
African Interests in the United States, and, indeed, as a very capable 
one. The Foundation was in the advantageous position of being able 
to dissociate Itself frcm many of the more outrageous aspects of the 
race policies of the South African government, while at the same time 
acting as a spokesman against the critics of South Africa. It ■was 
able to concentrate on the economic and strategic benefits which 
South Africa offered to the United States and on showing the folly of 
sanctions against South Africa.
By seeking out influential individuals, the Foundation reached 
up to policy-making circles and at the same time the views of some of 
those individuals trickled down to influence larger bodies of opinion. 
The Foundation did in fact reach the highest level of policy makers.
Christie, Washington, B.C., August 23, 1971- Ihe letter to Stanton 
and the FCC was not expected to produce any sort of action but it 
could serve to harass critics.
^South Africa Foundation, Annual Report for 1969. H  •
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The President of the Foundation had a long discussion about South Africa 
with Presi dent Nixon and Henry Kissinger at a time when the Administra­
tion was in the process of re-evaluating American policy on Southern 
Africa. The Foundation reported of the meeting that "the occasion was 
taken to bring to the President's notice some pointe which have 
received too little attention in the past. It would be hard to over-
Goestimate the importance to South Africa of this discussion."
Without question, the public and private groups discussed in 
this chapter did enjoy some success in influencing American opinions 
on South Africa. Yet the sinister picture painted of their activities 
by some of their critics was rather inaccurate. The efforts of these 
organizations came about largely in response to the high level of 
criticism of South Africa in the United States and elsewhere, criticism 
which often was exaggerated, shallow, and misinformed. In many in­
stances these groups did not try to induce a belief that apartheid 
was a positive good; they often tried only to convince the American 
observer that South Africa's problems -were complex and that outside 
pressure was undesirable as a means of promoting useful change. Those 
who attempted to improve the image of Soi±h Africa felt they were 
motivated by the desire simply to present the other side of the South 
African story, or to improve the chances for South Africa's survival 
In a hostile world, There were limitations on their efforts.
To be effective, the views promoted by the South Africa- 
connected groups had to have same intrinsic plausibility and merit.
82Ibid. It should be noted too that during the 1966 Sub­
committee on Africa hearings on American policy towards South Africa, 
the Foundation sent each member of the Subcommittee a booklet con­
taining essays which gave arguments for American-South African 
cooperation, United States-South African delations, 52b.
There was no way they could hide or avoid the many harsh realities 
of apartheid. Secondly, they could only influence one aspect of the 
image creation process; that is, they were only able to add to the 
information available to an individual on South Africa. They could 
do little to alter the basic value structures of the individuals and 
groups -that they sought to persuade. Nor could they control events 
external to South Africa that played a role in the formation and 
alteration of images of South Africa. These factors and views of 
conservative Americans will be discussed in the final chapters of 
this study.
CHAPTER VI 
SOUTH AFRICA'S AMERICAN FRIENDS
As the South African government and the South Africa Foundation 
knew when they made selections for their visitor's programs, South 
Africa's friends or potential friends in the United States were to he 
found in three discernible groups. When individual Americans came 
forward to speak favorably of South Africa, they usually could be 
identified as strong opponents of communism, as Southerners, or as 
businessmen associated with large corporations. The lines of distinc­
tion among these groups often blurred so that there was an overlapping 
of membership, particularly as to the first two categories. These 
Americans saw South Africa not as threatening the United States but 
rather as being threatened. Their favorable attitudes towards South 
Africa sprang from several motives: they felt that their enemies
were South Africa's enemies; it was in their self-interest to present 
a less critical view of South Africa; or they had a generally con­
servative view of life. Prior to the 1960s American policy had 
appeared sound to these people. They felt no need to defend South 
Africa until activists began to pose a serious threat to a continua­
tion of good relations between South Africa and the United States.
These three groupB all agreed that American policy should be to seek
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cooperation with, not criticism of, South Africa,
A. The Anti-Communist Ally
If some Americans viewed South Africa as a continuing invita­
tion to communism in Africa, there were others who believed Just as 
strongly that South Africa was the strongest, if not the only, bastion 
against communism on the entire continent. To such Americans, South 
Africa was the only bright spot on a still dark continent not yet 
emerged from cannibalism. They saw South Africa's whites as the only 
real friends of the United States in Africa. South Africa's political 
stability and its strategic value, both for its resources and its 
position on two oceans, convinced them that South Africa was too 
important as an ally of the United States to engage in what they be­
lieved to be petty carping at the country's race policies.
One of the infrequent articles on South Africa that did appear 
in a conservative publication prior to i960 was an essay in the July 
1957 issue of American Mercury.1 The title itself, "The Untold Story 
of South Africa," suggested that favorable reports on South Africa 
were not appearing in the 1950s. The mere fact that the Soviet Union 
was opposed to the Nationalist government was sufficient to indicate 
to the author of the article, Kent Hunter, that perhaps South Africa 
was not so terrible a place as the mass media made it out to be.
■hcent Hunter, "The Untold Story of South Africa," American 
Mercury. LXXXV (July, 1957), 37- American Mercury was the only 
periodical the author examined which exhibited a complete reversal 
of attitude towards South Africa. Until 1952 it was very critical 
of South Africa, Then the magazine was purchased by Russel Maguire, 
and became highly conservative; see John H. Schacht, The Journals 
of Opinion and Reportage (New York, 1966), 12.
Hunter stated: "Incitement against the governments of the free world
by Soviet agents is a story too well understood around the world to
2permit failure to look at both sides of the story in South Africa."
The "other side" of the story was that Communists had been
responsible for rioting by Africans in East London, South Africa, in
1952, and that many members of the multi-racial Congress of Democrats
had a Communist background. A TASS radio news broadcast concerning
the activities of the Congress was evidence to the American Mercury
writer that "Moscow was fully informed about the operational plan of
3the South African agitators." The "other side" of the story was also 
that South Africa was liberal by comparison with the Soviet Union, To 
support this proposition the writer pointed out that Russia's ruling 
class amounted to only 3.̂  per cent of the population whereas in 
South Africa the ruling whites constituted 18 per cent of the total 
population. Thus, the ruling class was five and one-half times 
greater in ratio in South Africa than in Russia.
Hunter's article in American Mercury was primarily an attempt 
to counter the existing negative image of South Africa. This was to 
be the pattern for anti-Communist conservatives writing on South 
Africa into the mid-1960s. Such Americans who wrote favorably on 
South Africa tended to do so within the framework of the unfavorable 
image that the critics of South Africa had been expressing throughout 
the previous decade. Many or most of the conservative writings on 
South Africa singled out specific critics of South Africa or attacked
2Hunter, "The Untold Story of South Africa," k2,
3lbid., Ul.
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the views of the ’’liberals" generally. Often, they were not so much
pro-South Africa as they were anti-liberal.
In the 1960s conservative periodicals, including the National
Review, U.S. News and World Report, Human Events. American Mercury,
Uand others, began devoting more attention to South Africa. The image
of South Africa as a valuable ally of the United States against
communism appeared in editorials in conservative newspapers like the
Manchester, New Hampshire, Union Leader and the St. Louis Globe-
Democrat, and in the syndicated columns of conservatives such as
Senator Barry Goldwater, John Chamberlain, Ralph de Toledano, and the
Robert S. Allen-Paul J. Scott Report.^ Some radio and television
6broadcasts presented this image of South Africa. Existing anti­
communist organizations, including the John Birch Society, the
^Examples from each of these are cited elsewhere in this
chapter.
^For a publication which reprints excerpts from these papers 
and commentators and others, see Frank S. and Elsie B. Meyer, Some 
American Comments on Southern Africa (New York, 1967), 19-27; see 
also Vernon McKay, "Africa and the American Right," New Republic,
March 26, 1966, pp. 13-l6.
^Vernon McKay has noted that the right-wing had a virtual 
monopoly on political radio programs. Such programs concentrated on 
Eastern Europe and Communist China in the 19^0s and 1950s and turned 
to the cause of the whites in Southern Africa in the 1960s. Vernon 
McKay, "Southern Africa and Its Implications for American Policy," 
in William A. Hance, ed., Southern Africa and the United States (New 
York, 1968), 20. In addition to the television programs promoted by 
the South African Information Service previously discussed, the 
author has found that television stations occasionally gave South 
African officials the opportunity to answer critical programs or 
showed pro-South African films in response to network shows hostile 
to South Africa. Several shows of this nature were noted, for example, 
in the Natal Dally News. October 13, 1967; and October 19, 1967 (all 
citations to this newspaper are from the paper's clippings files in 
Durban, South Africa).
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American Security Council, and the Liberty Lobby, took up the cudgel 
against South Africa's liberal critics, and new organizations were 
formed to disseminate more widely the anti-Coannrunist image of South 
Africa.
The development of the American organization that was most 
prominent in expressing the anti-Communist image of South Africa, the 
American-African Affairs Association, reflected well the growth of 
interest in South Africa among conservatives. The Association, which 
had close ties with the conservative Mational Review, first issued its 
prospectus in September 19^5; however, it had its origins in the mid- 
1950s in other Cold War issues. The Association grew out of the 
American Asian Educational Exchange, an organization originally con­
cerned with Nationalist China. With the coming to independence of 
African countries in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the A.A.E.E, 
included Africa in its interests and became the American Afro-Asian 
Educational Exchange.
The addition of African controversies, including that of South 
Africa, to the issues on which the Exchange was interested in taking 
a stand proved disturbing to some of the organization's members, 
especially to those affiliated with labor unions and to vice-chairman 
Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut. As a result the Exchange split and
7the American-African Affairs Association was created.
Co-chairmen of the Association at its founding were William A. 
Rusher, the publisher of the National Review, and Max Yergan, the
^Eor this information on the background of the Association, 
the author is indebted to Mr. William A. Rusher, whom he interviewed 
in New York City on June 12, 1972.
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"black sociologist who left the Council on African Affairs because of
Q
his anti-Communist convictions. The list of directors and preeminent 
members of the Association included a number of the nation's better 
known conservatives such as the novelist John Dos Passos, the educator 
Russell Kirk, the author and columnist Victor Lasky, Henry Regnery, 
a publisher of conservative books, and Senator James L. Buckley, to 
name a few. Many so listed in the publications of the Association 
were writers or editors for the National Review. A comparison of 
several of these lists with the names of individuals who toured South 
Africa as guests of the South African government or the South Africa 
Foundation indicated that a number of the A.A.A.A. members had been 
chosen to make tours of South Africa.
The American-African Affairs Association was modestly funded, 
and its activities from its beginning resembled in method those of the 
anti-South African organizations in attempting to influence public 
opinion. The Associ aiion issued a periodic newsletter entitled 
Spotlight on Africa, eleven issues of which were released from 1965 
through December 1968. Like its anti-South African counterparts, the 
Association printed a number of pamphlets on Africa; although the 
Association tock all Africa as its concern, most of these publications 
were on South Africa. Because of the close, though unofficial, rela­
tionship between the Association and the National Review, members'
OFor an essay indicating a growing favorability toward South 
Africa by Yergan, see his "Communist Threat in Africa," in C. Grove 
Haines, ed., Africa Today (Baltimore, 1955), 262, 269-70. Another 
black anti-Communist associated with the American-African Affairs 
Association was George S. Schuyler. A Director of the A.A.A.A,, 
Schuyler was also a prominent figure in the John Birch Society.
219
views appeared from time to time in that periodical. Publications of
the A.A.A.A. were distributed to all members of the African Studies
Association, editorial writers of all major American newspapers,
syndicated columnists and commentators, all members of Congress and
many other government officials (including members of the diplomatic
corps), two thousand other opinion leaders, and various foreign
opolitical and public opinion leaders.
As the prospectus of the organization indicated, the Associa-
H  cn's activities were prompted by a desire to undo the work of the
"liberals." It said that the situation with regard to Africa was
similar to that of China and American intellectuals from the 1930s on:
The field is largely in the hands of semiprofessional "liberals." 
Through various "scholarly" publications and organizations—  
such as the American Committee on Africa— they repeat the same 
intellectual blunders in regard to developments in Africa as 
did the IPR Ilnstitute of Pacific Relations] in regard to 
developments in China: emotionalism, naivete, wishful thinking,
and a Pavlovian "liberal" view of history. Through a default 
in the exposition of differing points of view, another in­
tellectual and political vacuum is being created which is 
capable of doing as much damage as was done by the IPR.-^
The purpose of the Association was to fill that vacuum, to further 
the cause of knowledge concerning Africa without regard to the "pre­
vailing shibboleths." Fate, the statement declared, had imposed an 
obligation on the American people "to defend the cause of human
American-African Affairs Association, 1969 Program: Report
September 1965-December 1968 (n.p., 1969), 8. Mr. William A. Rusher 
kindly provided the author with a copy of this Program.
■^Poriions cf the Prospectus are reprinted in ibid., 1. The 
complete document is reprinted in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, United States-South African Relations, Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Africa, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, pp. 
290-9^ (hereafter United States-South African Relations).
freedom everywhere against the worldwide Communist onslaught . . . .
The fact that the Association waa a response to the actions of the 
critics of South Africa was further indicated hy the organization's 
first publication. It was a reprint of portions of the Carnegie 
Endowment's study of Apartheid and United National Collective Measures; 
this was an effort to expose what the Association's directors con­
sidered to he the dangerous wrong thinking of the "liberals."
South Africa's value to the United States as an ally against
communism was brought out in a publication of the American-African
12Affairs Association written by General S. L. A. Marshall. Marshall
had been a guest of the South Africa Foundation on a tour of South
Africa and had testified before the House Subcommittee on Africa and
before the International Court of Justice in favor of South Africa.
In the pamphlet that he wrote for the Association he said that the
United States needed all the friends it could get. South Africa, he
pointed out, was an especially important one because it served both
strategic and commercial purposes for the United States by virtue of
its position. Quoting Admiral Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall said that South Africa stood "at
13the crossroads of the world, both economically and militarily."
The closing of the Suez Canal in the Arab-Israeli war of August 1967, 
and the possibility of American involvement in the Middle Eastern 
conflict, underscored and increased the importance of the Cape route.
^Prospectus, in United States-South African Relations, 291.




Marshall expressed amazement at the capriciousness of the United 
States government for its policy "to exorcise South Africa, to des­
troy it with incantations if possible, if not, to go on to something 
worse, and the failure to review, or in any way modify that policy, 
despite developments in the Middle East that make manifest its 
frivolousness, hypocrisy, and dangers.
South Africa also appeared to be a very desirable friend for 
the United States to Anthony Harrigan, a military writer, newspaperman, 
and prominent figure in the conservative, anti-Communistic American 
Security Council. In his highly laudatory book on The New Republic 
(South Africa), Harrigan expressed apprehension over strife and dis­
order in the southern hemisphere of the globe which posed a threat to 
North America and Europe. South Africa, he said,was important to the 
United States if the West were to be "fully protected against the 
ambitious proletarian aggressor states of the backward regions of the 
world."'*'̂  George N. Crocker, a journalist for the San Francisco 
Exaroi ner who made a tour of South Africa as a guest of the South 
African government, made similar observations in his newspaper.
Not only was the South African government preventing Soviet 
and Chinese takeover and exploitation of the country's strategic and 
economic potentials, but a continuation of white rule was also fore­
stalling the growth of communism among the Africans of South Africa.
1 ■ ^     n t *
lUIbid., 2.
■^Anthony Harrigan, The New Republic; South Africa's Role 
in the World (Pretoria, 19661, jl.‘ See also Harrigan*s Bed Star Over 
Africa CCape Town, 1964),
^See above, p. 190.
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As Thomas Molnar, a professor of French at Brooklyn College and a
director of the American-African Affairs Association, expressed it,
there was "little doubt that if the African National Congress and
fellow organizations came to power in South Africa, they would set
up a Communist-sympathizing 'neutralist* regime or an outright
17Communist satellite." The conservative periodical Human Events
said of Nobel prize winner Chief Albert Luthuli, leader of the
African National Congress, that his cause was "inextricably lined up
l8with the cause of Communism."
How many American military and diplomatic leaders shared these
views as to South Afrdca's strategic value to the United States? At
this point, it is impossible to suggest what influence such individuals
had on policy. General Marshall said that he talked with a number of
military officers and defense officials and they agreed with him that
19South Africa was important. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who apparently
had a role in the decision to impose an arms embargo on South Africa,
reported that high officials in the State Department did feel that
American defense interests in South Africa outweighed the political
POadvantages to be gained from participation in an arms embargo.
Secretary of Defense, Bobert S. McNamara, according to Schlesinger,
^Thomas Molnar, Africa: A Political Travelogue (New York,
1965), 278.
^"Bobby's African Safari," Human Events, June 18, 1966,
p. It.
19United States-South African Delations, 312; Marshall, South 
Africa: The Strategic Tiew. 12.
20Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (New York, I96T),
536.
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disagreed and said defense considerations should not stand in the 
21way.
There is other evidence also that American military officials 
regarded South Africa as important to American defense strategy. 
Important South Africans indicated from time to time that they be­
lieved that this was the case. Die Transvaler, the newspaper of which 
Prime Minister Verwoerd had been editor, stated that South Africa 
never had asked the United States for aid and yet was willing to help 
in the fight against communism; it went on to say:
That America in this respect has a single ally in Africa is 
greatly appreciated by American military circles. One can 
only hope that the truth will in time penetrate from the 
Pentagon to the Capitol and the White House.22
As has been observed, the South Africa Foundation and the South African
government sought out American military leaders for their tours of
South Africa. Still another indication of the views of the military
is the fact that despite the decision to stop allowing ships of the
American Navy to call on South African ports, some U. S, naval vessels
continued to put Into South A f r i c a . Finally, it should be observed
that some naval officers took the view that a cessation of visits to
South African ports aided United States-South African relations.
South Africa clearly did have some strategic value for the 
United States. Government officials and even publications critical
21lbid., 537.
ggDie Transvaler, November 9, 1965J translated in Thought, X, 
No, p, Similar' vTews appeared in the same newspaper on January 
30, 1967, and in Die Burner on November lU, 1967•
2%atal Daily News, February 2, 1968.
22k
pliof South Africa, such as the New York Times, asserted this. Moral 
issues aside, the question then became whether South Africa's 
liabilities to the United States outweighed its advantages. A key 
element in judging this was an individual's assessment of the prospects 
for continued stability in South Africa.
For years, as already observed, critics of South Africa pre­
dicted revolution within South Africa. In contrast to the Americans 
who saw South Africa as on the verge of a blood bath, anti-Communist 
conservatives described South Africa as among the more stable countries 
of the world. Less than a year after Sharpeville, two writers in the 
National Review challenged the "burning fuse" thesis and showed why 
they thought conditions were less suitable for an uprising in South 
Africa than in any other part of the African continent. These were 
Peter Duignan and Lewis Henry Gann, both scholars associated with the 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.
Specifically attacking the expressions of Chester Bowles in
his 'Africa's Challenge to America, thqr gave the following analysis
of conditions in South Africa:
South Africa, with by far the most mature economy, the most 
highly integrated industrial apparatus, and the strongest 
state machinery in Africa, is further removed from a revolu­
tionary situation (as opposed to sporadic rioting) than any 
other part of the continent; nowhere are conditions less 
suitable for a rising than in the land of Verwoerd,
The myth of a spontaneous revolt setting off other risings 
in Africa is based on a misreading of history. It shows a 
canplete misunderstanding of the way revolutions are made.
. . . Revolutions must be planned, they require organization 
and carefully trained cadres. Before the first shot is fired, 
a successful infiltration into all positions of power, whether
oliNew York Times, November 9, 1959* p. 30; United States-South 
African Relations, lo6, 111-12.
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military, administrative or economic must have been made.
The state machinery must have been fatally weakened, 
either by foreign war or complete internal decay. And 
none cf these conditions apply in the Union of South Africa.
The Union Government is neither weak nor seriously divided.
Its armed f crces and administration are bbth loyal and 
reasonably efficient. Its economy is expanding at a rate that 
would cause shrieks of admiration among fellow travelers, if 
achieved anywhere east of the Iron Curtain.^5
Because there would be no revolt, American action against South Africa,
such as a boycott, would accomplish little except to "deprive NATO of
..26one of its most vital strategic positions.
The first years of political development in the newly in­
dependent African countries did little to undermine the conservative 
view of South Africa's future stability. By comparison to the dis­
array to the north, South Africa's political and social order was 
placid. A writer for the John Birch Society's publication American 
Opinion lauded the "steadfast Union," either taking poetic license or 
ignorant of the fact that four years earlier the Union had become the 
Republic:
From A to Z— betrayed Algeria 
To fallen Zanzibar— a world goes down;
No longer the lion and the unicorn,—
Hyena and Jackal fighting for the crown!
Ben Bella, Nasser, Holden Roberto, slip 
The leashes from their mangy curs of war;
They serve the Masters of the Shadow, so
The light recedes that once shone more and more.
25peter Duignan and Lewis Henry Gann, "White and Black in Africa," 
National Review, January 28, 19&1, P- ^8. Duignan and Gann possessed 
certain "liberal" credentials, such as membership in the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the American 
Civil Liberties Union, which were atypical of the anti-Communist 
conservatives. However, their views are included here because they 
conformed to the conservative viewpoint, and because they appeared 
in the National Review.
26rbid., U9.
226
Yet brave sun-laving men, yea-saying men,
Stand proudly firm although the sky may fall:
The steadfast Union of South Africa „
The slender gallant lance of Portugal..
Another writer for American Opinion likewise contrasted South
Africa with the rest of the "Dark Red Continent." 'Writing in 1966,
the staff writer criticized the liberal press and called attention to:
Seven coups [in Africa] in a year, at last count, plus a few
they didn't call coups. The Western Press, at such pains to
make the black-ruled States seem advanced and respectable, 
averted its eyes from the spectacle in embarrassment.28
South Africa's stability was attributed to the Suppression of
Communism Act: "As long as it is [effectively enforced], South Africa
will remain the chief bastion of sanity on the African continent.
Karl Marx, wrote another American Opinion contributor, was the new
■anwitchdoctor in Africa.
The instability in Africa indicated to General S. L. A.
Marshall that there would be no great washing of the spears by
Africans from north of the Limpopo in the blood of white South
Africans. The belief in an African threat to South Africa, he
asserted, was "pure phantasmagoria," for in the previous three years
[196^-1966) twelve African governments had been shot down "like ducks 
31in a gallery." None of the African countries, said Marshall, even
^Valeron Edweurds, "Africa," American Opinion, VIII (July- 
August , 1965), 136.
28"The Dark Red Continent," American Opinion, IX (July-August,
1966), U7.
29Ibid.. 58.
*^Susan L. M. Huck, "Africa; Marx is the New Witchdoctor," 
American Opinion, X (July-August, 1967), 6l-72.
"^Marshall, South Africa: The Strategic View, 2.
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had enough force to keep its own interior tranquil, much less say 
mount an attack on the strongest country in Africa; none shoved promise 
of continued stability.
As the preceding discussion would suggest, those with favorable 
views on South Africa often took a rather dim view of the results of 
African independence. Conservative publications frequently spoke of 
black Africa in deprecating terms; indeed, they went so far as to 
assert that independence was a mistake. Writers in Human Events, a 
conservative periodical, often compared the new countries of Africa 
to children. For example, the publication quoted one American news­
paper (the Cincinnati Enquirer) in i960 to the effect that giving aid
32to Africans m s  like giving money to juvenile delinquents. Other
articles in the magazine expressed the conviction that independence
had come too soon, and that even the Africans themselves longed for the
good old days of colonial rule. One such piece was entitled "White
Mem Come Back," and stated that the "average African republic is about
as well-prepared for popular self-government as any kindergarten."^
After praising South Africa for its developnent, another writer told
her readers in Human Events that to expect the Congo to make a century
of progress in a decade was like ejqpecting a newborn infant to get up
3I*from the cradle to pilot a space ship.
An American Opinion writer, Jack Moffitt, made similar
op"Commentary," Human Events, October 27 > I960, p. 521.
33Jenkin Lloyd Jones , "White Man Come Back," Human Events, 
February 15 s 1964, p. 7.
34Alice Widener, "Most of Africa is Not Beady for 'One Man,
One Vote,'" Human Events, May l4, 1966, p. 6.
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observations. Commenting on reports of slavery in black Africa, he
stated that these -were "more evidence that colonialism was ended so
35that barbarism could flourish." Tom Anderson, president and pub­
lisher of Farm and Ranch publications, found his own government 
responsible
for the retreat of the West from Africa and the creation of 
a conglomeration of cannibal nations there who take from us 
with one hand and throw spears at us with the other. South 
Africa and Rhodesia, however, have stable, peaceful, pros­
perous, Christian governments. There aren't even any people- 
eaters there.3°
As might be expected from these anti-African comments, some of 
the anti-Communist friends of South Africa were racist in their views. 
Several of the more prominent members of the American-African Affairs 
Association were in the forefront of the historian I. A. Newby has 
called "scientific r a c i s m . O n e  such individual cited by Newby was 
Ernest van der Haag, a professor of social philosophy at New York 
University and a director of the American-African Affairs Association. 
Van der Haag, who wrote articles in defense of American segregation, 
was a witness for South Africa in the South West Africa case at the 
Internati cnal Court of Justice and testified favorably on South Africa 
before the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1966. Two other members of 
the Association, Nathaniel Weyl and Stefan T. Posscny, wore authors
3-̂ Jack Moffitt, "Eagle Rock," American Opinion, IX (July- 
August , 1966), lj-6.
36Tom Anderson, "Rhodesia," American Opinion. IX (June, 1966),
7-8.
37I. A. Newby, Challenge to the Court; Social Scientists and 
the Defense of Segregation, 195^-1966 (Baton Rouge, 1967K  173-76. 
180-83.
of an important tract of scientific racism, The Geography of 
38Intellect. In this work, Weyl and Possony indicated that they were 
gravely concerned about the genetic deterioration of the human race; 
that is, they feared that intellectually inferior races were re­
producing at a faster rate than were intellectually superior races. 
South Africa's progress seemed to be proof of this superiority and 
showed the dependence of the blacks upon the more advanced whites; 
they rejected the view that colonialism was the cause of poverty in 
Africa for the "African Negro enjoys higher living standards in the
Union of South Africa, where the white presence is most numerous and
39massive, than elsewhere. Because of this, action against the 
whites could only hurt the blacks of South Africa since they were 
incapable of maintaining the economic progress of the country: "There
is nothing in the slothful and insecure progress of the Negro that 
suggests that he will be able to replace this elite in Africa from 
his own ranks at any time in the foreseeable future.
Opponents of integration in the United States were among the 
members cf the American-African Affairs Association and were prominent 
in other organizations favorable to South Africa. The John Birch
^Nathaniel Weyl and Stefan T. Possony, The Geography of 
Intellect (Chicago, 1963). See also Nathaniel Weyl's volume on the 
Communist movement in Southern Africa, Traitors' End (New Rochelle, 
New York, 1970), 33-38.
^Weyl and Possony, The Geography of Intellect. 28h; see also
2h8-k9.
^Ibid., 28U-85. See also the review of this book in Human 
Events. February 22, 196U, p. 8, which argued that the '^masochistic 
racial policies of the West" involved genetic catastrophe and 
castigated Western policy for aiming at the subjugation or annihila­
tion of the whites of South Africa.
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Society whose publication American Opinion defended South Africa
occasi cnaliy equated integration of the races with communism. The
Citizens' Councils of America, a Southern group to be discussed
shortly, similarly fought integration. Some of the leaders of the
American-Southern African Council, an organization created in 1966
for increasing support for the white regimes of Southern Afri ca, were
instrumental in setting up a racist-oriented society called the Racial
Studies Committee and the American Lobby, an organization designed to
offset the influence of what it termed "the ubiquitous 'civil rights'
..Inorgani zations.
Apartheid was simply ignored by some of the anti-Communist 
conservatives. They did not discuss it in detail, suggesting in 
passing that South Africa was just following the only sane course 
available to the whites. George S. Schuyler, a black John Bircher 
and director of the American-African Affairs Association, expressed 
understanding of "the refusal of the Southern African whites to 
commit suicide by surrendering rule to surrounding Senegambians via
h2One man, one vote . . . ." Alice Widener, who wrote for Human Events, 
similarly did no more than comment that if South Africa were to 
follow the policies urged on it by the West it would go the way of the
1*3Congo into chaos and steady deterioration.
Another approach taken by some strongly anti-Communist
^Undated (1968?) flyers and brochures of the American Lobby 
and the Racial Studies Committee in possession of the author.
hoGeorge S. Schuyler, "From Africa," American Opinion, XI 
(May, 1968), 55.
U3Alice Widener, "Most of Africa is not Ready for 'One Man,
One Yote,1" 6.
231
conservatives was to praise the wisdom of South Africa's policies 
while condemning the egalitarian beliefs of the countries of the West. 
Anthony Harrigan in his New Republic described South Africa as "healthy 
because it has rejected the levelling philosophy of so many modern 
nations. Criticizing the liberal intelligentsia which had an 
"enormous hold" on American scholarly and journalistic writing on 
South Africa, Harrigan said that that levelling philosophy had led to 
a spirit of civil disobedience and an outlook that was almost anarchist. 
South Africa, in contrast, had avoided "the shattered nerves, the 
crippling philosophy and the suicidal impulses" of the West.
Playing upon a theme similar to Harrigan's was Revilo P.
Oliver, a professor of Classics at the University of Illinois and an
associate editor of American Opinion. On several occasions Oliver
wrote favorably on South Africa, portraying it as one of the Last
Outposts of Western Civilization:
I have heard of Americans who have migrated or are now 
migrating to South Africa or Australia, not as a permanent 
refuge, but in the hope that they may live a little longer 
and can, at least, die as men should, fighting their 
enemies. Are those who despair of America wrong? I cannot 
say categorically that they are, although I believe that 
we still have a chance— believe perhaps with an optimism 
as futile as Cicero's, that despite our churches, our 
schools, our Press, and our government, there is yet left 
in our nation enough moral integrity and intelligence for a 
desperate and victorious effort. °
Harrigan, more hopeful, believed that South Africa could save the
1*1*Harrigan, The New Republic. 47.
lieIbid., 1*8.
1*6Revilo P. Oliver, "Cicero," American Opinion, VIII (May, 
1965), 71- The author met several people such as described by Oliver 
while he was in South Africa.
232
West by leading it back to light and health of mind, back "into the 
fruitful use of pride in vital, differentiating inequalities in man­
kind."1*7
Still otha- conservatives sought to praise South Africa's 
policies, but from the standpoint of the benefits such policies con­
ferred upon the black South Africans. Thomas Molnar and Russell Kirk, 
each a conservative educator and member of the American-African Affairs 
Association, both -wrote favorably of aspects of the apartheid program 
in National Review. Molnar found desirable features in the achievement 
of self-government in the Transkei. He viewed the Bantustan program 
as a form of decolonization and foreign aid, although he did find many
48manifestations of apartheid grotesque and irritating. Apartheid, he
explained in one of his books on Southern Africa, "must not be viewed
as an anomaly in a harmonious world, but as a method— one among
several possible methods— of solving a particular problem by taking
49all the concrete elements of a situation into consideration."
Similarly, Russell Kirk, after visiting the African College of the
North at Turfloop, said that he found much good coming from the govern-
50ment’s efforts to educate the Africans.
Finaliy, there were conservatives who were very troubled by
^Harrigan, The New Republic, 47.
48Thomas Molnar, "First Step in the Transkei," Ifational Review, 
February 25, 1964, p. 156.
^Thomas Molnar, Africa; A Political Travelogue, 142-43.
50Russell Kirk, "The Higher Learning for the Bantu," National 
Review, February 23, 1965, p. 150. See also his discussion ln_n","0ne"''
Man, One Vote' in South Africa," National Review, March 9, 1965,
p. 198.
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apartheid but who felt that, under the complex circumstances of South 
Africa, few alternatives were available. The best example <3f this out­
look was an article written by William F. Buckley, editor of National 
Review, written in late 1962 after he had spent several weeks in South 
Africa. Although he noted the material advancement of the Africans 
under apartheid, he observed:
What Dr. Verwoerd considers to be indispensable psychological 
conditioners for separate statehood— rigid discouragement of 
any social intercourse between white and black— come from the 
drawing boards ugly and shocking and if they are not accepted 
as indispensable to the introduction of a radically new regime 
which strives for beneficent and realizable ideals, they are 
indefensible.51
Buckley felt that the ideals were beneficent but he had strong doubts 
about the ultimate feasibility of separate development, and, as a 
libertarian, he feared the excessive state regulation that would be 
necessary to make it work.
B. The Other Laager
South Africa had a second group of friends or potential 
friends in the United States. These were white Southerners who felt 
a bond of sympathy with the white South Africans who were besieged 
like themselves. As with South Africans, the American news media 
seemed to be very hostile to them, misrepresenting them and their 
way of life. People who knew little of their problems were telling 
them how to conduct their lives, and attempting to force them to 
restructure their society. Governments all over the world were 
criticizing them, undoubtedly, thought Southerners, with much 
Communist encouragement. South Africa, alone of the many countries
^William F, Buckley, Jr., "South African Fortnight,"
National Review, January 15, 1963, p. 22.
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of the earth, seemed to offer a parallel to the plight of the American 
South. It is not surprising then that white Southerners, even those 
who did not support segregation in the South, tended to he favorable 
to South Africa and to sympathize with its problems.
White Southerners often had a favorable image of South Africa 
despite the fact that most of the major news media was critical of 
apartheid. Other than newspapers (which depended on wire services 
that presented a harsh image of South Africa), the South had few 
distinctively Southern publications. Yet Southerners did develop 
sympathy for South Africa even from hostile reports in the media.
For example, a very critical 1953 article in Life magazine on South 
Africa prompted a man from Winter Garden, Florida, to write to the 
editors of the publication: "It is good to know that a great man
[Prime Minister Malan] and his people in another part of the world 
believe as we do here in the South. I refer to apartheid (separation 
of the races).
Prior to i960, Southerners said little on South Africa. 
Nevertheless, there are indications that Southerners who had some 
awareness of foreign affairs did have favorable attitudes towards 
South Africa. The most thorough student of Southern views on inter­
national political matters, Alfred 0. Hero, brought this out in his 
excellent study of The Southerner and World Affairs.^ Public opinion 
polls, examined by Hero, which were taken in the period between World
■52Letter of W. B, Burch from Winter Garden, Florida, to the 
editor, Life, May 25, 1953, p. 18.
53Alfred 0. Hero, Jr., The Southerner and World Affairs 
(.Baton Rouge, 1965).
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War II and 1957 showed that Southerners were more inclined to support
5I4.colonialism than were other Americans. This in itself would in­
dicate that Southerners were more likely to he favorable towards South 
Africa. The tendency was intensified after 1957 as white Southerners
55became more and more sensitive to criticism of their society.
A study made by Hero of Southern newspapers and interviews of 
Southerners in the period from 1959 to 1963 revealed that Southerners 
did sympathize with South Africa. Although Southerners were often 
apathetic to foreign affairs and the interviewees were drawn from the 
leadership elite, Hero did find white Southern approval of and support 
for South Africa and its policies.^ The fact that his interviews 
showed this at the time of the Sharpeville tragedy, when most of the 
national news media was highly critical of South Africa, is itself 
revealing on the extent to which Southerners were alienated from the 
rest of the country. Hero said that he found segregationist news­
papers and Southerners of like mind who knew something of events in 
Africa "were identifying to a significant extent with whites in the
Congo, Angola, the Rhodesians, and especially the Republic of South 
57Africa." The Southern sense of identity with South Africa was not, 
however, limited to supporters of segregation; it extended also to 
moderate Southerners who opposed racism.
5l+Ibid. , 186-87.
55rbid., 188.
•^Ibid., 188, 190, U19-20. Hero interviewed approximately 
1,100 white Southerners chosen from subscription lists of some seven 
national and international publications that dealt with foreign affairs.
57Ibid., U19-20.
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The reason why Southerners sympathized with South Africa was 
not only because they felt that whites in both areas had the same out­
look on race or shared a similar race problem— although this cer­
tainly was often an important element— but also because they believed 
that South Africa was threatened by the same forces threatening the 
South: liberalism, communism, the United Nations (often expressed
as "world government") and the United States government. In this they 
were much like the anti-Communist conservatives who valued South 
Africa's friendship. Indeed, many Southerners were to be found among 
the anti-Communist group, and the distinctions between the two groups 
were non-existent for some individuals.
The sense of being besieged by the same forces as those 
threatening South Africa came out clearly in the Southern response to 
Sharpeville. The anti-pass demonstrations by blacks in South Africa 
came just as civil rights "sit-in" demonstrations were beginning in 
the United States. Southerners who opposed the theory of civil 
disobedience, rejecting the belief that unjust laws do not have to 
be obeyed, saw parallels between the incidents in South Africa and 
the demonstrations against segregation in the United States, Bringing
out this position was David Lawrence, founder and publisher of U.S.
58News and Wor Jd Report. Shortly after Sharpeville, Lawrence editori­
alized that the "right to demonstrate" was being abused in both the 
United States and South Africa. What was, he asked,
rQ? It mcv be open to doubt whether Lawrence should be included 
with Southerners. He was born in Philadelphia in 1888 and went to 
Washingtbn in 1910. Washington is, or was for many years, a Southern 
city; Lawrence's views on many issues were essentially Southern and 
he was sympathetic toward the South,
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the "right to danonstrate" when public officials are 
challenged? Did the mob of 20,000 which "marched" on 
the police station in South Africa-— containing only 25 
policemen— have the right to throw stones and taunt 
and threaten so that the police grew frightened and 
opened fire? This was an example, not of a "peaceful 
assembly" but of a mobocracy.59
One of the "indefensible" acts of lawlessness which Lawrence cited
was the burning of passes by the Africans; these were, he thought,
"identity papers required of all citizens . . . .
Southern newspapers did not give Sharpeville the prominence 
that many newspapers in other parts of the country gave it. Stories 
concerning Sharpeville appearing on the front pages of other news­
papers were printed in the inner pages of Southern papers. Although 
Southern newspapers relied on the same wire services as other American 
papers for their stories, they indicated a somewhat different emphasis 
in their headlines.^ While other papers stressed white violence and 
American condemnation of the policies of South Africa, some Southern 
newspapers focused on black violence. The day after news of Sharpe­
ville first broke, the Atlanta Constitution put the story on page two
62under the headline: "Africans Set Fires, Stone Firemen." That same
59David Lawrence, "The 'Right to Demonstrate,'" U.S. News and 
World Report, April 11, i960, p. 128.
60...,Ibid.
61Some observers maintain that headlines are more important 
than the content of the story itself. Gay Talese in his excellent 
book on the New York Times, The Kingdom and the Power (New York, 1970), 
reports that in 1915 the Times was printing much pro-German material 
but the cumulative effect was very anti-German because of the subtle 
control of display of the news. A British citizen employee of the 
Times explained to another Times man, "let me control the headlines and 
I shall not care who controls the editorials." Ibid., 205.
62Atlanta Constitution, March 23, 1960, p. 2.
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day, the New Orleans Times-Picayune ran the story on page ten under the
heading: "S. Africa Mohs Fired On; Negroes Burn Buildings [subhead]:
Rioters Stone Firemen in New Violence.” The Charlotte, North
Carolina, Observer carried all of its stories on the South African
tuimoil on its inside pages until March 31, I960, when it gave front
6hpage coverage to the mobilization of reserves in South Africa.
Editorial comments on Sharpeville did appear in some prominent 
Southern newspapers. The Atlanta Constitution printed a cautious and
65ambiguous statement about the West being on trial in South Africa.
The Miami Herald implicitly deplored violence by both whites and 
blacks in South Africa, noting, however, that the criticism of South 
Africa by the United States government "violated the recognized inter­
national principle of non-interference in internal m a t t e r s . M o r e  
direct was the New Orleans Times-Picayune which criticized the State
New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 23, I960, sec. 1, p. 10.
^Charlotte, North Carolina, Observer, March 31, I960, A 1. 
Another North Carolina paper, the Raleigh News and Observer, was a 
notable exception to the general response of Southerners to Sharpeville. 
It featured the developments in South Africa prominently and 
editorialized that the lesson of South Africa for the South was that 
the South should work quickly to resolve racial difficulties. "Lessons 
from South Africa," Raleigh News and Observer, March 25, I960, p. U. 
However, the paper indicated a week later that its sentiment was 
less noble than enlightened self-interest. It editorialized: "Events
in South Africa have intensified demands that segregation end in the 
United States. Those who wish to retain limited segregation in the 
end, should see to it that abuses in connection with segregation end 
in all parts of the South." Raleigh News and Observa*, April 6, i960, 
p. k.
^Atlanta Constitution, April 1, i960, p. i». But the 
Constitution also printed more critical editorials on the subject 
which had appeared in the New York Times.
C
Miami Herald, March 29, I960.
239
Department's action deploring the violence. It asked, "Did it [the 
State Department] want the policemen to surrender their authority and
6ttheir lives?" The sense of identity with South Africa came out
most clearly in the editorial of the Columbia, South Carolina, State
entitled "Resentment," which stated:
It seems to us that the Union of South Africa has a strong 
point when it tells our State Department not to concern 
itself with its [the Union's] domestic affairs.
There is entirely too much meddling these days, Outsiders 
are trying to tell the South how to run its affairs.
And we rightfully resent the intrusion. So we can see 
how the people of South Africa would resent interference 
from our State Department, which the Union charges has 
entered the explosive race picture there without knowing 
all the facts "regarding attacks by many thousands of 
Bantu (Negroes) on a small police force to whom was en­
trusted the duty of maintaining law and order."
As to how much the State Department knew about South 
Africa we are not aware, but we do know that the South 
is all too often criticized by those who do not have 
facts. -And so we sympathize with the Union of South 
Africa.
The response to Sharpeville by the legislature of the most 
embattled of the Southern states indicated how extreme the views of 
some Southerners had become. Instead of deploring the slaying of 
sixty-nine Africans and the wounding of hundreds more, the Mississippi 
state legislature passed a resolution praising the white South Africans 
for their strong stand in favor of segregation. Introduced by a 
student at the state university, Phillip D. Bryant, the resolution
67'New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 2h, i960, sec. 1, p. 16. 
The Times-Picayune conceded that there might be just grievances 
against the pass system but said that this did not warrant inter­
ference. The paper thought that the State Department was attempting 
to curry the favor of the new African states.
^Columbia, South Carolina, State, March 25, i960, A k.
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was passed by a vote of seventy-eight to eight in the House and
forty-five to none in the state Senate. The resolution said that mob
demonstrations and disorders had been part of an effort to overthrow
South Africa's segregation policies and that "there exists a definite
parallel between events in that country and recent disorders in the
Southern States of the United States." It commended the South
African government for "its steadfast policy of segregation and the
staunch ddherence to their traditions in the face of overwhelming
„69external agitation. Copies of the resolution were sent to South 
Africa, to the American Secretary of State, and to the press.
Also expressing criticism of the State Department for its 
Sharpeville statement was Olin D. Johnston, United States Senator 
from South Carolina. Johnston called on the Congress to censure the 
State Department for its criticism of South Africa. He urged the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to investigate the American govern­
ment's action and to "put an end to the development of any policy
within the State Department to continue meddling in our internal
,.70affairs by other nations. A year or so later, the Jackson,
Mississippi, Clarion-Ledger expressed more colorfully the same fear 
of a precedent for foreign intervention in American racial problems:
"If and when South Africa's hide is nailed to the U. N. barn door,
African extremists can use the same pressure tactics against Mississippi
^ General Laws of the State of Mississippi I960. Chapter 519»
House Concurrent Resolution No, 67.
70Congressional Record. 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 6363 (March
23, I960).
2*a
and other Southern states."̂ "*" Dixie's turn, the paper warned, might 
come later.
It should he pointed out that the fear that American criticism
of or action against South Africa might lead to greater foreign
criticism of the United States was not peculiarly Southern, and it
probably did act as a real restraint on American policy. The Cleveland
Plain Dealer expressed misgivings about United Nations discussions of
South Africa after Sharpeville (and, by implication, American approval
of those discussions). It asked: "If the U. N. can intervene in
South African racial situations, what is to prevent the Soviet Union,
or South Africa, for instance, from introducing a resolution in the
U.N. Security Council demanding condemnation of the United States
because Negroes are deprived of the right to vote in certain sections
72of Alabama and Mississippi?" The Christian Science Monitor likewise 
stated that "in taking such a position (approving United Nations dis­
cussion of apartheid] the American Government invites some searching
questions as to its own attitudes toward the racial problem in the 
73southern states," Writers in several other non-Southern newspapers 
expressed similar sentiments.
Various members of Congress from the Deep South, in addition 
to Senator Johnston, went on record in the 1960s in favor of Southern
^Quoted in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs. 2^2.
72"The U.N. and South Africa," Cleveland Plain Dealer, April
3 , I960.
73Christian Science Monitor, March 2k, i960, p. 18.
^See Melvin K. Whiteleather, "South Africa on Trial Before 
UN," Philadelphia Bulletin, March 30, i960, p. 12; Toledo Blade,
March 2k, i960.
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African causes or actively opposed American policy in that part of the
continent. Senator Strom Thurmond, a South Carolinian who headed the
Dixiecrat movement in 19^8, and Representative Albert Watson, also of
South Carolina, both took part in American-Southern African Council 
75activities. Senator James Eastland, a conservative Mississippean,
?6
maintained a correspondence with S. E. D. Brown of South Africa.
Brown was the publisher of the most conservative English language
publication in South Africa and was a contributor to the John Birch
77Society's American Opinion. Representative John Bell Williams, also
of Mississippi, spoke out occasionally on the importance of South
Africa to the United States, stating that it was the "only effective
7ftpro-Western nation on the African continent." After George M. Houser
of the American Committee on Africa and others attempted to fly into
South Africa against that government's wishes, Representative Thomas
G. Abernathy, another Mississippi Congressman, spoke against their
being allowed to use their American passports to meddle in the affairs
79of another country.
•̂ American-Southern Africa Review, II (July, 1967), 1, 3.
Philip Woodyatt, "A Last Charee for South Africa," Harpers, 
CCXIV (May, 1957)* 57. A legislative assistant to Senator Eastland, 
Kenneth Tolliver, visited South Africa in 1967 ard. wrote a favorable 
article on the country, "Traveler's Report on Southern Africa,"
Citizen, XI (July-August, 1967), U-ll.
77E.g., S. E. D. Brown, "From Africa," American Opinion, VIII 
(June, 1965), ^7-^9. An examination of old copies of the South African 
Observer indicated that Brown had other correspondents and readers 
in the South.
78Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 15,6^0 
(August 6, 1962).
^ Ibid. , 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 36,518-19 (December lU, 1967).
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Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana caused a furor in 1962 by
expressing favorable views on South Africa during a tour of Africa.
While in South Africa he announced that from what he had seen of
Africa, Africans were not ready for self-government. South Africa, he
was quoted as saying, "seems to have the right idea with its policy
„80of racial separation. He later amplified these views in a long 
report in which he concluded that apartheid was the only possible
Q1
policy for South Africa. Ellender's fellow Senator from Louisiana,
Russell Lopg, spoke strongly in favor of granting South Africa a larger
sugar import quota after the House had reduced the administration's
82recommended amount. South Africa, he pointed out, had stood by the 
United States at a time when the United States had faced a sugar 
shortage. In addition, Representatives Joe D. Waggonner and John R. 
Rarick, both from Louisiana, went on record as strong supporters of 
South Africa as an anti-Communist ally of the United States.
Prominent state politicians in the South who were exponents of 
segregation likewise expressed sympathy for South Africa. Governor 
Lester Maddox of Georgia met with three members of the South African 
Parliament touring the United States in 1968. The South Africans were
fin"Foot in Mouth Disease," Newsweek, December 17, 1962, p. k2.
8au.s., Congress, Senate, Report on United States Operations 
in Africa, S.Doc. 8, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, pp. 11(3-30"! See 
also Ellender's comments criticizing the "liberals" who had criticized 
him in the Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., lU,191. (June
23, 1966).
^ Congressional Record. 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 27,526 (October 
20, 1965).
83Ibid., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 18,601 (July 12, 1967); 2^,079 
(August 2k, 1967).
2kk
told by Governor Maddox: "I want you to know that the Government of
8UGeorgia is standing with you." George Wallace declared in 1968 
that if he were elected president, one of the first acts of his 
administration would be to end the sanctions being enforced against
QcSouth Africa and Rhodesia.
Spokesmen for segregation in the South who did not hoJd public 
office also expressed sympathy and support for South Africa. James J. 
Kilpatrick, for example, was an Oklahoma-born journalist who went to 
work for the Richmond Mews Leader in 19^1. He gained notoriety in 
the mid-1950s for espousing the revival of the old states-rights 
theory of state "interposition" to nullify federal laws and supreme 
court decisions. In the 1960s he became a strong advocate for South 
Africa in the Richmond paper, in his nationally syndicated column, in 
the Mational Review and Human Events, and as a member of the American- 
African Affairs Association. Similarly, Thomas R. Waring, editor of 
the Charleston, South Carolina, News and Courier, was a defender of 
Southern segregation in the 1950s who became a spokesman for South 
Africa in the 1960s,
Strong too in support of the white government of South Africa 
were the Southerners whose views were aired in the Citizen. The 
Citizen was the publication of the Citizens' Councils of America, an 
organization based in Jackson, Mississippi, which was in the forefront
^Quoted in Natal Daily News, December 3, 1968. 
85rbid,, July k, 1968,
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86of the organized opposition to desegregation of the South. The 
Citizen "began to support South Africa and Rhodesia with enthusiasm 
after William J. Simmons, the Councils' administrator and editor of 
Citizen,made a tour of those countries in 1966 as a guest of the South 
African government.
Simmons summarized his views on South Africa in an address to 
a joint meeting of the Association of Citizens' Councils of Mississippi 
and the Jackson Citizens' Council. After commenting on the growing 
Southern interest in South Africa (and South African interest in the 
South), Simmons told those assembled that it was increasingly clear 
"that our destiny here in the South is entwined with that of South 
Africa." If South Africa succeeded, he said, the South's cause was 
helped; and if it failed, the South's cause was hurt. This was in 
part because the same tactics were being used against both: "Sanctions
have been and are being used against both Southern Africa and the 
Southern states in an undisguised campaign to bring about black 
rule . , . . "^
Apartheid to Simmons was a worthwhile and successful method 
of fostering racial harmony and engendering racial pride in both 
black and white groups. He found South African blacks "more settled 
and stable than American Negroes," and possessing more human digniiy.
South Africa, he continued, did not have a race problem "any more
S^For a study of this organization see Neil R. McMillen, The 
Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction
(Urbana, Illinois, 1971).
Qj
William J. Simmons, "Report on a Trip to Southern Africa,"
Citizen. X (July-August, 1966), U, 5.
oothan we in the South had a race problem." Wistfully, Simmons re­
flected in his address on how different things would have been in the 
South "if United States leaders [had] exhibited a fraction of the 
wisdom, realism, and restraint shown by South African leaders, and if 
the same integrity of purpose [had] permeated lower echelons of our 
government . . . .
Apparently one of Simmons' colleagues on the Citizen, Robert
B. Patterson, the Executive Secretary of the Citizens' Councils, did 
not believe it was too late for the United States to begin emulating 
South Africa. In reference to the United States, Patterson asked in 
an editorial: "Why Wot Separate Development?"^ Six months later he
wrote a similar editorial under the heading "Separate Development 
Seen as a Solution."^
It is not surprising that strong advocates of segregation or 
white supremacy were favorable towards South Africa. But it would be 
a mistake to believe that such support was limited to racial extremists 
in the South. Moderate Southerners who accepted or favored integration 
in the South also often had sympathy for South Africa. Such individ­
uals, however, seldom had occasion to express their views in print.
86 Ibid., 10.
89Ibid., 11. Simmons indicated his high regard for South 
African leaders when he devoted a page "in Manorium" after the 
assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd, Citizen, XI (October, 1966},
k.
^Robert B. Patterson, "Why Not Separate Development?" Citizen, 
XII (November, 1967), ^-5. Although Patterson did not specifically 
mention South Africa, the reference was unmistakable, especially since 
the story on the next page was on South Africa and Rhodesia.
^Robert B. Patterson, "Separate Development Seen as a Solution, 
Citizen, XII (May, 1968), 16-17.
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They knew, too,that to speak out favorably on South Africa meant that 
they were almost inevitably associated in other people's minds with 
those who joined the Citizens' Councils and the John Birch Society.
In spite of the fact that the published expression of few 
such moderate Southerners have been found, it is worthwhile to look 
in depth at the views of three of these. The individuals represent 
different parts of the South and vary in degree of sophistication and 
education. Their views illustrate some of the factors involved in 
image creation with regard to South Africa. While the fact that all 
three visited South Africa made them somewhat atypical, nonetheless 
their opinions are indicative of the ways in which thoughtful Southern 
moderates probably regarded South Africa. The three whose views will 
be discussed are Frederick Willetts, a Wilmington, North Carolina 
businessman; Holding Carter, the publisher of a Greenville,
Mississippi newspaper, and Rene Williamson, a professor of political 
science at Louisiana State University. Common to their views were a 
feeling of affinity with the Afrikaners, a belief that conditions for 
Africans were improving under separate development programs, a dis­
taste for various aspects cf apartheid policies, and a belief that the 
whites of South Africa were capable of making reforms essential for 
racial peace and stability in that country.
Frederick Willetts made a business trip to Johannesburg in 
September 1959- He was attending an International Congress of 
Building Societies and Savings and Loan Associations, of which he was 
a Council member. Upon his return he wrote a small book on his 
Journey and had it published in his home town. In it he brought out 
his admiration for the Afrikaners, whome he found to be "wonderful
2it8
„92people possessing many stalwart virtues . . . .  They were, he
continued, "well equipped hy temperament and tradition to cope with
93the 20th Century."
South Africa was not quite as Willetts had expected it to he.
He discovered that the reporting on South Africa with which he was 
familiar had portrayed only the worst aspects of the situation there; 
the reporting was too sensational. Prospects for the future were, 
in his opinion, hopeful for improving race relations rather than 
worsening them. Kacial tensions, he said, were becoming less as the 
African realized "the interest of the government in helping to raise 
his standard of living and to improve his economic life generally."9^
For two decades the whites had "performed economic and social miracles" 
for both black and white. He believed that the government was doing 
everything possible to provide proper housing, medical care, and 
recreational facilities for the Africans.
Willetts did not feel that the existing policy of apartheid 
was suitable for South Africa's future; instead, he believed change 
would be necessary. The policy was, he believed, the result of fear 
on the part of the whites. But that fear was justified, because the 
Africans had barely been brought into civilization. They were, he 
said, backward, indifferent toward work, and reluctant to make use of 
the good farmland (some of the best in the country) that they had.^
92Frederick Willetts, Africa: Winds of Destiny (Wilmington,





The second Southern moderate to he discussed was considerably
more prominent. He is Hodding Carter, the editor and publisher of
the Greenville, Mississippi, Delta Democrat-Times. Fcr his courageous
opposition to segregation in the South through his newspaper he won
a Pulitzer Prize in 191*6. Carter made a visit to South Africa in
1959 under the auspices of the United States-South African Leader 
9 6Exchange Program. His views appeared in, among other places, an 
article in the Saturday Evening Post entitled "We Never Felt More at 
Home."97
The Carters felt at home in South Africa because of the strong
similarities in the histories of the South and South Africa. The
Boers of 1900, Carter wrote, were the outnumbered Confederates of the
l860s. The English were the Yankees, and just as in the United States
up to the time in which Carter wrote (and later) "the English-Yankees
still have most of the money in the land that the Boer-Southerners 
98run." He found that in background, behavior, and outlook the 
Afrikaners were more like Southerners than any other people in the
967 It should be pointed out that Carter had favorable views 
of South Africa before going to South Africa. As he told the 
House Subcommittee on Africa:
Two of my uncles were mining engineers in South 
Africa. One fought on the side of the Boers in 
the Boer War. Another one lived out his life there.
I had six first cousins born there. I have known 
about South Africa, even though I have visited it 
only once, ever since I could remember. I grew up 
full of admiration for the Zulus as well as the others.
United States-South African Relations, 332.
^Hodding Carter, "We Never Felt More at Hame," Saturday 
Evening Post, January 23, i960, p. 18.
98Ibid., U5.
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world. The folk similarity was, he said, all but complete: they
both had a farm background, the Dutch Reformed Church was much like
the Presbyterian Church of the Scots-Irish who settled in the South,
thare was respect for patriarchial authority in both regions, and both
peoples had the same "strong self-identifying affection for their 
99beset land,"
Carter was very critical of some aspects of apartheid, just 
as he was critical of the South. In fact, he said South Africa was 
a police state with respect to surveillance of the Africans Never­
theless, he apparently believed that apartheid was in part justified, 
for he said he agreed with most white South' Africans that there should 
not be an immediate end to segregation nor unrestricted suffrage' for 
the Africans. Carter appeared before the House Subcommittee on Africa
in 1966 and made this point more strongly when he stated that suffrage
for the Africans would have to be limited:
otherwise you would have more than three million people, who 
have built a culture of which anyone could be proud, and who 
are building an industrial society and much else besides who 
I know would go down tomorrow if this Uhuru went the full
way and the 12 million black Africans would have the right to
vote completely on racial grounds. The white man would be 
run politically and other ways into the sea.101
In Carter's view, there were liberalizing forces at work in
South Africa and other signs that were encouraging for the future.
9^Ibid., I+5-U6.
■'‘̂ Despite his strong denunciation of much of apartheid,
Carter's story drew letters to the editor suggesting that Carter 
and like-minded Southerners should all emigrate to South Africa.
See the letters to the editor, Saturday Eyening Post. March 5> I960,
p. 6.
1Q1Unlted States-South African Relations, 332.
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Contributing to this view was the contrast that he found between the 
South and South Africa. There was more academic freedom in South 
Africa's state-supported institutions than in similar institutions in 
the South. South African newspapers were more critical of the in­
equalities of the segregationist system than were their Southern 
counterparts. There were black publications as well as white publica­
tions in South Africa. Moreover, the parties in South Africa in 
opposition to the government "provide[dJ, to a far greater degree than
I was] the case in our South, persistent opposition to immoderate race 
1 OPpolicies." Indeed, he saw the possibility of apartheid being 
ended by the white groups voting it out of the system. As he told 
a disbelieving Subcommittee member, Representative Benjamin Rosenthal 
of New York, in the 1966 Congressional hearings: "[M]any white South
Africans, including the Dutch, the Boers, are inclined to make con­
cessions."^0^
The final Southern moderate whose views will be treated here
is Rene Williamson, a professor of political science at Louisiana
State University, In the spring of 1969 Williamson spent two months
in South Africa as a visiting professor at the University of Natal.
As a result of his stay there he was moved to write a paper entitled
"Impressions of South Africa," which was one of the most sophisticated
lotdiscussions of South Africa by anyone with a Southern background.
l0^Carter, "We Never Felt Mcr e At Home," 52.
103United States-South African Relations, 335.
^0l|Rene Williamson, "Impressions of South Africa" (copy of 
unpublished typescript in possession of author, kindly provided by 
Professor Williamson). Williamson made a subsequent visit to South 
Africa as a guest of the South African government.
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Like nearly all Southerners who were favorable to South
Africa, Williamson felt especially warm to the Afrikaners because
of the historical parallels between the whites of the two regions:
In many ways the Afrikano: resaubles our own white Southerners, 
and that is probably why I felt a strong sense of kinship with 
him despite the language difference. Like our Southerner, 
the Afrikaner is an agrarian, a fundamentalist church-centered 
Protestant, a race conscious individual, a victim of a lost 
war and painful reconstruction, and the object of economic 
inferiority. ^
But he also found attractive the peoples of other races in South
Africa, and the land itself. The country was "a fairyland of bright
blue skies and golden sunshine ...."106 Added to this was the fact
that there was "none of the sharp 'Yankee Go Home' or bitter criticism
of American policies that one finds in most other countries nowadays.
As was true with other moderate Southerners, Williamson found
that there were aspects of apartheid that he did not like. The
security measures he pointed out had "all the earmarks of a pdlice
state"; the worst of these was the provision for ninety-day detention
t riftof individuals without trial. Indeed, he did not believe that com­
plete separation could ultimately be achieved because of the inter­
dependence of blacks and whites in the economy.
In spite of his dissatisfaction with apartheid, Williamson 
believed that limitations on the franchise, segregation, and white 






Echoing Carter, he stated: "I can see no other way to avoid retro­
gression into barbarism or a descent into massacres like those taking 
place in Nigeria [during the civil war there between the Ibos of 
secessionist Biafra and the rest of the countryJ. Williamson re­
jected the notion that segregation was inherently evil. Segregation 
was philosophically and politically acceptable if it was beneficial 
to ail concerned, conducive to the common good, and not contrary to 
the will of the people concerned. The South African argument for 
segregation was strengthened, in Williamson's view, by the fact that 
black nationalists in the United States were making essentially the 
same argument for racial separation. The test, he said, of segregation 
lay not in its concept but in its practice:
It is the implementation of segregation that determines whether 
it is good or evil, and the test lies in its effects on human 
welfare and happiness. There is a liberal orthodoxy that gets 
in our way here, and we need to study the question with fresh 
minds.
South Africa, concluded Williamson from his visit, had been at 
least partially misrepresented abroad. One of the reasons for this was 
that Americans viewed black South Africans and black Americans as 
though they were politically and culturally the same. This -was far 
from the truth, he felt, because black Americans were culturally part 
of Western civilization. Black South Africans were, for the most part, 
not, a consideration which gave Justification for a limitation of 
political rights and for segregation.




discussed here, saw certain "beneficial results from the South African 
government's policies, and he expected future liberal developments 
within the white groups in South Africa. Although harsh in its imple­
mentation, he observed that the pass system was preventing the further 
growth of shanty towns and ghettoes. Government officials were 
working very hard to improve African agricultural techniques, and at 
times were trying to aid the Africans by manipulating employment 
categories to permit higher pay for them. He found hopeful the govern­
ment's "outward" policy of seeking dialogue with other African coun­
tries and the growth of a verligte (enlightened) wing of the gcverxiing 
Nationalist Party. Also encouraging was the opposition of many English- 
speaking South Africans to the harshness of the government's race 
policies. Such opposition stood in considerable contrast to what he 
had known of segregation in the American South. Describing a demon­
stration at the University of Natal in Durban he commented:
I doubt very much that even the most liberal, progressive, and 
academically distinguished universities in our South would 
have gone this far when the segregation crisis was at its 
height— and we had the federal government on our side!-1-11
As a desirable political development, Williamson expressed the hope
that the verligtes of the Nationalist Party would break away and join
with the United Party to bring about a more moderate race policy.
White Southerners, then, whether conservative or moderate on 
race Issues in the South, tended to identify with South Africa and to 
have sympathy for the plight of white South Africans. They drew 
parallels between their own background and the history of the 
Afrikaners. Although some of them disapproved of American segregation,
111Ibid., 11.
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they vere willing to accept, at least temporarily, a policy based 
on segregation in South Africa. They were much more inclined to see 
progress in South Africa and hope for future political liberalization 
than were other Americans. Perhaps this was because they saw that 
racial progress in the United States was being identified, rather 
falsely, with symbolic victories over prejudice, and thus they were 
more keenly aware of the economic focus of South African efforts at 
racial progress. Perhaps, too, they had seen how much white Southerners 
had changed in attitude in a generation and thus saw this possible in 
South Africa. Indeed, there was an ironic inversion of C. Vann 
Woodward's view of the contrast between Northern optimism and Southern 
pessimism. It was the South that saw the possibility of progress
in South Africa; it was Southerners who were optimistic far the future.
C. The Only Real Industrial Camplejc South of Milan
The third identifiable group which had or was likely to have 
favorable attitudes towards South Africa was American business.
Americans were economically involved in South Africa at least from the 
time when diamonds were first dug at Kimberly and gold first dis­
covered on the Witswatersrand. South Africa was regarded favorably 
by businessmen as an important trading partner for the United States 
and as a place for profitable financial investment. Moreover, they 
viewed South Africa as a country possessing ‘a responsible business 
community which looked to the future welfare of the country.
After World War II there was a rush to riches in South Africa
Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (New York,I960), 19-21.
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Just as there had been earlier gold and diamond rushes. Individual 
fortuneseekers now, however, had been replaced by the polished repre­
sentatives of large business and industrial concerns. For a variety 
of reasons South Africa appeared to be an excellent area for invest­
ment, for expansion of existing industry, and for export marketing.
During World War II South Africa not only had been far from the 
fighting fronts, but had also experienced an expansion of its industry 
and economy as a result of the war. Business Week listed some of the 
reasons why South Africa looked so attractive after the war. Because 
of its annual gold output worth over $1*00,000,000, South Africa had a 
strong dollar exchange position. Local industries were available for 
subcontracting and for supplying raw materials when needed. A helpful 
government, favorable to foreign investment, was more than willing to 
aid American firms getting started in South Africa. Skilled workers 
were emigrating from Britain and Europe to the country, and cheap, 
unskilled labor was readily available. In addition, the periodical 
pointed out that there was a growing market for all sorts of goods
H'awithin the Union and elsewhere in southern Africa. J Such favorable 
conditions were virtually unduplicated in any other country in the 
world. Dozens of major American firms started or expanded operations 
in South Africa.
Typical of the outlook of businessmen viewing South Africa in 
the immediate post-war period was a report cn "Why South Africa Rates 
A-l for Export" by Raymond L. Hoadley, the financial editor of
■*"̂ "New U.S. Stake In South Africa," Business Week, November 
29, 19^7, PP. 81-82.
114Aviation magazine. The Union of South Africa, he wrote, was
an exporter's dream— a wealthy young country where the importer 
may purchase any product from the United States in any amount 
he sees fit— without government import or exchange permits re­
quired. The trade is unfettered by any artificial restraints.
What other markets fit this description?!!?
In many respects, said Hoadley, South Africa was "the best country in
the world for our manufactured goods.
Another business periodical, Fortune, reported on the success
of the O'okiep Copper Company in South Africa. This was an American
firm which took part in a United States government program in World
117War II to expand production of strategic materials. The company
had been able to repay its loan quickly and had continued to make sub­
stantial profits after the war. Fortune noted that a consequence of 
O'okiep's experience had been to make American capital think well of 
South Africa, and that American investment companies were sending 
representatives to the country to examine the prospects for further
n *i Oactivities in South Africa.
Business expectations were more than fulfilled. Total Ameri­
can exports to South Africa rose from $69,000,000 in 1939 to
^Raymond L. Hoadley, "Why South Africa Hates A-l for
Export," Aviation, XLIV (June, 19^7), 81-82.
115Ibid-» 01.
Ibid.
"^^"Nababeep and East O'okiep," Fortune, XXXVI (July, 19^7),
76-81.
"I "1 AIbid., 79. Not all businessmen who went to South Africa 
were favorably impressed. Walter Kreiger, president of Chicago 
Tool and Die, visited South Africa in 1956 as representative for a 
number of American businessmen. His Judgment: "I wouldn't invest a
dime in Ithisl country in its present circumstances." New York 
Times, July 10, 1956 ,p. U3.
$227,000,000 in 19^6, an increase of three hundred per cent.‘*“*'9
Although rising less dramatically thereafter, the figure for total
exports increased to $285,000,000 in 1957 and by 1965 it was at the
120level of $1+38,000,000. More significant than the amount and value
of the goods exported to South Africa was the fact that the United
States almost always imported less from South Africa than it exported
there. This meant that the United States maintained a favorable
balance of trade with South Africa throughout most of the period after
World War IX. For example, in 1957 the United States imported only
$101,000,000 worth of goods and materials from South Africa; the
1965 figure was $226,000,000.'*'̂'*'
The amount of direct American private investment in South
Africa also Increased considerably in the postwar period. It rose
12?from $87,000,000 in 19U3 to $19*+,000,000 in 1952. By 1966 it was 
more than $601,000,000 with almost 300 American businesses operating
^■^U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and 
Domestic Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United 
States, 1939 (Washington^ 19V0),xv; U.S. Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business, XXVII (March, 19^7), S 20.
120U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, 
Trade of the United States with Africa 1956-1958 (World Trade Informa­
tion Service: Statistical Deports, Part 3, Wo. 59-39) (Washington,
1959), 3-^; U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, 
XLVII (December, 1967), S 21.
121As Alexander Trowbridge, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
for Domestic and International Business, told the House Subcommittee 
on Africa, the "surplus for the United States stemming from our trade 
with South Africa in 19&5 furnished over 1+ percent of our global trade 
surplus in 19^5 • Thus, U.S.-trade with South Africa contributes to 
the favorable U.S. balance of trade position." United States-South 
African Delations , 1+1+.
122Herbert J. Cummings and Bernard Blankenheimer, Investment 
in Union of South Africa: Conditions and Outlook for United States
investors (Washington, 195*0, 26.
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123directly in South Africa, The return on investments there through­
out the postwar period has been quite high, with firms enjoying a
X2h sreturn of twenty-seven per cent or more. By the mid-1960s annual
earnings on American investments in South Africa were over $100,000,000,
and South Africa ranked as the seventeenth largest area for American
private investment in the w o r l d . W i t h  such rewards available for
American industry, it is not surprising that President Eisenhower's
Secretary of Commerce, Sinclair Weeks, praised South Africa for its
"adherence to free trade principles and its firm belief in the private
enterprise system.
Throughout the century South Africa has been the most important 
area in sub-Saharan Africa for both trade and investment. In spite of 
the fact that same Americans looked to black Africa as a region for 
growing American economic activity, South Africa held on to the 
largest share of American business even after the independence of most 
of the African countries. It continued to be the most attractive 
field for business. To be sure, Sharpeville did cause seme consterna­
tion in the business community. For several years afterward there was 
a net flight of capital from South Africa. Nevertheless, it was only
■'■'̂ Walther Lederer and Frederick Cutler, "international 
Investments of the United States in 1966," Survey of Current Business,
XLVII (September, 196?), 1*2.
12U"Where There's A Beal Boom in Africa," U.S. News and World 
Report, May 11, 1961*, p. 108,
125Lederer and Cutler, "International Investments of the 
United States in 1966," 1*3; United States-South African Relations, U6.
126Sinclair Weeks, "South Africa's Contribution to Free Trade 
and the Private Enterprise System," South African-American Survey,
VIII (195U-1955), 35.
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a few months after Sharpeville that a large loan was extended to 
South Africa by American bankers and businessmen, and within a year 
or two after the i960 tragedy a number of American firms, particularly 
the large automobile manufacturers, authorized major expansion in 
South Africa.
The first decade of African independence did little to change 
the views of American business about the attractiveness of South 
Africa as compared with other countries on the African continent. In 
contrast to the revolutions taking place in black Africa and the 
socialist nature of many African countries' economies, South Africa re­
mained prosperous, stable, and essentially capitalistic.
American businessmen and business publications contrasted 
South Africa with the newly independent countries elsewhere on the 
continent when they looked to the prospects for business activity in 
South Africa. For example, a Vice-President of the American-owned 
Newmont Mining Company, Marcus Banghart, was quoted in 1962 as 
commenting that South Africa "offers better promise for stability
I pQthan untried social and political reforms in other areas.1 Making
similar observations, a journalist reported in the U.S. Mews and World 
Report that South Africa was in the midst of a boom and was not facing 
imminent revolution. The economic picture was highly favorable for 
investors, he said, and the standard of living was improving for all
■'■‘̂ New York Times, February 5, 1962, p. 35; August 18, 1963, 
111,1. See also, "Chrysler, Ford and General Motors in South Africa," 
Economic Priorities Report, I (October-November, 1970), 10-11, 15.
128Quoted in Colin Gonze, George M. Houser and Perry Sturges, 
South African Crisis and United States Policy (New York, 1962), 50 
(pamphlet in possession of the author).
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the raceB in South Africa. As to the future of the country, he 
stated:
South Africa’s resources remain vast. Internal unrest is 
negligible. The impression you get here is of a country 
that is in the midst of dynamic expansion— and rolling 
along on the crest of a boom unequalled anywhere else in 
the world at this time.-*-2^
Even more effusive in his praise of South Africa's accomplish­
ments was John Davenport, the editor of the business publication 
Fortune. The very title of his report was designed to draw the 
reader's attention to the contrast between South Africa and the rest 
of the continent: "The Only Real Industrial Complex South of Milan."^30
Complaining of the "angry clouds of rhetoric" raised against South 
Africa, he said that the controversy over the country's race policies 
had obscured the achievements of its dynamic economy. He reminded 
his readers of those achievements. Half of all the automobiles on the 
entire African continent were registered in South Africa. Half of the 
continent's telephones were in South Africa, and half its electricity 
was generated there. With only six per cent of the total population 
of Africa, he continued, South Africa created twenty-five per cent of
its industrial output. In average income per capita South Africa led
131all other African countries by a wide margin.
The difficulties encountered by multinational corporations 
attempting to do business in the newly independent African countries 
were spelled out in detail in a Business International research report
■*"^"Where There's A Real Boom in Africa," 109.
"*'3^John Davenport, "The Only Real Industrial Complex South of 
Milan," Fortune, LXXIV (December, 1966), 180.
131Ibid., 181.
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132entitled Prospects for Business In Developing Africa. Business
International is a special publication which provides business firms
with up to date information on world business developments. The 1970
report said that black Africa's "short history has been characterized
by political and economic chaos, set-backs, and disappointments, as
133well as bright examples of solid progress." The publication pre­
dicted some movement in the 1970s away from the "ostentatious 
politicking" of Africa's rulers but warned;
Despite the breakthrough to realistic economic thinking, 
one cannot assume that Africa will now settle into the 
business-like mold of Western industrial powers. African 
business dealings are often still paralyzed by people who feel 
that "if we can't do it our way, it's best not to do it at 
all."^
The necessary change in attitude, the report said, would come to Africa 
only slowly.
Business International listed a number of specific problems 
that businessmen would have to deal with in Africa. One of the most 
important of these was the "almost universal lack of entrepreneurial 
spirit among African people. "^35 concept of trade and commerce
was, it said, essentially alien to the masses of black Africa. It 
warned of the political headaches that they would have to face, 
stating "day to day domestic politics will continue to hinder progress 
and present multinational companies with serious problems for years
i3^Business International Corporation, Prospects for Business 





to come. Bribes, or their equivalents (such as hiring relatives 
of politicians or paying "consulting fees" to political figures), had 
to be considered as part of normal business expenses.
In contrast, a report on South Africa two years later by the 
same business reporting service stated that South Africa "has a 
favorable attitude toward the free enterprise system and has a record 
of efficiency and honesty in its dealings."1^  It found the possi­
bility of future internal or external turmoil "very unlikely." The 
report noted that despite external criticism of South Africa, more and 
more foreign business firms were setting up manufacturing operations in 
South Africa. An Information Guide for Doing Business in South Africa 
by the American multinational accounting firm Price, Waterhouse 
similarly gave favorable comments on business prospects in South 
Africa. It stated one of the important reasons why the country was 
attractive to foreign investors:
For the reason that its legislative and business structure 
and the traditions of its people of European descent are 
those of the western world, it follows the general business 
concepts of that world and thus its economy is mainly one 
of private ownership and free enterprise.
All this is not to say, however, that American business was 
entirely happy with South Africa. Investment there by American firms, 
it should be pointed out, was not completely voluntary. Concerned 
about the country's trade deficits, the South African government at
136Ibid., 13.
137Business International Corporation, Investing. Licensing 
and Trading Conditions Abroad; South Africa (n.p., 1972), 2.
1 oflPrice, Waterhouse and Co., Information Guide for Doing 
Business in South Africa (n.p,, 1972), 1.
various times severely limited the repatriation of capital.. With 
nowhere else to go the money was reinvested in South Africa. Local 
content laws made demands on American businessmen, requiring them to 
make extensive new outlays of capital within the country. In 1962 
the government began a local content program that required that by a 
set date a certain percentage of each automobile sold in South Africa 
be made from locally produced components. Manufacturers were forced 
then to choose between withdrawing from South Africa and expanding 
their plants. They chose the latter.
Local content requirements perhaps reflected a certain 
hostility to outside investors. But they also manifested the strong 
South African desire to be self-sufficient in all areas of the 
economy. Self-sufficiency was an effort to prepare for sanctions as 
well as an attempt to forestall them. In order to encourage the 
growth of South African-based business, the government was often un­
willing to grant long-term permits to foreign firms for carrying on 
business. This, of course, did not please American firms which were 
faced with uncertainty about whether they should expand their 
activities or whether it would be more profitable in the long run to 
sell their operations before their facilities became obsolete.
In addition, American business spokesmen and publications 
expressed the view that the government, and the Afrikaners as a 
group, let ideology or prejudice get in the way of good business. 
Restrictions on African migration, job classification, and other 
aspects of apartheid did not promote optimal conditions for the con­
duct of business. Indeed, the Afrikaners were portrayed frequently 
as backward and unprogressive in outlook. The English-speaking, by
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way of contrast, were seen as progressive, enlightened and good 
businessmen.
Just after the 19^8 Nationalist victory, the "Business"
section of Newsweek brought out the differences between the two groups
of whites and explained what these meant for the American business
community. The article stated:
Until two weeks ago the Union of South Africa looked to a 
growing number of American businessmen and bankers like a 
promising field for expanding trade and investment. Then 
came the sudden election turnover. Field "Marshal Jan Smuts 
and his British-oriented United Party were turned out of 
office by a narrow majority. Power passed to Dr. Daniel 
Malan and the ultra-isolationist, racist, and anti-British 
Nationalist Party, a strong group of Boers who speak more 
for the Afrikaan farmer than for finance and industry. -̂39
South Africa was, it said, on the "threshold of a great boam," but
the rosy prospects had been clouded by the Nationalist victory.
This approach continued to be taken by business publications
throughout the period after 19^8. Reporting on civil unrest in South
Africa in 1952, Business Week expressed the opinion that the source
of racial strife was to be found in the differing business outlooks
of the Afrikaners and the English-speaking:
At bottom, the struggle today is the same as it was 50 years 
ago. On one side is the Afrikaans farmer who hates indus­
trialization, urbanization, and political liberalism. On 
the other side is the British business and professional 
man who wants to promote a modern industrial society.
Editorializing same eight years later on the Sharpeville deaths,
Fortune magazine expressed virtually the same view:
■̂ ■̂ "Bouth Africa: Complications in the Land of Opportunity
PIub ,11 Newsweek, June 21, 19̂ *8, p. 7̂ .
^^"South Africa Heads for Civil Violence," Business Week, 
September 6, 1952, p. 172.
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The difference between English-speaking and Afrikaans­
speaking whites is better explained by the fact the latter 
group is dominated by its farmers, who are relatively 
isolated from world currents and who utilize Negro labor 
for tasks requiring little education or skill. The 
English-speaking community, on the other hand, is business- 
oriented. 1
Because of these different orientations of the two white groups, said 
Fortune, the government was pursuing backward race and business 
policies while business, i.e., primarily the English-speaking, took a 
more progressive attitude. Similarly, Business Week observed a year 
later:
Organized commerce, dominated by English speaking South
Africans, is trying to head off this fate [racial chaos]
by urging the government to shelve its Bantustan projects, 
to allow Africans to develop productive skills in urban 
industries, to increase African purchasing power through 
higher wages, and generally to adopt a more enlightened policy.1^2
The pattern of portraying bad Afrikaners versus good English- 
speaking businessmen was modified in the 1960s as economic conditions 
changed somewhat in South Africa. Afrikaners rose to higher levels
in businesses as more of them moved from the farms to the urban areas
ikl"Racism vs. Business," Fortune, LXI (May, i960), 12k. See 
also Michael Halpern, "The Cost of Apartheid," Fortune, LXHI 
CJanuary, 1962), 1+7-U8.
iho"Afrikaners Decide to Go It Alone— Sort Of," Business 
Week, March 25, 19^1, p. 111. Especially important for the pro­
gressive image of South African business has been Harry F. Oppenheimer, 
As the head of dozens of South African companies, Oppenheimer pre­
sided over a vast mining empire that extended to other parts of Africa 
as well as South Africa. Articles in American publications stressed 
his opposition to government policies; e.g., "Gold and Diamonds,"
Time, February 12, 1951, p. 8l; "Harry Oppenheimer's Industrial 
Africa," Fortune, LXI (May, i960}, 152-65; and more recently, "Blacks, 
Whites and Harry Oppenheimer," Forbes, June 15, 1973, pp. 38-^9.
See also, Harry Oppenheimer, "Why Apartheid Will Not Work," New 
Repub lie. February 20, 1961, pp. 17-l8; and "People," Time, June 9, 
1967, p. 5.
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and as Afrikaner groups proved more successful in uplifting the 
volk, with the help, of course, of the Nationalist government,
Africaner "businessmen, such as Anton Rupert, who controlled one of 
the largest tobacco industries in the world, and Jan Marais, who 
introduced more progressive banking practices to South Africa, re­
ceived some favorable treatment from the press in the United States,
lli 3particularly as they expressed opposition to apartheid.
Some statistical data is available on views of American 
businessmen on South Africa. Although not very reliable, it is at 
least some indication of how American businessmen in South Africa felt 
towards the government and its race policies. The information is the 
result of several surveys undertaken in 19 68 -1969 "by tiie South African 
firm, Market Research Africa, Ltd. In the July 1969 survey three 
hundred questionnaires were sent out to American and Canadian business­
men based in South Africa. Only about thirty-five per cent of the 
forms were returned by the respondents. The businessmen in this poll 
and in the poll taken Hie previous year indicated that if they were 
South Africans they would have supported the three principal (white)
lit itpolitical parties in the following percentages:
"Watching His Smoke," Time, December 21, 1962, p. 73;
Allen Drury, A Very Strange Society (New York, 1968), 363.
lUUThis data is drawn from Dudley Horner, United States Cor­
porate Investment and Social Change in South Africa (mimeograph pub- 
lication by the South African Institute of Race Relations,
Johannesburg, 1971), and Timothy H. Smith, The American Corporation 
in South Africa: An Analysis (New York, 1970), 5 (pamphlet in
possession of the author).
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Nationalist United Progressive
1968 355? 315? 155?
1969 315? 325? 205?
The businessmen were also asked whether South Africa's racial policies 
represented "an approach that is, under the circumstances at least, an 
attanpt to develop a solution." In 1968 eighty-one per cent responded 
affirmatively and in 19&9 seventy-seven per cent gave the same answer.
These polls provide some confirmation for the conclusions de­
rived fran reading the published views of businessmen on South Africa. 
American businessmen tended to prefer the English-speaking South 
Africans to the Afrikaners, and they believed that conditions in South 
Africa gave at least partial justification for apartheid. On the 
latter point it should again be pointed out that Americans who spent 
any length of time in South Africa were inclined to be less critical 
of its race policies than others. John Davenport, the editor of 
Fortune, observed and commented on this after his 1966 Journey to the 
country. He stated:
Living In daily contact with the realities of South Africa, 
businesanen taid to be more relaxed and more open-minded 
about its race problem than many critics at home, precisely 
because they realize its complexity.
Some American businessmen clearly did favor apartheid; perhaps 
some who were sent to represent their corporations in South Africa 
were selected because of their racial views. But this is not to sug­
gest that most American businessmen thought that apartheid was the 
most desirable policy. Rather, they saw It more as a necessary evil,
1115 Ibid. 
lU6Davenport, "The Only Read Industrial Complex South of 
Milan," 251.
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one which got in the way of sound business practices, which was often 
harsh, hut which produced benefits for blacks as well as whites and 
adjusted relations between peoples of differing levels of civilization.
Typical of Uiis approach was Clarence B. Randall, a former 
president of Inland Steel Corporation and author of several books on 
public affairs and capitalism. Randall visited South Africa in 1962 
with the assistance of the South Africa Foundation. Much that Randall 
observed during his visit was not to his liking. He "boiled with hot
lli Yanger" at some of the requirements of the South African government.
He declared that he could not
stomach the intrusions into personal liberty: the constant
carrying of identification cards; the requiring of passes for 
both the white man and the black man when either enters territory 
reserved for the other; house arrest and detention solely upon 
accusation of the police; the separation of husband and wife 
after years of wedded life; judicial determination of race; the 
denial of nonwhites of the right to own land in freehold in an 
urban area; the recent decree that requires professional 
societies such as law and medicine to enforce segregation; and 
the Sabotage Act,-*-̂ °
But he went on to say that the doctrine of apartheid had to be con­
sidered in light of the population differences. Some sort of restric­
tions had to be placed on the exercise of political rights by the 
Africans. As he saw it:
Only the incredibly naive can honestly believe that political 
democracy— "one man, one vote"— will at once solve this complex 
problem. The sober truth is that it would probably create chaos
^Clarence B. Randall, "South Africa Needs Time," Atlantic, 
CCXI (May, 1963), 77. This was reprinted as "Why South Africa Needs 
Time," in Reader's Digest. LXXXIII (August, 1963), 151-55- See also 
Clarence B. Randall, "Do We Understand the New Africa?" in Sarah 
Gertrude Millin, comp,, White Africans Are Also People (Cape Town, 
1966), 79-99.
1 UflRandall, "South Africa Needs Time," 77.
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iJigfrom which the country might never recover. ^
Apartheid also had to he weighed against the "highly creditable record 
of conduct" of the white population in providing benefits for the 
blacks. The blacks had the highest per capita income for Africans on 
the continent. Some eighty per cent, he observed, of the children 
were in school, with many Africans studying at the university level 
or practicing in professions.
Time, said Randall, would provide solutions to the problems 
of South Africa. He felt that the Bantustan program was proving suc­
cessful and would continue to move forward. There were liberalizing 
forces at work within the Dutch Reformed Church, the business community, 
and the press. Expressing the conviction that the whites of South 
Africa knew they had a great responsibility and would live up to its 
demand, he stated: "At heart they are our kind of folk. In the end,
they will do right.
Another businessman who held opinions similar to Randall's was 
Stanley Shaw, editor of the Whaley-Eaton Service (a service reporting 
on foreign political and economic developments affecting American 
business). Shaw had also made a trip to South Africa at about the 
same time as did Randall, and he found the country "trying desperately 
to improve the economic status of its so-called downtrodden."'*'̂ '*'
Conditions for Africans were improving, and Shaw believed that political
11+9Ibid. , 78.
15°Xbld., 80.
■^'Stanley N. Shaw, "The Truth About South Africa," U.S. News 
and World Report. November 19, 19&2, p. 115* This was evidently a 
shortened version of Shaw’s business newsletter.
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advancement would accompany economic progress. In time, he said, 
apartheid would be modified: "From separateness will come unity and
equal rights.
Randall, Davenport, Shaw and others were of the opinion that 
economic forces in South Africa were working to mitigate the harshness 
of apartheid and to lay the foundations for greater trust and coopera­
tion among the races of the country. Business, in their view, was 
working against apartheid rather than apartheid supporting business. 
Foreign trade and investment were aiding racial progress in South 
Africa rather than shoring up an oppressive system. Assistant Secre­
tary of Commerce Alexander Trowbridge took this position while testi­
fying to the Ifcuse Subcommittee on Africa in its 1966 hearings on 
American policy on South Africa. He asserted:
[T]he presence of U.S. business in South Africa has, in certain 
limited areas, exerted a positive influence on some aspects of 
racial practices in South Africa, particularly in the industrial 
sphere. In many instances, U.S. firms have been in the fore­
front in introducing progressive labor-management practices, 
such as employing nonwhite labor at high job and skill classi­
fications .53
Some American businesses operating in South Africa themselves 
began putting forth the argument that they were promoting progressive 
change in South Africa as liberal groups increasingly brought pressure 
on them to withdraw from South Africa. To some extent, public state­
ments by these businesses were self-serving. American corporations 
had much invested in South Africa and did not wish to be forced to 
divest themselves of their holdings there. Statements about their
152m d .
~*~̂ -%nited States-South African Relations, H6.
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opposition to apartheid became necessary so as to answer same of the 
questions of critical shareholders and to forestall boycotts of their 
products. For example, a proposal that General Motors should withdraw 
from South Africa resulted in a report on "General Motors and South 
Africa" by Elliott M. Estes, Group Vice President with jurisdiction 
over the Overseas Operations. He explained to an audience at a
conference on General Motors’s performance in matters of public 
interest:
The General Motors position is that its economic presence in 
South Africa is our greatest contribution to progress in that 
country. We believe that through the steps we are taking and 
the good working conditions and facilities at General Motors 
South African, we are providing an example for other employers 
to accelerate the pace of progressive change, . . .
We feel that the black man would be the first to suffer from 
any serious failure in the process of economic growth in South 
Africa. Further, any attempt to damage the South African 
economy or isolate South Africa from the rest of the world may 
only produce a deeper commitment by the white population to the 
perpetuation of apartheid.^55
Estes went over the steps General Motors was taking in South 
Africa to improve conditions for Africans. These included wage in­
creases, Job training, medical services, and scholarships for non­
white children. The Polaroid Corporation made similar representa­
tions in newspaper advertising in major American newspapers and in 
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1971.
l^Elliott m . Estes," General Motors and South Africa," in 
General Motors Corporation, 1972 Report on Progress in Areas of Public 
Concern (Warren, Michigan, 1972), 53-59-
155Ibld,, 53.
J.56U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. 
Business Involvement in South Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Africa, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, Part 1, pp. U-5, 13. The news­
paper advertisements appeared in the New York Times, Boston Globe and
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Although such statements "by business can be regarded as self- 
interested rationalizations, they are nonetheless consistent with the 
views of businessmen and business publications that appeared occasion­
ally in the 1950s, that is, before there were strong pressures for 
business withdrawal from South Africa. Indeed, they are consistent 
with what critics of South Africa had been saying for years, albeit 
with a different emphasis: a dynamic economy and apartheid were in­
compatible. Some of the businessmen who came forward on behalf of South 
Africa had only negligible or no financial interests in the country.
For some businessmen, their views on South Africa were clearly a re­
flection of their belief that economic well-being is a precondition of 
democracy. Clarence B. Randall, for example, argued that "no man can 
be free unless he eats. "-*-57
Finally, it should be observed that there have been black 
South Africans who have agreed substantially with the spokesmen for 
business that American business activities in South Africa have pro­
duced benefits for blacks as well as whites. Gatsha Buthelezi, leader 
of the Zulu nation, has gone on record in opposition to a discontinua­
tion of the American purchases of South African sugar* as part of its 
1quota program. Lucy Mvubelo, secretary of the National Union of 
Clothing Workers, expressed pleasure at Polaroid's refusing to pull
Herald, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, and 
twenty papers in the black community. For a generally favorable report 
on the activities of American corporations in South Africa, see "U.S.
Raises for Blacks," Time, June U, 1973, p. 8U.
157Randall, "Bo We Understand the New Africa?" 82.
~^®Natal Bally News, September 8, 1971.
159out of South Africa. An African librarian in Umtata, the capital 
of the Transkei, asked this author to try to encourage American in­
vestment in the Transkei when he returned to the United States. His 
people, he said, needed jobs. While American critics of South Africa 
may have regarded the arguments put forth by business as unconvincing, 
those who would be most affected by American economic disengagement 
from South Africa found them more persuasive and were reluctant to 
give up the benefits of American investment so as to ease the con­
sciences of the Americans claiming to speak on their behalf.
Although the three groups and the individuals discussed in 
this chapter differed in important aspects of their views, such as in 
their attitudes towards Afrikaners and the Nationalist Party, they all 
shared the opinion that American policy on South Africa after 1958 
was misguided and unsound. However, the criticisms of American policy 
varied somewhat in emphasis.
For the anti-Communist conservatives and the more Negrophobic 
Southerners, American policy on South Africa was another example of 
the blundering incompetence and destructive naivete of the "liberals" 
in the State Department. The publisher Tom Anderson, writing in the 
John Birch publication American Opinion, said that "the fruit flies in 
our State Department" were constantly making trouble for South Africa 
and Rhodesia because they were stable, prosperous and Christian. 
Continuing, he contrasted American policy on Southern Africa with 




Prehensile characters a generation out of the trees tear 
down our flag, stone our Embassies, and spit on our 
Ambassadors as we continue to deliver billions of dollars 
worth of our grandchildren's seed corn to them. As for 
our real friends, such as South Africa and Rhodesia, we 
spit on them. We boycott them. We give no foreign aid to 
them. We even threaten— through the United Nations— to 
invade them.1®1
An editorialist in the Citizen complained bitterly that American policy 
was being directed against the"only remaining areas of peace and sta­
bility in Africa— our own natural allies— anti-Communist South Africa 
1and Rhodesia." Commenting on the American government's refusal to 
allow the carrier Franklin U. Roosevelt to put into a South African 
port, the writer said that he thought the decision was "an interesting 
case history, in miniature, of the concoctions served up at the Mad 
Hatter's Tea Party on the banks of the Potomoc."1^
For the more moderate Southerners and for people associated 
with American business, criticism of South Africa seemed likely to 
have the opposite effect from that which was desirable; that is, it 
would cause the progressive whites in South Africa to lose strength 
to the more conservative elements and would limit the possibilities 
of fruitful communication and Interchange with the South Africans.
Thus, Hodding Carter and Clarence B. Randall both felt that South 
Africa should be given time to work out its problems without outside 
interference.1^  J. Irwin Miller, a prominent manufacturer, found
l6lIbid., 78.
l62"Where's the Riddle?" Citizen. XI (April, 1967), 2.
■i Ibid.; see also ,fU.S. Carrier Caper Confuses Cape Town," 
ibid., 10-15.
l6\jnited States-South African Relations, 333; Randall, "South 
Africa Needs Time," 77-78.
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the arguments for economic disengagement from South Africa like argu­
ments against "financing atheism" by trading with Russia; if sanctions 
were imposed against South Africa, he said, it would destroy the 
possibility that trade and cultural relations might help bring about 
change in South Africa.
There is no reason to belabor the point covered here and else­
where in this chapter: those with favorable views of South Africa or
who believed that South Africa's benefits to the United States out­
weighed its liabilities did not feel that a hostile policy towards 
South Africa served a useful purpose. Although it is not possible to 
say what influence the groups and individuals treated on here may have 
had on policy formulation, one can note that their arguments seemed 
more persuasive and they found greater support as the 1960s grew 
older. The reasons for this will be taken up in the final chapter 
of this study.
-̂ Letter of J. Irwin Miller to the editor, Christian Century, 
January U, 1967, p. 18.
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
For a time in the mid-1960s it appeared that the United States 
might participate in measures that had as their goal the destruction 
of apartheid. The United States did not, however, act to "bring apart­
heid in South Africa to an end. There are many reasons why it was un­
willing to support United Nations sponsored sanctions or to take 
unilateral measures against South Africa, hut it may he generations 
before these are publicly known. However, based on presently avail­
able materials and the analysis of American views on South Africa that 
has been employed in this study, it is possible to suggest some fac­
tors that caused the arguments in favor of American sanctions to lose 
much of their force.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s it seems clear that many 
Americans were looking upon South Africa more favorably, or at least 
less critically. Numerous observers have commented on this. South 
African reporters in the United States asserted that the movement for 
sanctions had lost its vitality.'*' William A. Hance, a professor of 
economic geography at Columbia University, spoke of the movement in the 
past tense in 1968. In a collection of essays on American relations 
with South Africa he wrote:
■̂ John Jordi, "The Anti-S.A. Lobbyists Lose Steam," Natal Daily 
News, June 2k, 1969!(clippings file of the newspaper); Ken Owen, "Steam 
Goes Out of U.S. Protests on SA Racism," Johannesburg Star, December 




Several years ago there was very considerable interest in the 
possible application of sanctions as a way of bringing about 
desired change in South Africa. Some would not agree that there 
has been a reduction of this interest, but it seems clear that 
the major powers have rejected sanctions as a method of forcing 
change in South Africa.^
The novelist James A. Michener after a visit to South Africa concluded
that "everyone is agreed" that there should be no withdrawal of
American business from South Africa.
Bishop C. Edward Crowther, an American clergyman once expelled
from South Africa, commented on the shift in American views on South
Africa and attributed the change to the South African government's
efforts to improve its image;
A massive propaganda attempt has been more successful than 
anyone could have dared to hope, presenting a benign new 
image for South Africa. Suddenly, South Africa projects her­
self as yearning to be understood, exuding international good­
will and extended toleration. It is as if the polecat had 
been a mink all along, and understandably the world is 
puzzled.
Others too have asserted that the activities of the South African 
government and South Africa Foundation have been responsible for a 
new "climate of opinion" on South Africa.5
William A. Hance, "The Case For and Against United States 
Disengagement from South Africa," in William A. fiance, ed., Southern 
Africa and the United States (New York and London, 1968), 107.
James A. Michener, "The Five Warring Tribes of South Africa," 
Mew York Times Magazine, January 23, 1972, p. 56.
Ĉ. Edward Crowther, "South Africa's New Look: A Detente
Cordiale?" American Scholar, XXXVII (Winter, 1967-68), 5̂ * Evidence 
of the shift in views is also provided by conservative Americans who 
thought South Africa was becoming too liberal. See Jim Lucier, 
"Africa: Year of the Simba," American Opinion, VIII (July-August,
1965), 12; and fievilo P. Oliver, review of Anton Rupert's Progress 
Through Partnership, in South African Observer, XIII (March, 19^8), 5.
^E.g., Vernon McKay, "South African Propaganda: Methods and
Media," Africa Report, XI (February, 1966), U1-I16.
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There seems to be no doubt that the pro-South Africa agencies 
and organizations have contributed to more favorable views on South 
Africa. However, a lobbying group can do little more than marshall 
facts and present arguments. The soundness or persuasiveness of the 
arguments turn on factors beyond the control of opinion influencing 
groups. It has already been observed that even some of the harshest 
critics of South Africa doubted that sanctions could have the effect 
of improving conditions for blacks in South Africa.^ Other developments 
in both the United States and South Africa made the arguments for 
sanctions seem still less sound.
Probably the most important single factor tending to lessen
support for sanctions against South Africa was the Viet Nam Weir.
That war has undoubtedly altered the outlook of Americans on world
affairs in many ways. For years it was the primary foreign policy
concern of the American people and drew their attention away from other
issues. As one critic of South Africa complained in 1966:
Che of the unwelcome side effects of the Vietnamese war has 
been to drain U.S. energies to such an extent that any 
attempt to launch an anti-apartheid campaign in 1966 will 
probably fail if it depends largely on the United States.
Although official American sympathies are firmly on the 
side of the African nations and against South Africa, Ameri­
can thinking on foreign policy is completely entangled in 
the jungles of Vietnam. Until the Vietnamese issue is 
resolved, there is little chance of the United States „ 
opening a second front in equally remote southern Africa.
As Viet Nam dragged on, Americans increasingly doubted their 
claim to moral leadership in the world, and many doubted their
^See above, p. lUU.
7Anthony A, D 1 Amato, "Apartheid; Catalyst in the U.N.,1’ 
Christian Century. October 26, 1966, p. 1306.
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essential goodness as a people. The war caused them to seek a smaller
role in world affairs. It caused them to question strongly their
ability to bring a better society to a foreign country through the
use of force. It exposed the limitations on power theretofore thought
to be virtually limitless. Speaking on Viet Nam and many aspects of
post-World War II policies, Secretary of State William P. Rogers
told the graduating class of Colgate University in 1971 that American
idealism had been "too grandiose." He stated:
We presumed a degree of omnipotence for good which has led 
to considerable disillusionment. We found that we lacked 
the power to affect bthers as we thought we might. We 
often approached political problems with an excessively 
moralistic and self-righteous attitude.
As American opinion turned against the war in Viet Nam, Americans
were not prepared to take actions in southern Africa that could lead
to war there for the sake of getting South Africans to adopt policies
more in line with American concepts of morality.
Indeed, Americans began to doubt that their policy of integra­
tion or assimilation was the most moral policy to follow on race 
relations. There was in the mid-1960s a shift in the thrust of the 
civil rights movement in the United States. After achieving victories 
for equality of treatment in the courts and in Congress, the movement 
shifted from an emphasis on equal opportunities to an emphasis on 
black power or black separatism. Large masses of blacks rioted in a 
number of American cities, especially in the summer of 1966, causing 
millions of dollars in damage and a white backlash. Black leaders
^William P. Rogers, "Relating Our National Idealism to Inter­
national Realities," Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1571* p. 
796.
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rejected white paternalism and democratic homilies in favor of self- 
determination and a new sort of segregation.
In the mood of dismay over this turn of the civil rights 
movement, commentators "began to suggest that integration had failed 
in the United States. The vice-president of the liberal Center for 
the Study of Democratic Institutions, W. H. Ferry, reflected the 
pessimism about the prospects for peaceful race relations when he 
declared in a speech that the United States was irremediably disunited 
on race. He said that the United States had to discover "a philosophy 
and machinery for the democratic government of a separated country.
An editorial in America described well the shift that took place in 
the civil rights movement and the response of white Americans to the 
shift:
Black nationalism became the cry, and in place of pleas for 
integration came rejection of white society as a whole.
The reaction was first one of incredulity. On the right came 
a counter-cry for "law and order" at any cost, even the harsh 
repression, not only of violence and crime, but of dissent 
and agitation, too. Some on the extreme left were driven 
by desperation and a sense of guilt to "burn down America" 
in quest of Justice and reprisal. Many moderates or liberals 
sought to regain the old myths by redefining or abandoning 
policies to which they had been committed. While integration 
was all right for the South, conditions in the metropolitan 
North made it impracticable in the foreseeable future. A 
new-style "separate but equal" policy suddenly became 
acceptable.-^
The magazine then counseled Americans to heed C. Vann Woodward's plea
H. Ferry, "Farewell to Integration," in Barry N. Schwartz 
and Robert Disch, eds,, White Racism: Its History, Pathology and
IVacoice (JNew York, 1970), 505. See also "Grasping at ChaoB," Nation, 
November 27, 1967, p. 5^7; and "An End to Self-Deception," America, 
March l6, 1968, pp. 3UU-U5.
10,,The Burden of American History," America, November 23, 1968,
p. 511.
that the United States abandon its childish holier-than'-thou myths.
The implications of the changing vievs of American race 
relations for American perspectives on South Africa very soon became 
apparent. If race relations were bad in South Africa, they were, 
as America noted, "far more bloody” in the United States.11 If the 
United States was unable to cope with its own race problems, how could 
it improve South African race relations? Indeed, black Americans 
were proposing a black cultural (or even geographic) separation that 
shared much of the ideology of South African apartheid. Discussing the 
increase in demands in the late 1960s for black studies programs at 
American universities, John Hatch, a South African "banned” for his 
opposition to apartheid, expressed his surprise and shock at such 
demands:
This year, my fifth in America's academic world, I have sensed 
there a closer approximation to the apartheid spirit than in 
any society since I was last in South Africa. . . . Some aspects 
of the demands I have heard or read from black students on 
American campuses could have been copied from the words or 
writings of white South Africans— with the words "white" and 
"black" transposed,̂ -2
The new black attitude towards separatism caused some Americans to
reconsider apartheid and suggest that it might have some merit, at
least in theory. To take one example, James A. Michener spent a month
in South Africa in 1971 and wrote of his views of South Africa. After
noting separatism of ethnic groups in Canada, Cyprus, Belgium, and
Ireland, he commented on "grand" apartheid:
One must not therefore contemptuously dismiss South Africa's
^-''Controversy Over a Bishop," America, August 19, 1967, p. 16U
^John Hatch, "Black Studies: The Real Issue," Ration, June 16
1969, p. 755.
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effort to achieve something which many areas in the rest of the 
world have tried. One must also remember that many black 
leaders in the United States advocate precisely what South 
Africa is recommending— that defined areas like Alabama and . 
Mississippi be turned over to the blacks for their control.^
If a change in the civil rights movement in the United States 
made apartheid appear to have a moral and ideological basis, develop­
ments in Africa made the white fear of "swamping" appear more valid 
than it had appeared in I960. The record of the first decade of 
independence of the black ruled countries of Africa proved to be a 
disappointment to Americans who had been optimistic about the potential 
for democracy in those new states. The hopes of i960 turned to pro­
found disillusionment. As the historian Cornelius W. de Kiewiet ob­
served in 1970, "a pall of doubt has descended upon Africa."1  ̂
Revolutions were frequent, and the typical form of government became 
the military dictatorship or the one party state. Time magazine. for 
example, noted in 1966:
The Congo has been in perpetual chaos, the Sudan has been 
unable to cope with the rebellion of its anti-Moslem south 
against its Moslem north. Three east African nations have 
had to put down military uprisings, and the governments of 
eight countries have fallen before military coups. In 
addition, only a handful of Africa's new countries have 
maintained any resemblance of the multiparty democracy that 
they inherited from their departing European colonists.^
Newsweek. commenting on the tenth anniversary of the Organization of
l6African Unity, called it a "dismal and disillusioning decade."
l^Michener, "The Five Warring Tribes of South Africa," U7.
^Cornelius W. de Kiewiet, "The Revolution That Disappeared," 
Virginia Quarterly Review, XLYI (Spring, 1970), 202.
Great White Laager," Time, August 26, 1966, p. 25.
■^"Africa: The 'Toothless Dog,"' Newsweek, June U, 1973, p. 3̂.
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Political instability in the African states was often com­
pounded by cupidity in the leaders. Meaningful reform did not 
accompany revolutionary rhetoric. Tribalism continued in post­
colonial Africa and was at times associated with racism far worse 
than any that had ever appeared in South Africa. Even publications 
or individuals sympathetic to Africa began to express their misgivings 
about the new states. For example, a writer in the Mew Republic ob­
served with some distress that "although most African leaders condenn 
racism, immigrants have been expelled on 2k hours notice, forced to 
leave friends and livelihood behind, and even the small minority of
Asians and Europeans who have become citizens of the East African
17countries are discriminated against in employment." The same writer 
suggested that in the future leaders might use racial scapegoats to 
divert mass frustrations. The Asians became such scapegoats in 
Uganda when General Amin dispossessed and/or expelled nearly all 
Aslans from the country in 1972 with much violence. When African 
countries called for South Africa's exclusion from the 1968 Olympic 
games because of its racial policies, even the liberal Christian 
Century noted that it was unlikely members of the Ibo tribe would be
-1 Qfound on the Nigerian teams or Asians on the Kenyan teams. There 
were mass tribal slaughters in Rwanda and Burundi for more than a 
decade, with a death toll amounting to an estimated one hundred to
■^Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Civil Rights for Whites," New Republic, 
October 2k, 196k, pp. 5-6. See also Walter Laqueur, "Reflections on 
the Third World," in Irving Howe, ed., A Dissenter's Guide to Foreign 
Policy (New York, 1968), 173-9k.
^"Soiiih Africa Barred from Olympics," Christian Century, May 
15, 1968, p. 6k0.
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two hundred thousand systematically murdered in 1972 alone.^  These
developments in black Africa made white South African fears of rule
by black Africans appear wfell founded. Rupert Emerson, a noted
authority on Africa at Harvard University, commented in 1967:
[l]t is a wide open gamble what manner of governments and 
societies might emerge in southern African countries if 
their economies were ruined and their present regimes over­
thrown by force [i.e., enforcement of sanctions] . . . .
The simplest realism demands recognition that the way in which 
the black African states have conducted their affairs since 
independence can inspire no abundant confidence that southern 
Africa, liberated from white domination, will develop stable 
democratic governments which promote development.^
The discouraging developments in black Africa caused Americans
to play down the importance of Africa to the United States. They
also caused Americans to look to the more positive aspects of the
political order in South Africa. Thus, the author of a study of the
world's outstanding newspapers observed in 1968 that despite certain
reactionary social practices, "South Africa has the freest press on
21the entire African continent." Time magazine observed that under 
the Verwoerd government the Africans of South Africa had become "the
ppbest-paid and best-fed blacks on the continent." Even the New
•^Stanley Meisler, "Rwanda and Burundi," Atlantic, CCXXXII 
(September, 1973), 6. Meisler suggested the possibility of an American 
boycott of the two countries or that the United States and others 
"refuse to support all African resolutions on southern Africa in the 
United Nations unless these resolutions also condemned the disaster 
in Burundi and Rwanda. . . .  At the least, it would expose African 
hypocrisy." Ibid., 16.
20Rupert Emerson, Africa and United States Policy (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, 196?)» 106, 108.
21John C. Merrill, The Elite Press: Great Newspapers of the
World (New York, 1968), lUl.
22iig0uth Africa: Death of the Architect," Time, September 16,1966, p. 39- ----
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Republic felt compelled to say that "this crazy system— a superstruc­
ture of political and social, segregation erected on a base of economic 
integration— works in the sense that there is stability and pros­
perity . . . .,,23
In this new climate of opinion, Nationalist leaders began 
receiving more favorable treatment in the American press. After 
Prime Minister Verwoerd was assassinated in 1966 he was succeeded by 
B. J. Vorster. During World War II, Vorster had been a leader of the 
Ossewabrandwag and had been interned by Jan Smuts for his opposition 
to the war. When Vorster became Prime Minister the American press was
pKinitially hostile to another "pro-Nazi" Nationalist, After a short
time, however, it began to treat Vorster more favorably. Vorster
proved to be accessible to the press; he had a sense of humor and was
n6t aloof like Verwoerd. Moreover, he seemed willing to make changes
in South Africa's policies. Observers saw signs that Vorster was
taking steps to limit apartheid, and that this reflected a change in
the racial views of other Afrikaners. In foreign policy, Vorster
embarked on an "outward" policy, seeking friendlier relations with
25black African countries. ^
^"South Africa Under Its New Leader," New Republic, October 
29, 1966, p. 11.
q J."The Security Man," Time, September 23, 19^6, pp, 3^, 37; 
"What Now in South Africa?" Christian Century, September 21, 1966, 
p. 1136; "South Africa: New P.M." America, September 2U, 1966, p.
308.
^See Amry Vandenbosoh, South Africa and the World: The
Foreign Policy of Apartheid (Lexington, Kentucky, 1970), 272-80; 
and Gail-Maryse Cockram, Vorster's Foreign Policy (Pretoria and Cape 
Town, 1970), ll6-l»6, 187-^
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Time magazine reported that Vorster had been a "considerable 
surprise." It observed that Vorster was proving far more reasonable 
than his predecessors and was injecting humanity into South Africa's 
heavy ideological climate. The Afrikaans word for his style, it 
said, was "billikheid— sweet reasonableness." Time noted that Vorster 
was taking steps to ease apartheid, removing new apartheid bills from 
the legislative docket, receiving black trade delegates from an 
African state, and holding secret trade talks with other African 
delegates. The magazine predicted no overnight scuttling of apartheid, 
but did believe that Vorster had "given moderate South African whites 
the first hint of encouragement in nearly two decades of Nationalist 
rule."27
Going further than Time was an editorial in America, a
publication that had long been critical of South Africa. It found
that Afrikaners were becoming less tightly knit and less racially
conscious, suggesting that apartheid was logically the next to suffer
Pflfrom the erosion of the old values of the Afrikaners, u Similarly, 
Newsweek interpreted the results of the 1970 South African elections 
as signifying a trend toward moderation, and it saw "a real prospect 
that without abandoning the concept of white supremacy, South Africa 
might begin to move toward a slight relaxation of apartheid in the
pQnation's economic life." 7 This view appeared to be confirmed by a
2^"A Touch of Sweet Reasonableness," Time, March 31, 1967, p. 28.
27JIbld., 29. For similar views by an American official, see 
David D. Newsom, "A Look at African Issues at the United Nations," 
Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1971, pp. 371-71*.
28"Apartheid Next," America. August 17, 1968, p. 90.
^9"South Africa: Relaxing a Bit," Newsweek. May 1970, p. 5̂*
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study conducted by Donald E. Pursell, an associate professor of 
economics at Memphis State University. Pursell's study of South 
African wage policies from 1925 to 1968 concluded that the govern­
ment's Wage Board had since 1957 been improving non-white earnings 
significantly. The author stated that the Wage Act under which the 
Board operated
has ceased to support white workers and has Instead adopted 
the policy of increasing non-white earnings. In its current 
policy objective, the Wage Board stands to guarantee that the 
non-whites receive a portion of the growth of the economy.
Seen from this point of view apartheid, or separate economic, 
social, and political development, can be interpreted as far 
removed from baaskap, or complete domination by whites.
All this is not to suggest that Americans suddenly decided 
that they had been all wrong about apartheid or that they embraced it 
as an acceptable or desirable social policy. They continued to 
criticize apartheid and to call for abandonment of the oppressive 
policies of the Nationalist government. However, now they did 
acknowledge that the policy of separate development was not without 
some degree of Justification and that under it some benefits had 
been passed to the Africans. There seemed to be a basis for believing 
that the situation could be improved in South Africa from internal 
change, that catastrophe could be averted without resort to inter­
vention from the outside. In addition, the possibility of a race 
war lessened as Americans came to the realization that the expected 
revolution in South Africa would be much longer in coming than had 
been predicted.
^Donald E. Pursell, "South Africa Labor Policy: 'New Deal'
for Nonwhites?" Industrial Relations. X (February, 1971), ^8.
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Vernon McKay, himself a strong opponent of apartheid, ob­
served In 1968 that "instead of talking about change in three to five 
years, numerous opponents of apartheid nov speak of twelve to twenty- 
five y e a r s A n o t h e r  strong critic of South Africa, Joseph Lelyveld 
of the New York Times, similarly asserted that there was "no power
inside the country or on the African continent that the whites for
32the present need fear." If there were to be no revolution in South
Africa, then American withdrawal might be a futile gesture; there
would be only limited benefits to the United States in its relations
with black Africa and whatever beneficial effects there were from an
American presence would be lost. Spelling out the policy implications
of the view that there would be no revolution, William A. Hance stated:
If the evidence suggests . . . that no crisis is likely to 
occur in the foreseeable future, then the United States might, 
by a policy of unilateral economic disengagement, not only 
reduce its own ability to influence change in South Africa 
but weaken to some extent those economic forces which are 
working against certain of the stated goals of apartheid.33
The implications for policy were also brought out by Jim
Hoagland who wrote a series of Pulitzer Prize (1971) winning articles
on South Africa for the Washington Post. Hoagland suggested that the
1Vernon McKay, "Southern Africa and Its Implications for 
American Policy," in Hance, ed., Southern Africa and the United 
States, 17. McKay also called attention to the fact that as the 
realities of power have become more widely understood, numerous shifts 
in attitudes toward the white redoubt [southern Africa] have occurred, 
both inside and outside Africa." Ibid., 15-l6.
"^Joseph Lelyveld, "Where 78$ of the People are the 'Others,'" 
New York Times Magazine, June 19, 1966, p. 28.
^Hance, "The Case For and Against United States Disengagement 
from South Africa," 160.
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predictions of a successful black revolution had been dangerously 
facile, and said that the prospects for such a revolution "seemed to 
be growing dimmer with each passing year a3 the ni neteen seventies
Qlibegan. As a result, he felt that a coherent American policy on
South Africa could flow best from a decision that white power would 
survive over at least another half-century. The only other alter­
native he saw was to support revolution. This he was not prepared 
to do, so he saw the "white power option" as the only realistic 
policy. As of the date of this study, it appears that for the
present the United States has adopted a "white power option."-5
What can be drawn from this study? Hopefully it has shown 
the wide variety of views that have been taken by Americans on South 
Africa since 19^8 and how strongly these reflected the domestic con­
cerns of the individuals asserting them. Hopefully too it has shown 
something of the complexity of the issue of American policy on South 
Africa and the range of factors that might be taken into consideration 
by a policy maker; it has attempted to place these factors in a 
historical perspective. However, a study of public views on a country 
cannot show what considerations actually led to particular policy 
decisions. The reason for this is not only that each individual is
J Jim Hoagland, South Africa: Civilizations in Conflict
(Boston, 1972), 77-78.
3^Ibid., 383.
The Nixon administration apparently decided to reduce the 
criticism of South Africa to a lower level than that of the previous 
two administrations in December 1969 or January 1970. See New York 
Times. April 2, 1972, p. 1, and Natal Daily News, February 11, 1971.
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subject to differing influences but also because there is a fundamental
difference between members of the public and the makers of foreign
policy. A member of the public may express a view and his statement
will be only a few more drops in the sea of words that wash over the
United States daily. A policy maker knows that the position he takes
on an issue may influence the lives of millions and have consequences
that will be felt for generations. The responsibility of the policy
maker is much greater, and, if he takes his task seriously, he must
work diligently to get at the truth of a situation. And what is the
truth about South Africa hiding in all the conflicting views that have
been presented on South Africa in this study? The author can only
repeat what another visitor to South Africa, the novelist Allen
Drury, has said of his own book:
If it has made you as confused and uncertain as the visitor 
about a most complex and difficult situation, then the effort 
has been well-spent: because with uncertainty may come
humility, with humility understanding, with understanding 
compassion, and with compassion that patience indispensable 
if the Republic’s problems are ever to be worked out in a 
” ■ ’ ”  ^es conscience
37Allen Drury, A Very Strange Society: A Journey to the Heart
of South Africa (New York, 1968), 505.
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